New Federalism\u27s Unanswered Question:
Who Should Prosecute State and Local
Officials for Political Corruption? by Brown, George D.
Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 60 | Issue 2 Article 3
Spring 3-1-2003
New Federalism's Unanswered Question: Who
Should Prosecute State and Local Officials for
Political Corruption?
George D. Brown
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Law and Politics Commons, and the State and Local
Government Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington & Lee University School of Law
Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law Review by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University
School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
George D. Brown, New Federalism's Unanswered Question: Who Should Prosecute State and Local
Officials for Political Corruption?, 60 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 417 (2003),
https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol60/iss2/3
New Federalism's Unanswered Question:
Who Should Prosecute State and Local
Officials for Political Corruption?
George D. Brown*
Table of Contents
I. Introduction ....................................... 419
II. The Prosecutions: The Present State of Play and the Uncertain
Role of Congress ................................... 421
iiI. The New Federalism: A Constitutional (Counter)
Revolution? ....................................... 428
A. The New Federalism: A Brief Overview .............. 428
B. The New Federalism as Pronounced by the Court ....... 430
C. The New Federalism as Seen by the Academy .......... 436
IV. The New Federalism and the Prosecutions: A Fundamental
Inconsistency? ..................................... 440
A. The Pre-New Federalist Critiques ................... 440
B. The New Federalism: A Constitutional Basis
for the Critiques ................................. 444
V. Corruption, Patronage, and the Rehnquist
and Burger Courts: Support for a National Role? .......... 448
A. The State and Local Corruption Cases in the
Suprem e Court ................................. 448
B. The Patronage Cases: Stretching Both Patronage and the
First Amendment to Reach Corruption ............... 456
1. O verview .................................. 456
2. Elrod: Shocked to Find Patronage in Cook County! .. 458
* Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. A.B. 1961, Harvard University, LL.B.
1965, Harvard Law School. A grant from the Carney Fund at Boston College Law School
provided research support. Many helpful comments were received at a Boston College Law
School faculty colloquium. In addition, Professors Sara Sun Beale, Charles Baron, and Avi
Soifer read the manuscript, as did Paul Salvatoriello, Georgetown Law School class of 2001.
60 WASH. &LEE L. REV 417 (2003)
3. Branti: Refining (and Reaffirming) Elrod ......... 461
4. Rutan: Continuing and Broadening the Debate ...... 464
5. Umbehr and O'Hare: Extending Patronage Analysis
Beyond Patronage ............................ 466
a. Umbehr: Pickering Now? ................ 467
b. 0 'Hare: Melding Elrod and Pickering? ........ 468
6. The Patronage Cases and the First Amendment: A
Further Look at the Problems ................... 472
7. The Patronage Cases as an Anticorruption Statement:
A Supplemental Explanation .... ............... 475
8. When Good Government and the First Amendment
Clash: The Campaign Finance Reform Conundrum .. 479
9. The Patronage Plaintiffs as Private United States
Attorneys Combating Corruption ................ 482
VI. The National Government's Protective Role Within the
New Federalism ................................... 483
A. The Patronage Cases and the Prosecutions: Common
Values .................................. 483
B. Confidence, the Franchise, and the Goal of Neutral
Governm ent ................................... 484
C. Towards a Right to Good Government ............... 487
D. Preventing Corruption as Protecting Civil Rights ........ 489
E. The Issue of State Inability to Act as a Justification for a
National Protective Role .......................... 491
F. The Guarantee Clause: The Road Not Taken .......... 495
VII. A Tentative Reconciliation and Some Possible Scenarios ..... 497
A. A Tentative Reconciliation ........................ 497
B. Possible Scenarios .............................. 497
1. Federal Criminal Law in General: Tightening
Jurisdictional Elements ........................ 497
2. Mail (and Wire) Fraud: Revisiting Schmuck ........ 498
3. Tightening Jurisdictional Elements and the Special
Problem of the Hobbs Act ...................... 500
4. The Substance of the Hobbs Act and Mail Fraud
Violations in the Corruption Context .............. 502
5. The Federal Program Bribery Provision: Has the Court
Foreclosed a Limitation of Its Use? .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 504
6. Executive Action ............................ 510
VIII. Conclusion ....................................... 511
NEW FEDERALISM'S UNANSWERED QUESTION
L Introduction
The conviction of Providence, Rhode Island, Mayor Vincent J. "Buddy"
Cianci on federal corruption charges was a major national news story.1 The
case's notoriety may owe a lot to the NBC television series "Providence" as
well as to the theatrics of the trial, which at times exceeded those of the
television show.2 Even Time viewed the following example of the Mayor's
political philosophy as worth quoting: "The toe you stepped on yesterday
may be connected to the ass you have to kiss today."' However, much more
was involved than good courtroom theatre and colorful maxims. The Cianci
prosecution-preceded by a federal investigation colorfully entitled "Opera-
tion Plunder Dome"-is hardly unique. State and local officials from gover-
nors and mayors to police officers and sewer inspectors have faced federal
charges for corrupt activity.
The Mayor is gone, but a fundamental question about American federal-
ism remains: Is it a responsibility of the national government to ferret out and
prosecute political corruption at the state and local level? The controversy is
not new,4 but it seems increasingly important as the Supreme Court expands
the reach of its federalism decisions, sometimes applying the "new federal-
ism" with a vengeance.'
It is hard to believe that a doctrine which emphasizes state sovereignty,
imposes limits on the national government's power over the states, and
stresses the accountability of state officials to their citizens would accept as
business as usual prosecution of those same officials by that same national
1. See, e.g., Dan Barry, Providence Mayor is Guily ofCorruption, N.Y. TIMEs, June 25,
2002, at A14 (outlining the "colorful" career of Cianci and the city's reaction to the charges);
Elizabeth Mehren, Providence Mayor Is Found Corrupt, LA TIMEs, June 25, 2002, at A12
(reporting jury findings that Cianci and two codefendants ran an elaborate scheme involving
bribes in exchange for city jobs and favors).
2. See Brian C. Mooney, Club Snub: Cianci, Elite atOddsA gain, THE BOSTON OLOBE,
May 1, 2002, at BI (describing charges against Cianci that he abused his position). Particularly
colorful was the testimony over whether Cianci had retaliated against an exclusive club that
once denied him membership. Id. One witness testified that Cianci vowed to have members'
cars ticketed any time they were outside the club. Id.
3. Karen Tumulty, Can Buddy Beat the Rap?, TIME, May 20,2002, at 47.
4. E.g., Andrew T. Baxter, Federal Discretion in the Prosecution of Local Political
Corruption, 10 PEPP. L. REV. 321 (1983).
5. For example, in the Eleventh Amendment context, the Court has seriously limited
Congress's authority to abrogate state immunity using its Fourteenth Amendment power. See,
e.g., Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627
(1999) (concluding that Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act was an
invalid abrogation of State's sovereign immunity).
60 WASH. &LEE L. REV 417 (2003)
government. Yet the Supreme Court has virtually ignored the issue, and the
mountain of commentary generated by the federalism initiatives largely has
not addressed it. Perhaps the inconsistency is so obvious that the Court is
simply waiting for the right case to take a major step in curbing these prosecu-
tions.
However, a close look at the issue of dealing with state and local corrup-
tion suggests that the answers are not clear cut. A few recent Supreme Court
precedents involve such prosecutions, 6 but they offer little guidance on how
to reconcile the phenomenon with current federalism doctrine. Moreover, in
the civil context, the Burger and Rehnquist Courts have decided a series of
cases on patronage that represent an active role on the part of the national
judiciary in dealing with state and local corruption.7 One can extrapolate from
these cases support for federal corruption prosecutions. A substantial national
presence in this area may also reflect deeply held constitutional and non-
constitutional values within the legal system. Protecting civil rights is a well-
accepted national responsibility. So is guaranteeing the right to vote and
ensuring the openness, and perhaps the fairness, of subnational political and
governmental processes. How big is the step from open government to good
government? The notion of the national government as guardian of civic
virtue at all levels is not far-fetched-at times, the system seems to have come
close to acknowledging a generalized right to good government as part of the
rights that belong to every citizen in our democracy.
This Article advances the thesis that the Court is likely to take a nuanced
position on the matter when cases presenting these issues come before it,
while perhaps tilting toward the side of the new federalism. One can foresee
the Court cutting back on some instances of federal prosecution while endors-
ing the basic federal role. We are left with the phenomenon of increasingly
"autonomous" states whose officials are policed by the government from
which they are autonomous. That may seem paradoxical, but so is federalism
itself.
Part II of the Article outlines the type of prosecutions that occur most
frequently and analyzes their statutory bases. Part III briefly examines the
new federalism, both as pronounced by the Court and as seen by the academy.
Part IV focuses on why the prosecutions seem fundamentally inconsistent with
the premises of the new federalism. Part V turns to the patronage cases. It
6. See infra subpart VA (analyzing the Court's treatment of corruption cases).
7. See, e.g., Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668,675 (1996) (determining
that the First Amendment protects independent contractors from the termination of at-will
government contracts in retaliation for the exercise of their freedom of speech); Elrod v. Bums,
427 U.S. 347, 349-50 (1976) (concluding that the practice of patronage dismissals violates the
First and Fourteenth Amendments).
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analyzes them at length and concludes that they provide substantial support for
national action to deter corruption. Part VI examines other possible sources
of support for a protective role on the part of the national government. I take
as my point of departure Professor John Hart Ely's position "that it is an
appropriate function of the Court to keep the machinery of democratic govern-
ment running as it should, to make sure the channels of political participation
and communication are kept open."8 Numerous themes in the American legal
tradition are relevant to the question of guarding the guardians. States may be
unable to police certain problems adequately, especially if those involved are
investigating themselves. The national government has always shown a
special solicitude for matters such as the franchise, the functioning of the
electoral process, and the protection of civil rights. I examine these and other
themes, such as the development by the lower federal courts of the doctrine of
a citizen's intangible right to honest services,9 with a view to arriving at an
accommodation between the apparent dictates of the new federalism and the
well-established role of the national government in prosecuting corruption.
Part VII develops several scenarios in which the Court might be called upon
to deal with what I regard as one of federalism's great unanswered questions.
I. The Prosecutions: The Present State of Play and the Uncertain
Role of Congress
Prosecuting state and local corruption is an important activity of the
Department of Justice. Between 1981 and 2000, 1,704 state officials were
indicted on corruption offenses, 1,462 were convicted, and 554 were awaiting
trial at the end of 2000.10 The twenty-year totals for local officials were as
follows: 4,968 were indicted, 4,233 were convicted, and 1,735 were awaiting
trial as of the end of the year." These prosecutions are sometimes the result
of extensive investigations using all the tools of high-tech law enforcement as
well as more classic methods. "Operation Plunder Dome," involving corrup-
tion in Providence, Rhode Island, has already been mentioned. 2 Another
equally colorful title is "Operation Lost Trust."'3 This investigation stemmed
8. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRuST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REvIEW 76
(1980).
9. E.g., United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1982).
10. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE ACIITvIES AND OPERATIONS
OF THE PUBuC INTEGRIrY SECTION FOR 2000, at 36 (2000).
11. Id.
12. See id. at 30-32 (describing Operation Plunder Dome, an FBI undercover investiga-
tion of municipal corruption in Providence, and the resulting cases).
13. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE ACTIVrTIS AND OPERATIONS
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from a "narcotics sting operation against a prominent lobbyist and former state
legislator" in South Carolina. 4 The investigation centered on a bill that would
have legalized gambling on horse and dog races. 5 The former legislator
cooperated with the FBI and posed as a lobbyist for an FBI dummy corpora-
tion, offering cash during meetings which were wired and videotaped. 6 The
operation led to the indictment of twenty-eight individuals, primarily on
extortion and drug charges. 7
The phenomenon of what Judge John Noonan calls "the Larger Than
Local Champion"'" is relatively recent. Analysts agree that it achieved its
present status in the late 1960s and early 1970s as a result of three distinct
developments. The first is a broad interpretation of the Hobbs Act'9 pushed by
United States Attorneys and generally supported by the federal courts. The
Act deals with extortion. In United States v. Kenny,2" the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit took an important step toward an expansive reading
of the Hobbs Act.2' The court defined extortion broadly to reach what Judge
Noonan has described as "a new crime-local bribery affecting Interstate
Commerce."' Federal prosecutors seized upon the Act after the court broad-
ened it and made it the vehicle for "extortion convictions of an astonishing
variety of state and local officials, from a state governor ... down to a local
policeman."' One United States Attorney went so far as to describe the Hobbs
Act as "a special code of integrity for public officials." '24 Writing in 2000,
Professors Abrams and Beale state that '"he Hobbs Act now appears to be the
statute of choice in prosecutions for bribery involving state and local
officials.
25




17. See id. (detailing the "lost trust" cases stemming from the sting operation).
18. JOHN T. NOONAN JR., BRIBES 584 (1984).
19. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2000).
20. United States v. Kenny, 462 F.2d 1205 (3d Cir. 1972).
21. Id.
22. NOONAN, supra note 18, at 586.
23. Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 291 (1991) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
24. United States v. O'Grady, 742 F.2d 682, 694 (2d Cir. 1984) (en bane) (quoting letter
from Raymond J. Dearie, U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of New York, to the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit).
25. NORMANABRAMs & SARA SUN BEALE, FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ENFORCE-
MENT 195 (3d ed. 2000). The ABRAMS & BEALE casebook contains an excellent overview of
many of the problems discussed in this Article. See Id. at 262-74 (presenting "overview of
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However, a parallel development is of equal significance: the articula-
tion of the "intangible rights doctrine" under the mail (and wire) fraud
statute.26 The statute is aimed at persons who use the mails "having devised
or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining
money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations,
or promises."2 Beginning in the 1940s, the courts developed the notion that
the "scheme to defraud" prong extended to the intangible rights of citizens to
honest public services.2 As with the Hobbs Act, federal prosecutors pushed
for aggressive applications of this broad reading. Again, the 1970s saw an
expanded use of the statute in both the public and private sectors." Professors
Abrams and Beale discuss how broadly the statute could reach, as illustrated
by a case of corruption in Illinois:
The intangible rights cases substantially extended the concept of fraud.
The cases typically involved neither an express misrepresentation, nor the
loss of any money or tangible property by the victim of the scheme. The
element of deceit or misrepresentation was generally satisfied by non-
disclosure of dishonest or corrupt actions, and the loss of an intangible
right obviated the necessity to determine whether the scheme caused any
economic loss. For example, former governor Otto Kerner of Illinois was
convicted of mail fraud on the theory that his failure to disclose a sweet-
heart deal with the racing industry deprived the public of his faithful
services as an elected official? °
Indeed, one can argue that the mail fraud statute is potentially far broader
in application than the Hobbs Act. The latter uses the term "extortion," which
is contained to some degree by precedent. It has been broadened to include
bribery, which is itself a legal term of art. The concept of honest services has
no such common-law moorings, however. A frequently cited formulation
from a federal court of appeals is that it reaches schemes that "[fail] to match
the reflection of moral uprightness, of fundamental honesty, fair play and right
dealing in the general and business life of members of society.
31
federal crimes dealing with political corruption").
26. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2000) (mail fraud); id. § 1343 (wire fraud).
27. Id. § 1341.
28. See ABRAMS & BEALE, supra note 25, at 131 (describing how early, broad construc-
tion of the statute ultimately led to honest services concept).
29. See id. at 131-33 (detailing the application of the expanded definition of mail fraud
to various public officials).
30. Id at 132.
31. Blachly v. United States, 380 F.2d 665, 671 (5th Cir. 1967) (quoting Gregory v.
United States, 253 F2d 104, 190 (5th Cir. 1958)).
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The third development was the increased priority placed on prosecuting
political corruption at all levels by the Department of Justice.32 Judge Noonan
traces this phenomenon to the administration of Richard Nixon,33 although one
might view him as one of its victims. However, its most important formal
manifestation was the creation of the Department of Justice's Public Integrity
Section in 1976."4 In a sense, one can view the emphasis on state and local
corruption as a parallel to the concern with corruption at the federal level, most
obviously manifested in the creation of the Independent Counsel mechanism.35
Under the traditional analysis of federal prosecution of state and local
officials, emphasis has been on the role of the federal executive and judicial
branches, particularly the United States Attorneys and the lower federal
courts.36 This analysis suggests that Congress has not been a major player in
making state and local corruption a significant national priority. I believe that
this picture is incomplete. The most dramatic example of Congress's endorse-
ment of a strong federal role is its quick reaction to the Supreme Court deci-
sion in McNally v. United States,3" in which the Court ruled that the develop-
ment of the intangible right of honest services doctrine under the mail fraud
statute was an invalid statutory construction. Obviously, McNally was a
significant threat to the expansive role that the mail fraud statute was playing.
Congress responded quickly and decisively. The following year it enacted 18
U.S.C. § 1346,39 which provides that, for purposes of the mail and wire fraud
statutes, "the term scheme or artifice to defraud includes a scheme or artifice
32. See Baxter, supra note 4, at 321-22 (describing federal prosecutors' increased efforts
to target local political corruption in the 1970s); Paul Salvatoriello, Note, The Practical
Necessity of Federal Intervention Versus the Ideal of Federalism: An Expansive View of
Section 666 in the Prosecution of State and Local Corruption, 89 OEO. L.J. 2393,2393 (2001)
(discussing the policy of the Department of Justice, beginning in the 1970s, to prosecute public
corruption at all levels of government vigorously).
33. See NOONAN, supra note 18, at 598 (advancing several hypotheses to explain the
increased efforts to prosecute corrupt officials during the Nixon administration).
34. See Adam H. Kurland, The Guarantee Clause as a Basis for Federal Prosecutions
of State and Local Officials, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 367,379 n.26 (1989) (explaining that, since the
formation of the Public Integrity Section, public corruption at all levels has been a specific
target).
35. See, e.g., George D. Brown, Putting Watergate Behind Us-Salinas, Sun-Diamond,
and Two Views of the Anti-Corruption Model, 74 TUL. L. Rsv. 747, 804-07 (2000) (providing
a description of the independent counsel system, including the history surrounding its creation).
36. See NOONAN, supra note 18, at 584, 590 (describing centralization of power in federal
government and expanding role of federal judiciary in policing of local corruption).
37. McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987).
38. See id. at 356-59 (concluding that while mail fraud statute protects property rights,
it does not refer to intangible rights of society to good government).
39. 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2000).
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to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services."4 As one key
congressional supporter indicated, the amendment was intended to "reinstate"
pre-McNally caselaw, "including the right of the public to the honest services
of public officials."4
The 1988 amendment is a dramatic example of congressional reaction to
a judicial decision curbing the federal role. It does not stand alone, however.
In 1984, Congress enacted the federal program bribery statute.42 The problem
that the national government faced concerned acts of theft or bribery in con-
nection with federal funds disbursed to states, localities, and other entities.
Prosecutors brought bribery charges under the general federal bribery statute,
which appears to apply only to federal officials and those closely associated
with them.4' Lower courts were divided on whether the statute reached
nonfederal officials administering federal funds." To resolve these doubts,
Congress enacted a strikingly broad statute which, read literally, provides that
any official of a government or other entity receiving a threshold amount of
federal funds can be prosecuted for bribery as long as the matter with which
the bribe deals is valued at more than $5,000. As with the honest services
amendment, Congress intended to increase the power of federal prosecutors
over state and local officials.4 6
40. Geraldine Szott Moohr, Mail Fraud and the Intangible Rights Doctrine: Someone
to Watch Over Us, 31 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 153, 169-70 (1994). For a discussion of the enact-
ment of § 1346, see id. at 169-70 (outlining Congress's reinstatement of the intangible rights
doctrine) and ABRAMS & BEALE, supra note 25, at 134-35 (describing legislative response to
the abolition of the intangible rights doctrine).
41. ABRAMS & BEAL, supra note 25, at 134-35 (quoting remarks of Senator Biden).
42. 18 U.S.C. § 666 (2000); see generally Salvatoriello, supra note 32.
43. Title 18, section 201 of the United States Code covers "bribery of public officials and
witnesses." 18 U.S.C. § 201 (2003). Its definition of "public official" is as follows:
Member of Congress, Delegate, or Resident Commissioner, either before or after
such official has qualified, or an officer or employee or person acting for or on
behalf of the United States, or any department, agency, or branch of Government
thereof, including the District of Columbia, in any official function, under or by
authority of any such department, agency, or branch of Government, or a juror.
Id.
44. See Dixson v. United States, 465 U.S. 482, 505 (1984) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(asserting that there "is no consistent lower court construction of the statute as it applies to grant
recipients to bolster the Court's reading," and citing lower court cases utilizing varying
constructions).
45. See George D. Brown, Stealth Statute-Corruption, The Spending Power, and the
Rise of 18 US.C. §f 666, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 247, 272-76 (1998) (describing various
offenses that are potentially covered by 18 U.S.C. § 666 and detailing the legislative history of
the statute).
46. A dispute exists over how far Congress intended to increase this power. Compare id.
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Admittedly, the mail fraud and federal program bribery statutes are clear
examples of this approach. The more fundamental question is whether the
basic array of other federal statutes utilized in state and local corruption cases
shows the same attitude toward the problem. The general view is that they do
not. Rather, the standard description of these statutes is that they are aimed at
criminal activity in general, and that federal prosecutors are forced to shoehorn
acts of corruption under them.4' As one recent defense of the federal role puts
it, because "Congress has considered, but never enacted, a general federal
statute focused specifically on state and local corruption, federal prosecutors
have resorted to charging state and local officials under an array of statutes that
were not initially intendedto target such corruption."48 However, this analysis
is open to question. Indeed, one can offer a totally different interpretation of
the statutory scheme, under which the federal prosecutor's problem is not
finding a statute available for acts of state and local corruption, but rather
choosing the one that fits best, bearing in mind the need to meet the relevant
jurisdictional predicate. Consider the Hobbs Act: it punishes, in part, extor-
tion that "obstructs, delays, or affects commerce." '49 Extortion is defined as
'the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful
use of actual or threatened force,. violence, or fear, or under color of official
right."5 The italicized language seems clearly aimed at acts of corruption.
Thus, the prosecutor's main problem might be the effect on commerce.
Another important statute in the federal anticorruption arsenal is the
Travel Act.5" It punishes persons who travel in interstate commerce or use its
facilities in order to commit certain acts that constitute or facilitate what the
statute terms "unlawful activity. ''52 Unlawful activity, as defined, includes a
number of crimes such as "extortion, bribery, or arson in violation of the laws
of the State in which committed or of the United States. 5 Federal prosecutors
use the Travel Act frequently in corruption cases. Such use is hardly surpris-
ing given the fact that the Act's references to extortion and bribery present a
clear statutory basis for pursuing the sorts of crimes involved in these cases.
at 276-81 (arguing for narrow reading of legislative history) with Salvatoriello, supra note 32,
at 2396-2403 (arguing for broad reading of legislative history).
47. See Kurland, supra note 34, at 381 (noting that "none of the statutes was originally.
drafted specifically to combat official corruption"). See generally ABRAMS & BEALE, supra note
25, at 262-63.
48. Salvatoriello, supra note 32, at 2393.
49. 18 U.S.C. § 195 1(a) (2000).
50. Id. § 195 1(bX2) (emphasis added).
51. Id. § 1952.
52. Id.
53. Id. § 1952(b).
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A commentator has stated that "since the Travel Act was not drafted with
official corruption in mind, its effectiveness in prosecuting official local
corruption is necessarily limited."' However, the plain language is not
limiting in terms of its application to corrupt acts. If one considers only the
four statutes just discussed, the substantive references to corrupt conduct are
clear.
The complex federal statute known as RICO (Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act)"5 is also widely used in corruption cases. 6 Here,
there is initial force to the argument that the statutory language does not
directly refer to corruption, although the title does. However, the Supreme
Court, with ample support from legislative history, has consistently held that
courts should construe RICO broadly, extending beyond any core notion of
activities that are solely the province of organized crime. 7 Because the
language applies to a wide range of economic crimes, there seems no reason
to believe that it should not embrace corruption. Indeed, much of the RICO
offense depends upon the commission of a number of so-called "predicate
crimes," which include the Hobbs Act, the mail fraud statute, and the Travel
Act.' The organizational component of the RICO offense clearly can be
triggered by commission of the predicate crimes in the context of political
corruption.
In sun, I think that a strong case can be made that the prosecutorial
developments which began in the 1970s are solidly grounded in federal
statutes, as well as supported by both the executive and judicial branches.
This phenomenon is consistent with the contemporaneous growth of federal
criminal law in general, as well as notions of constitutional federalism embod-
ied in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority.59 The basic
premise in both contexts is that few, if any, federalism-based limits exist on
the power of the national government. This premise would certainly extend
to prosecuting state and local corruption. However, beginning in the 1970s,
a group of critics began to invoke federalism to question sharply the practices
54. Kurland, supra note 34, at 386.
55. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (2000).
56. See ABRAMS & BEALE, supra note 25, at 456 (stating that "courts have uniformly
upheld treating government agencies as enterprises under RICO"). The previous version of the
casebook contains an extensive list of state and local agencies that have been treated as
"enterprises" for RICO purposes. See NoRMAN ABRAMS & SARA SUN BEALE, FEDERAL
CRimiNAL LAW AND ITS ENFORCEMENT 475-76 (2d ed. 1993) (listing numerous state and local
agencies treated as "enterprises" for RICO purposes).
57. E.g., United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981).
58. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (2000) (listing various forms of "racketeering activity," the
commission of which is a predicate to the applicability of RICO).
59. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
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that all three branches of the national government seemed to endorse. In the
last decade, that critique may have gone beyond policy considerations to find
support in basic tenets of constitutional doctrine.
X. The New Federalism: A Constitutional (Counter) Revolution?
A. The New Federalism: A Brief Overview
"New Federalism" is not a new idea. President Richard Nixon referred
to it frequently in articulating his plans for devolving to the states substantial
authority in the administration of federal grant programs.' During the 1970s,
the Supreme Court articulated a form of "judicial new federalism" emphasiz-
ing, in cases such as Younger v. Harris,6' the respect due to state courts and
the need to fashion federal jurisdictional doctrines accordingly. 2 However,
in current discourse, the term refers to efforts by a majority of the Supreme
Court to emphasize concepts of dual federalism and the separate legal status
of the constituent states within the American republic, as well as the effects
of this doctrinal shift on national power.
This development's most important origin is the decision of the Burger
Court in National League of Cities v. Usery.'3 In that case, the majority
attempted to articulate and utilize federalism-based limits on national power
to invalidate an otherwise valid exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause
authority to regulate wages and hours of state and local employees. The Court
articulated such concepts as regulating the "states as states," 6 "attributes of
state sovereignty, ' 6' and "areas of traditional governmental functions"' as
benchmarks for any such limitations. Nine years later, however, Garcia v.
San Antonio Metropolitan Transit AuthorioP overruled National League of
Cities. Garcia essentially rejected the notion of judicially enforceable limits
on the Commerce Clause and, adopting a view first propounded by Professor
60. See generally RICHARD P. NATHAN, THE PLOT THAT FAILED: NIXON AND THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PRESIDENCY 16-26 (1975); see also Daniel J. Elazar, Reagan's New Federal-
ism and American Federal Democracy (1982) (unpublished manuscript prepared for American
Enterprise Institute) (on file with the author).
61. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
62. See generally Louise Weinberg, The New JudicialFederalism, 29 STAN. L. REV. 1191
(1977).
63. Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
64. Id. at 845.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 852.
67. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 528.
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Herbert Wechsler," stated that the principal protection for the states' role in
the constitutional system was to be found in the congressional legislative
process rather than through judicial review.69 Garcia was certainly a setback
for the new federalism, but because both it and National League of Cities were
five-to-four decisions, the issue was far from closed.
Indeed, a federalist majority emerged to give the states some protection
through statutory construction andthe rule of "clear statement" six years after
Garcia in Gregory v. Ashcrofl.0 The utilization of statutory construction to
further state autonomy can be viewed as a step toward re-establishing it as a
constitutional construct. The technique permits the conservative Justices to
find in favor of the states on nonconstitutional grounds while suggesting that
a constitutional background that compels this approach to the statute in
question exists. An important next step was the partial restoration of immu-
nity from federal regulation through the "anticommandeering" principle
articulated in New York v. United States71 and Printz v. United States.72 Those
cases stand for the proposition that, even within its enumerated powers,
Congress cannot impose duties on state legislative and executive branches.
As for the basic existence of federal power, United States v. LopezP and
United States v. Morrison4 held, for the first time since the early New Deal,
that regulatory exercises of congressional power under the Commerce Clause
were invalid. Although neither involved classic economic regulation of the
New Deal variety, the symbolic importance of a brake on congressional power
was great.
Another controversial area was the question of state immunity from
citizen suits in federal courts on federal statutory claims. Relying heavily on
notions of state sovereignty, the Court treated this immunity as a major
attribute of the states' role in the federal system in cases such as Seminole
Tribe of Florida v. Florida" and College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Education Expense Board."' Much ofthe debate in these cases
68. Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in
the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 543, 543-60
(1954).
69. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Trans. Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 537-56 (1985).
70. Gregory v. Ashcro, 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
71. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
72. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
73. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
74. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
75. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
76. Coll. Say. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666
(1999).
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was a rehash of the debate over whether the Eleventh Amendment furnishes
a constitutional basis for state immunity from such suits. The issue had
periodically divided federalistic and nationalistic judges for a number of
years." The cases brought to the forefront the question of Congress's power
to abrogate whatever immunity states might enjoy. In Seminole, the majority
overruled an earlier holding that Congress could do so under its Article I
powers."8 The same majority later took a dim view of notions of waiver. 9
Thus, for Congress to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity, it
would have to act under the powers granted by Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Court had previously recognized that Congress had this
power, relying in part on the notion that the Fourteenth Amendment brought
about a substantial change in the underlying nature of federal-state relations. '
Thus, the Eleventh Amendment battleground shifted to Fourteenth Amend-
ment abrogation at the same time as the Court was re-examining the broader
issue of Congress's authority under Section 5."I The net result was a series of
Eleventh Amendment decisions fortifying limits that the Court seemed already
prepared to place on Congress's exercise of this non-Article I power over
states.
As this brief synopsis indicates, the new federalism cases cover a sub-
stantial range of ground and articulate a number of doctrines and concepts
that, taken together, can substantially recast the nature of American federal-
ism. Rather than analyze them further, I will let the Court speak for itself.
The following discussion of key decisions gives the reader a sense not only
of substance but also of rhetoric and symbolism in an area in which these two
qualities have taken on substantial importance.
B. The New Federalism as Pronounced by the Court
Several major themes emerge from the cases decided over the last eleven
years, beginning with Gregory v. Ashcroft. 2 The first is that the courts can
77. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Union Oas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 5-23 (1989) (upholding federal
legislation giving individuals a federal cause of action against states for environmental harms),
overruled by Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
78. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 63-74 (overruling Union Gas).
79. See Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. at 666 (affirming dismissal of trademark claim against
state education board on sovereign immunity grounds).
80. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 447-56 (1976) (upholding the 1972 amend-
ments to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which allow federal courts to award money damages to
an individual succeeding in a suit against a state).
81. See City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 518-19 (1997) (limiting congressional
authority under U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5).
82. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
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enforce limits on the national government and that these limits are based in
federalism. This is an exceedingly important doctrinal development, given the
basic premise of Garcia that such limits were unnecessary and unworkable.
In Lopez, Justice Kennedy concurred in part to emphasize the importance of
the Court's willingness to find and enforce limits. 3 He noted the argument
that issues of federal and state power should be left to the national political
process, 4 but concluded that "the absence of structural mechanisms to require
[national political] officials to undertake this principled task, and the momen-
tary political convenience often attendant upon their failure to do so, argue
against a complete renunciation of the judicial role."85 For Justice Kennedy,
"the federal balance is too essential a part of our constitutional structure and
plays too vital a role in securing freedom for us to admit inability to intervene
when one or the other level of Government has tipped the scales too far." 6
Both Justice Kennedy and Chief Justice Rehnquist acknowledged that a
judicial role in preserving federalism limits on Commerce Clause authority
would lead to "legal uncertainty""7 in some cases. They considered this an
inevitable consequence of constitutional adjudication in this area, and each
citedMarbury v. Madison8 for a recognition of the Court as the branch whose
duty it is to declare "what the law is." 9 As Justice Kennedy put it, "we are
often called upon to resolve questions of constitutional law not susceptible to
the mechanical application of bright and clear lines."'  Thus, an important
component of the new federalism is the commitment to treat federalism-based
constitutional adjudication as seriously as, for example, issues of individual
rights.
A second important theme is that there is something for the Court to
enforce. Limits on the power of the national government exist. This, of
course, is the message of Lopez and Morrison, both of which found internal
limits on the reach of the Commerce Clause.91 The two cases struck down
legislation dealing with guns within school zones" and civil remedies for
83. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 574-581 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(noting that while courts have struggled to define the limits of Congress's commerce power,
education and police powers fall within the domain of the states).
84. Id. at 577 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
85. Id. at 578 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
86. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
87. Id. at 566.
88. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
89. Id. at 177.
90. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 579 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
91. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598,608 (2000); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557.
92. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551.
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gender-based violence.93 Chief Justice Rehnquist began the analysis of his
Lopez opinion with the following observation: "We start with first principles.
The Constitution creates a Federal Government of enumerated powers. See
Art. 1, 8. As James Madison wrote: 'The powers delegated by the proposed
Constitution to the federal government are few and defined. Those which are
to remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite."' 94 Particu-
larly troubling to the majority in both Lopez and Morrison was the possible
connection of virtually any activity to commerce, thus permitting the national
government to regulate all aspects of American life through that power.95
The majority has also found external, federalism-based limits on national
power. The best example is Justice O'Connor's majority opinion in New York
v. United States.'. She viewed the constitutional structure as one which
provides Congress with a certain amount of authority over individuals but not
over states.' She quoted The Federalist Papers for the following proposition:
"[A] sovereignty over sovereigns, a government over governments, a legisla-
tion for communities, as contradistinguished from individuals, as it is a
solecism in theory, so in practice it is subversive of the order and ends of civil
polity.... "" Her opinion reasoned that an effort to commandeer the state
governments would run directly counter to this basic structural premise."
New York involved what the majority saw as an effort to commandeer the state
legislature.1te In Printz v. United States, the majority extended this princi-
ple to national efforts to commandeer the state executive branch for the
administration of a federal program."°2
Explicit in these analyses of the constitutional structure is a concept of
divided sovereignty in which the states retain a substantial amount of power.
Lopez enforces this notion by its emphasis on the Federalist concept of "nu-
93. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617-18.
94. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552 (quoting THE FEDERAUST NO. 45, at 292 (James Madison)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
95. See, e.g., id. at 564-67 (noting that, under the dissent's view, even child rearing might
fall under Congress's Commerce Clause powers).
96. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
97. Id. at 181.
98. Id. at 180 (quoting THE FEDERALST No. 20, at 138 (Alexander Hamilton & James
Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
99. See id. at 181-83 (noting that a state's consent cannot enlarge the powers of Congress
beyond constitutional boundaries).
100. See id. at 174-75 (noting that "take title" provision of Low-Level Radioactive Waste
Policy Act "crossed the line distinguishing encouragement from coercion").
101. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
102. Id. at 902-35.
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merous and indefinite" powers in the state governments. What Justice Ken-
nedy saw as a threat in the Gun Free School Zone Act was a danger that the
statute "upsets the federal balance to a degree that renders it an unconstitu-
tional assertion of the commerce power. ' He also saw the statute as seeking
"to intrude upon an area of traditional state concern.""° Obviously, concepts
like the latter, which played a prominent role in National League of Cities,
have undergone a substantial resurrection.
When they exercise their considerable array of powers, the states func-
tion as political entities. One of the themes of the new federalism cases has
been the importance of preventing federal actions that blur the lines of ac-
countability within these entities. In Lopez, Justice Kennedy enunciated a
means of keeping the lines of accountability clear: preventing the federal
government from taking over "entire areas of traditional state concern. '' 05 In
New York, Justice O'Connor emphasized the importance of having a state's
citizens know whether their elected officials were attempting to follow the will
of the voters or applying a policy imposed from above. Thus, "the residents
of the State retain the ultimate decision as to whether or not the State will
comply. "' InPrintz, which involved administration of a gun control program,
Justice Scalia pointed to the opportunities for officials at one level to take
credit for "solving" a problem while constituents at another level must pay
higher taxes."1 7 The Court's emphasis on accountability includes fiscal as well
as policy choices. This emphasis has constituted an important theme in
Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence, questioning the desirability of federal
instrumentalities imposing large fiscal burdens on states when their citizens
might choose to expend the funds elsewhere." 8
Indeed, the Court has gone beyond treating states as political entities to
the point of referring to them repeatedly as sovereigns. Gregory represents an
important step: "Through the structure of its government, and the character'of
those who exercise government authority, a State defines itself as a
sovereign."" New York referred to "the sovereignty reserved to the States by
the Tenth Amendment," ' ° and asserted that "[s]tate sovereignty is not just an
end in itself,""' noting the importance of federalism as a means of protecting
103. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 580 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
104. ld. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
105. Id. at 577 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
106. Iew York v. United States, 505 U.S 144,168 (1992).
107. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898,929-30 (1997).
108. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706,8751-52 (1999).
109. Aregory v. Ashcrof , 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991).
110. New York, 505 Ur.S at 174, 177.
111. Id. at 181.
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individual liberties.' 12 In Printz, Justice Scalia returned to the theme, viewing
it as "an essential attribute of the States' retained sovereignty that they remain
independent and autonomous within their proper sphere of authority."' This
emphasis on the status of states appears to reach its full development in the
Eleventh Amendment cases. In Seminole Tribe of Florida, Justice Rehnquist
stated as a fundamental premise of Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence 'that
each State is a sovereign entity in our federal system.""' 4 College Savings
Bank takes the point one step further by treating the state's sovereign immunity
as a "constitutional right."'"
In Alden v. Maine,"6 Chief Justice Rehnquist trotted out a familiar
metaphor to describe the place of states within our federal system:
When Congress legislates in matters affecting the States, it may not treat
these sovereign entities as mere prefectures or corporations. Congress
must accord States the esteem due to them as joint participants in a federal
system, one beginning with the premise of sovereignty in both the central
Government and the separate states.'
The reference to "esteem," which apparently follows from their sovereign
status, is an example of the current majority's emphasis on showing "respect"
for states. The Court's most recent statement on the subject highlights this
dimension of dual federalism: "While state sovereign immunity serves the
important function of shielding state treasuries and thus preserving the States'
ability to govern in accordance with the will of their citizens... the doctrine's
central purpose is to accord the states the respect owed them as joint sover-
eigns.""1
8
The Justices supporting these various new federalism initiatives take
care to tie them to broader questions of the purposes of federalism. An
obvious example is the role of states as "laboratories," invoked by Justice
Kennedy in his Lopez concurrence." 9 However, the central theme is the
Framers' intentional division of governmental power into two distinct, inde-
112. Id.
113. Printz, 521 U.S. at 928.
114. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996).
115. Coll. Say. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 684
(1999).
116. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
117. Id. at758.
118. Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 765 (2002) (quoting
Alden, 527 U.S. at 750-51; Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf and Eddy, Inc.,
506 U.S. 139,146 (1993)).
119. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 581 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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pendent spheres, each with the ability to compete with the other, thereby
preventing tyranny and enhancing the liberty of citizens. Far from a potential
ifringement on individual rights, federalism is presented as a central means
of achieving them. The following statement from Justice Scalia's opinion in
Printz, with its reference both to The Federalist Papers and Justice Kennedy's
oft-cited concurring opinion in US. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton,1 20 summa-
rizes these themes well:
The Framers rejected the concept of a central government that would act
upon and through the States, and instead designed a system in which the
State and Federal Governments would exercise concurrent authority over
the people .... The great innovation of this design was that our citizens
would have two political capacities, one state and one federal, each
protected from incursion by the other-a legal system unprecedented in
form and design, establishing two orders of government, each with its
own direct relationship, its own privity, its own set of mutual rights and
obligations to the people who sustain it and are governed by it. The
Constitution thus contemplates that a State's government will represent
and remain accountable to its own citizens.' 2'
If all of this sounds too good to be true, perhaps it is. Each of the opin-
ions quoted above provoked one or more strong dissents by "liberal" members
of the Court. 2 The critiques of the majority in these opinions are wide
ranging, including incorrect history, improper methodology, and insufficient
respect for the role of Congress. I" The dissents of Justices Souter and Breyer
in Morrison are particularly relevant. For the former, the Court is attempting
in vain to restore "the Federalism of some earlier time,"'2 4 a goal that cannot
be achieved through constitutional interpretation. Justice Breyer appears to
take the analysis one step firther, suggesting that federalism itself is not only
irrelevant but also has all but disappeared: "We live in a Nation knit together
by two centuries of scientific, technological, commercial, and environmental
change."' Justice Breyer was arguing the futility of imposing boundaries
through the Commerce Clause, particularly because it touches upon a subject
120. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring).
121. Printzv. United States, 521 U.S. 898,919-20 (1997) (quoting T1HEFEDMLUT No.
15 (Alexander Hamilton); United States Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995))
(internal punctuation altered).
122. E.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 655 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting);
Prinz, 521 U.S. at 939-75 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
123. Printz, 521 U.S. at 919-20.
124. Morrison, 529 U.S at 655 (Souter, J., dissenting).
125. Id. at 660 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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which highlights the interdependence of contemporary society.126 However,
his observations suggest that the entire new federalism project is doomed to
failure because its fundamental core-separate and independent states-no
longer retains validity. 27 Perhaps the majority is, in fact, tilting at windmills.
Still, it seems to have knocked quite a few of them down. The new federalism
cases have had a definite theoretical impact on the relationship between the
two governments. In the remaining Parts of this Article, I will apply new
federalism precepts to the highly visible practice of federal prosecution of state
and local officials for political corruption."2 Before turning to that subject,
however, I wish to examine briefly the voluminous academic commentary that
the cases discussed above have generated.
C. The New Federalism as Seen by the Academy
As the saying goes, many trees have been felled to support articles
analyzing what the Court has done over the last decade to redefine American
federalism. The commentaries run the gamut of perspectives, from viewing
the decisions as "revolutionary"'129 to taking the position that the new federal-
ism is not a major change, but should be seen as more of a tinkering with the
status quo, which remains basically intact. 3 ' Needless to say, much of the
analysis is highly critical. For example, in an article partially entitled The
Hypocrisy ofAlden v. Maine,' Professor Chemerinsky asserts that the Court
has rendered to the states power over the individual analogous to that enjoyed
by the Soviet Government under the Stalin-era Constitution.3 2 None of the
major articles appears to address the issue of federal prosecutions of state and
local officials for political corruption. I find this a surprising omission.
Nonetheless, some analyses are particularly helpful in addressing the issues
of states as polities and the ability of the national government to reach the
manner in which those polities interact with their citizens.
126. See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that, in modem times, all activities affect
interstate commerce).
127. Id.
128. Infra Parts IV-VII.
129. Steven Calabresi, Federalism and the Rehnquist Court: A Normative Defense, 574
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 24,25 (2001).
130. See Michael Dorf, No Federalists Here: Anti-Federalism and Nationalism on the
Rehnquist Court, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 741,741 (2000) (arguing that the Supreme Court decisions
in the last decade do not fundamentally threaten federal power).
131. See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, The Hypocrisy of Alden v. Maine: Judicial
Review, Sovereign Immunity and the Rehnquist Court, 33 LoY. LA. L. REv. 1283 (2000).
132. Id. at 1308.
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Professor Daniel Farber notes the Court's "reverential language' 33
toward the states that I have referred to above in connection with the concept
of sovereignty. He views a principal goal of the new federalism as establish-
ing the position of the states as republics.'34 Within their allotted sphere, these
republics will function as co-sovereigns with the national government.
Professor John 0. McGinnis has elaborated on the division of responsibility
and the role of the states (and localities) in a "certain sphere of non-economic
matters, such as criminal law and human rights. '3- The national government
remains supreme in economic matters, perhaps reflecting the view that when
the national government regulates "activities having spillover effects among
the states," it furthers efficiency. 36 Outside of this realm, Professor McGinnis
posits a model in which the states compete with each other and encourage
active citizen participation in making the relevant policy decisions. 37 "Thus,
the Court is responding to the danger of mass apathy and interest group
politics by making state citizens more responsible arbitrators of their own
affairs. 03
8
These latter analyses of the status of states within the new federalism are
similar to Professor Deborah Merritt's earlier hypothesis of a developing
"autonomy model" of federalism. 39 However, the defenders are usually quick
to point out that the states do not get carte blanche. Not only does Congress
remain supreme in regulating the national economy, but also the dormant
Commerce Clause shows that the Court can utilize the Constitution to mount
strong limits on state authority in order to further the national interest.14 As
Professor Farber asserts, 'he Court views the federal system as one where
federal law is paramount within its sphere, but with implementation mecha-
nisms that are tempered by an appreciation for the state role in the system.'
' 41
133. Daniel Farber, Pledging a New Allegiance: An Essay on Sovereignty and the New
Federalism,75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1133,1135 (2000).
134. Id. at 1134.
135. John 0. McGinnis,RevivingTocqueville 'sAmerica: The Rehnquist Court'sJurispru-
dence of Social Discovery, 90 CAL. L. REV. 485, 519 (2002).
136. Id. at 516.
137. See id. at 521 (concluding that reserving power to the states may encourage political
participation).
138. Id.
139. Deborah Jones Merritt, Three Faces of Federalism: Finding a Formula for the
Future, 47 VAND. L. REv. 1563, 1570-73 (1994).
140. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The "Conservative" Paths of the Rehnquist Court's
Federalism Decisions, 69 U. CHL L. REv. 429, 460-62 (2002) (illustrating how the dormant
Commerce Clause doctrine can limit state authority).
141. Farber, supra note 133, at 1139.
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Even Professor Steven Calabresi, who had described the recent decisions as
"revolutionary, 1 42 views current doctrine as essentially "a mild corrective to
a half-century of steady and sometimes ill-considered expansions of national
power." 43 Thus, one might analyze Lopez not as an attempt to roll back the
Commerce power, but rather as an attempt to prevent it from becoming all
embracing.' 44 This is certainly what Chief Justice Rehnquist said he was
doing, both in terms of utilizing existing precedent and expressing disagree-
ment with nationalist logic that knows no stopping point.1
45
The commentators have devoted considerable attention to the manner in
which the new federalism might affect the national government's ability to
reach the manner in which its co-sovereign states treat their citizens. The
driving force here is concern over preserving the federal government's historic
role as protector of civil rights. For example, Professor Calvin Massey asserts
that there will be no effect on this role, particularly on enforcement by the
Court.
146 The position of Professor McGinnis on this matter is particularly
interesting. He includes human rights as an area in which the states have room
for some experimentation, but stresses the guarantee of a core of constitu-
tional rights through Fourteenth Amendment doctrine.' 47 Indeed, he goes
beyond federal enforcement: "The national government can enforce a thresh-
old level of enforcement by authorizing actions against state officials for
enforcement failures.' 48 This backstop role might cover not only failure to
enforce nationally guaranteed rights, but could conceivably extend to those
created by the states themselves.
Most analysts appear to be discussing civil rights within a relatively
traditional framework. They are sharply at odds, and not all of them share
Professor Massey's optimism. Professor Michael Crusto contends that the
danger of the new federalism is that it may strengthen state majorities to the
point at which they can substantially oppress minority and civil rights. 49
142. Calabresi, supra note 129, at 25.
143. Id. at33-34.
144. See McGinnis, supra note 135, at 516-19 (contending that the "contours and coher-
ence" of the Court's federalism revival are unclear).
145. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 554-55 (1995).
146. See Calvin Massey, Federalism and the Rehnquist Court, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 431,437
(2002) (emphasizing "a judicial claim of primacy in interpreting the nature and scope of
individual liberties"); id. at 439-40 ("Federalism has no place with respect to individual rights
secured by the Constitution.").
147. McGinnis, supra note 135, at 519 (noting that the Court has guaranteed a core of
human rights through the Fourteenth Amendment).
148. Id. at 521.
149. See Mitchell F. Cnzsto, The Supreme Court's "New" Federalism: An Anti-Rights
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Echoes of Madison's concern about diluting the tyranny of factions in the
larger nation are part of the analysis. Professor Crusto views the current
decisions as part of the Court's general anti-rights agenda which could lead
to a pre-Brown constitutional stance. 50 Like other commentators, Professor
Rebecca Zeitlow notes the apparent paradox of a deferential approach to the
congressional spending power within an overall federalistic doctrine intended
to limit Congress's ability to regulate states.' She sees the continuation of
spending power doctrine as crucial to the maintenance of a strong national
role in protecting civil rights, especially if federal power under Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment is contracted. 2 Other analysts suggest that the
civil rights area will remain an important realm of national authority. Profes-
sor Fallon stresses the Court's respect for precedent and its desire to avoid the
embarrassment caused by its resistance to the New Deal." Professor Farber
sees defending constitutional rights from either level of government as part of
the current Court's vision.1
5 4
Clearly, for most analysts, the new federalism decisions represent an
important development, although they disagree on its content, significance,
and validity. Let us assume, nonetheless, something close to a consensus that
the states, under emerging doctrine, will play a more meaningfil role, some-
what as equals with the national government. The economic authority of the
latter is not disputed. What is in question is the national government's role
in overseeing the manner in which states protect their citizens. The commen-
tators have focused on civil rights. Prosecuting state and local officials for
corrupt government acts may seem far removed from this arena, but there are
a striking number of similarities. For example, the prosecutions represent a
national intervention to correct mistakes by government officers that have hurt
citizens, at least indirectly. Civil rights and "good government" might both be
part of a national protective role. Can one reconcile the prosecutions with the
new federalism? The next Part develops the hypothesis that one cannot and
that the two phenomena are fundamentally at odds.
Agenda?, 16 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 517, 520 (2000) (asserting that the Court's new pro-state
government orientation may threaten civil rights).
150. Id. at 533.
151. Rebecca E. Zeitlow, Federalism's Paradox: The Spending Power and Waiver of
Sovereign Immunity, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 141, 189-90 (2002).
152. Id. at 192.
153. See Fallon, supra note 140, at 475-76 (arguing that the Court in Lopez was cautious
not to overreach in its ruling).
154. Farber, supra note 133, at 1134.
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IV The New Federalism and the Prosecutions:
A Fundamental Inconsistency?
A. The Pre-New Federalist Critiques
As early as the 1970s, observers of the criminal justice system began to
question the expanding prosecutions of state and local officials.'55 To some
extent, any such critiques might be viewed as part of the general debate over
the existence and scope of federal criminal law-a debate that remains intense
today. 56 The early federalism-based criticisms ofthe corruption prosecutions
are important in and of themselves and form an important backdrop for a new
federalism-based critique. One of the first articles to deal with these issues
was the late Charles Ruff's examination entitled Federal Prosecution of Local
Corruption: A Case Study in the Making of Law Enforcement Policy."7
Professor Ruff used the expanding interpretations of the Hobbs Act as a point
of departure to examine the general phenomenon of corruption prosecutions.158
He devoted much of his analysis to the rapid growth of this body of law and the
role of individual federal prosecutors in both guiding and utilizing it."59
However, he also placed some emphasis on the federalism problems that the
prosecutions created." For example, he stated the following:
[G]ranting that it is detrimental to the interests of the citizens of a state for
their elected or appointed officials to breach the trust reposed in them,
these interests would be served better by effective state enforcement than
by reliance on the federal government for remedial action. 61
He also quoted extensively from the oft-cited case from the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, United States v. Craig,62 in which the court
invoked "the federal nature of the American system of government"1 63 to call
attention to the potential dangers of federal prosecution of state legislators. In
the view of the Seventh Circuit, while the United States Attorneys may prose-
cute local officials who violate federal law, "the primary responsibility for
155. E.g., Ralph E. Loomis, Comment, Federal Prosecution of Elected State Officials for
Mail Fraud: Creative Prosecution or an Affront to Federalism?, 28 AM. U. L. REV. 63 (1978).
156. See generally ABRAMS & BEALE, supra note 25, at 64-72.
157. Charles Ruff, FederalProsecution of Local Corruption: A Case Study in the Making
of Law Enforcement Policy, 65 GEO. L.J. 1171 (1977).
158. Id. at 1174-93.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 1216, 1223-25.
161. Id. at 1214.
162. United States v. Craig, 528 F.2d 773 (7th Cir. 1976).
163. Id. at778.
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ferreting out their political corruption must rest, until Congress directs other-
wise, with the State, the political unit most directly involved.'
The year after the Ruff article, a student note, using the growing number
of mail fraud prosecutions as a point of departure, asked whether such actions
by the federal government constituted Creative Prosecution or an Affront to
Federalism?6 ' The author recognized the relationship between the corruption
prosecutions and the broader issues triggered by the debate over federal
criminal law." He articulated the concept of "a special state interest" that
might be present beyond the state's "traditional role of administering criminal
justice" as a deterrent to federal action.167 In his view, corruption prosecutions
represented a clear example:
The policing of a state government's own political system would seem to
be such a special state interest. The duty owed the state and its citizens by
an elected official is fiduciary in nature, a special duty of honest and
faithful service. Insuring the performance of this duty is best left to its
beneficiaries-the people and government of the state. Indiscriminate
intervention by the federal government may dampen not only internal state
efforts at reform, but also the special rapport necessary between an elected
representative and his constituency. Elected state officials increasingly
may gauge their activities by the federal standard rather than that imposed
by their constituents. The people, moreover, may rely increasingly on the
federal prosecutor to turn the rascals out."6
Like other analysts, the author focused on the dramatically expanded and
highly visible role of the federal prosecutor, citing well-publicized corruption
cases that had increased the stature of prosecutors such as United States
Attorney James Thompson in Chicago.'69 "The dangers of this activist ap-
proach are twofold: It legitimatizes the United States Attorney as a political
actor, and advocates a broad unchecked use of discretion.'
70
Five years later, Andrew Baxter authored a comprehensive study of
Federal Discretion in the Prosecution of Local Political Corruption.1  He
began by arguing that the statutory interpretation developments discussed
earlier in this Article'72 stretched the federal laws far beyond their original
164. Id. at 779.
165. See Loomis, supra note 155, at 63 (examining expanding federal prosecution powers).
166. See generally id.
167. Id. at 73.
168. Id. at 73-74.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 78-79.
171. Baxter, supra note 4.
172. Supra Part 11.
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intent." 3 He saw both a danger to the federal-state balance in criminal law and
a dramatic increase in the discretion and power of individual federal prosecu-
tors.'74 He posited a general "state interest in law enforcement autonomy"
which seems "especially compelling in the context of local political corrup-
tion."'"5 He dealt with the problem of states' inability to prosecute their own
officials some of the time." 6 He admitted the possibility, noting that it could
hinder the enforcement of both state and federal law, but argued that federal
prosecutors are too quick to find state or local lack of capacity.' He argued
for action at all levels of the federal government to limit prosecutorial discre-
tion.
178
A pair of important articles in the early 1990s continued the pre-new
federalism critique in the context of both the mail fraud statute and Congress's
endorsement of its exponential growth in overturning McNally. Professor,
later Dean, Gregory Howard Williams analyzed Good Government by Prose-
cutorial Decree.179 He first discussed the problem of prosecutorial discretion
in administering a broadly drafted statute."" Turning to issues of federalism,
he expressed a certain ambivalence based on his perception of the need for the
national government to play something of a backstop role."" Williams thought
any debate over federal intervention should include:
[C]onsideration of the state's interest in controlling its own political
forums. States should have the opportunity to act against local corruption
and legitimate themselves before the federal government intercedes. This
does not mean there is not an appropriate federal role in controlling cor-
ruption nationwide, but states' efforts to police public corruption should
be recognized and encouraged. In fact, many states have grappled with
thorny questions surrounding bribery and corruption.
8 2
173. See Baxter, supra note 4, at 322-23, 330-33 (arguing that federal prosecutors
stretched the Hobbs Act, the mail fraud statute, the Travel Act, and RICO beyond what the
legislature had intended).
174. See id. at 323 (contending that "federal prosecutors have enjoyed broad discretion in
developing and implementing, unilaterally, federal law enforcement policy").
175. Id. at 337.
176. Id. at 340.
177. Id.
178. See id. at 345-76 (offering ways to narrow federal prosecutorial discretion).
179. See generally Oregory Howard Williams, Good Government byProsecutoialDecree:
The Use andAbuse ofMailFraud, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 137 (1990).
180. See id. at 143-44 (noting that federal prosecutors investigated a very low number of
mail fraud complaints).
181. See id. at 155-56 (contending that the federal government should have some limited
role in combating fraud).
182. Id. at 156-57.
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Williams thus questioned the assumption that states cannot or will not deal
with the problem and advocated a federal prosecutorial role that keeps state
concerns in the forefront. He predicted an increasing debate about the national
role in "establishing ethical standards for the states" and insisted that in any
such debate 'there is a special need to respect governmental boundaries and
limit the intrusiveness of the federal government into state matters." ' For
Williams, as for the other critics, the fact that corruption was involved was an
argument for less federal involvement.
More recently, Professor Geraldine Szott Moohr offered a particularly
trenchant analysis of the same statute, entitled in part Someone to Watch Over
Us." 4 She discussed issues of drafting, vagueness, and prosecutorial discretion
as well as separation of powers problems, given the extensive power placed in
the hands of judges and juries.' However, she also devoted considerable
attention to federalism." 6 She invoked values such as decentralization and
government responsiveness to citizens. Under her analysis, the corruption
prosecutions impair federalism in several ways. In particular, she discussed
their impact on the concept of accountability and on the important value of
encouraging maximum state and local government responsiveness to citizen
desires."n According to Professor Moohr,
[F]ederal prosecutions for political corruption make state and local offi-
cials more accountable to an extrinsic entity, the federalgovernment, than
to those who voted for them. An interventionist federal presence encour-
ages citizens to abdicate their responsibility for self-government at the
state and local levels. The ultimate result is a diminished demand on state
and local legislative and executive branches to control political corrup-tion188
Professor Moohr wrote the article after the decision in New York v. United
States, enabling her to cite an important early example of the new federalism
to bolster her argument on this point. However, her analysis generally as-
sumed that federalism concerns are matters of policy rather than doctrines that
derive their strength from a body of binding constitutional law.' 9 Indeed, one
of the striking aspects of all of the early critiques is the extent to which their
authors mounted strong federalism-based arguments without the advantage of
183. Id. at 154.
184. Moohr, supra note 40, at 153.
185. Id. at 178-83.
186. Id. at 171-78.
187. Id. at 175.
188. Id. (citations omitted).
189. See id. at 177-78 (noting that "[c]ourts also routinely reject defenses grounded on the
debasement of federalism") (citation omitted).
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direct constitutional support. The current Court's new federalism provides
that support, thus substantially reinforcing the earlier analyses.
B. The New Federalism: A Constitutional Basis for the Critiques
One of the central themes of this Article is that the national role in
bringing corruption prosecutions needs re-examination because of the changed
constitutional dynamic the new federalism has engendered. Certainly, one
general message. of the current new federalism cases is that previously unques-
tioned assumptions are up for grabs. Why should this not be true for federal
prosecutions of state and local officials? Basic concepts from the body of new
federalism cases discussed in Part III cast serious doubts on the practice. At
this stage of the inquiry, my focus is not on any particular statute but on the
broader question of the effect of the constitutional dialogue on the federal
anticorruption role in general.
The fundamental structural relationship that the advocates of the new
federalism envisage between the national and state governments is captured
in the following quote from The Federalist No. 20, that Justice O'Connor
utilized in New York- "[A] sovereignty over sovereigns, a government over
governments, a legislation for communities, as contradistinguished from
individuals, as it is a solecism in theory, so in practice it is subversive of the
order and ends of civil polity."'' In New York, Justice O'Connor used the
precepts of Madison and Hamilton to buttress her conclusion that the federal
government could not act directly on the state legislature by "commandeering"
it. 19 However, the quote catches nicely the broader view of the current
majority that, to a remarkable degree, revives the vision of National League
of Cities.1'
Justice Kennedy outlined the same vision when he concurred in US.
Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton,'93 an essentially nationalistic decision that
invalidated state imposition of term limits on candidates for Congress." 4 For
Kennedy, the case provided an excellent opportunity to demonstrate that
federalism works both ways. As he put it, the "Constitution created a legal
system unprecedented in form and design, establishing two orders of govern-
ment, each with its own direct relationship, its own privity, its own set of
190. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 180 (1992) (quoting TIB FEDERAUSTNO.
20, at 138 (Alexander Hamilton & James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
191. Id. at 161.
192. Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
193. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring).
194. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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mutual rights and obligations to the people who sustain it and are governed by
it."'1 95 Building on this view of federalism, one can make a strong argument
that the "mutual rights and obligations" between the citizens of each state and
their officials include complete power over their qualifications and their job
performance. In other words, if a state cannot impose term limits on federal
representatives, neither should the federal government establish standards of
criminal conduct for governors and mayors. In each case, one "order of
government' is determining who can serve in the other.
New York was the Court's first constitutional foray in this direction after
Garcia. The anticommandeering principle was, understandably, controversial
within the Court.19" The nationalist dissenters recognized it for what it was:
a step back towards state immunity from federal regulation."9 Even if we take
the anticommandeering principle in a narrow sense, it argues against the
prosecutions. Conceptually, telling state officials what to do is not a big step
from the imposition of standards on how they perform their jobs. Either way,
federally imposed standards on the state government are at issue, even if
conduct is distinguishable from substantive policy. Perhaps the more funda-
mental point is the notion of state sovereignty reflected in the majority's
rejection of commandeering. Here, the inconsistency of the corruption
prosecutions is even clearer. An essential part of sovereignty is control of the
officials and employees who exercise it. The federal prosecutions can be seen
as either taking away that control or creating an awkward sharing of power
when the lines should be distinct. In a sense, the federal prosecutions turn the
state officials into federal officials.
Another way of bringing the anticommandeering decisions in New York
and Printz to bear is to focus on their emphasis on the issue of accountability.
In Printz, for example, Justice Scalia invoked the highly plausible scenario in
which, "[b]y forcing state governments to absorb the financial burden ofimplementing a federal regulatory program, Members of Congress can take
credit for solving problems without having to ask their constituents to pay for
the solutions with higher federal taxes."' 9 Again, although the emphasis in
discussing accountability is on policy, it carries over to performance. The
prosecutions put the federal government in the position of choosing when to
ride in on a white horse and take credit for "cleaning up" an egregious govern-
mental situation, while the normal discontent and grousing about incompetent
195. Id. (Kennedy, I., concurring).
196. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 939 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
197. Id. at 956-62 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Garcia and expressing doubt that "the
entire structure of federalism will soon collapse").
198. Id. at930.
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or marginally corrupt state and local officials is not directed at the national
government.
On a more symbolic level, this Article has already noted the high degree
of "respect" that the current majority insists the federal government must show
to states. Professor Farber has noted the "reverential" language used in the
opinions. 1" A recent example is found in Federal Maritime Commission v.
South Carolina State Ports Authority.2" In Federal Maritime Commission,
Justice Thomas contended that "[w]hile state sovereign immunity serves the
important fimction of shielding state treasuries and thus preserving the States'
ability to govern in accordance with the will of their citizens, the doctrine's
central purpose is to accord the states the respect owed them as joint sover-
eigns. '"201 The Court has made it clear that while respect is a somewhat
symbolic concept, it has teeth in that it opens to question traditional roles of
the federal government. The most notable example is the sharp restriction on
the availability of federal courts for suits by citizens against their own state
for violations of federal law. On a symbolic level, a state's being haled into
the courts of a fellow "sovereign" can be seen as a lack of respect. On a more
practical level, the Court's decisions call into question an important dimension
of the protective role of the national government-a concept that is analyzed
at length later in this Article as part of a theoretical justification for the
corruption prosecutions. 2"
Notably, many of the Court's decisions curbing the power of Congress
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment have come in the context of
attempts to abrogate the states' protection from suit in federal court under the
Eleventh Amendment. 3 The Fourteenth Amendment most strongly supports
a reversal of the original federal-state balance that the current majority repeat-
edly cites as integral to its vision of federalism.2" By developing concepts
such as the requirement that the record before Congress demonstrate state
inability to protect rights205 and that federal action must be not only essentially
remedial in nature but also congruent and proportional,2° the Court has placed
199, Farber, supra note 133, at 1135.
200. Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Author., 535 U.S. 743 (2002).
201. Id. at 765 (citations omitted). Justice Scalia began his analysis by stating that "dual
sovereignty is a defining feature of our Nation's constitutional blueprint." Id. at 751.
202. See infra subparts VIA-D.
203. See, e.g., Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coil. Say. Bank, 527 U.S.
627, 634 (1999) (invalidating the abrogation of state immunity under the Patent Remedy Act).
204. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 453-56 (1976) (discussing impact of Four-
teenth Amendment on relationship between federal and state governments).
205. Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 639-645.
206. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997) ("There must be a congruence and
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serious restrictions on Congress. "Respect" imposes limits on the protective
role of the judicial and legislative branches. It is not a large step to extend this
analysis to prosecutions of state and local officials brought in federal tribunals
by officials of the federal executive branch under statutes passed by Congress.
Thus far, I have focused on the relationship between the national govern-
ment and the states as a key aspect of the new federalism that calls into
serious question the federal prosecutorial role. An additional element of the
Court's federalism jurisprudence is, of course, the notion of internal limits on
the enumerated powers of the national government. In Lopez, Justice Ken-
nedy elaborated on these limits by identifying "areas of traditional state
concern" as subjects where federal criminal legislation is suspect.2' One
federal judge has already utilized this reasoning in a decision striking down
an anticorruption statute.2" 'I think that narrow construction of the relevant
statutes is more likely than outright invalidation. However, the notion of
limits on granted powers must be factored into the debate on the federal role
in prosecuting corruption, as well as into the debate on federal criminal law
in general. Certainly, whatever momentum that might have once existed for
a broad-based federal anticorruption statute is diminished, if not eliminated,
by the constitutional approach of the current Court.2'
In his Lopez concurrence, Justice Kennedy also developed a persuasive
analysis of the states' classic laboratory role in the context of novel criminal
problems." 0 This concern is particularly relevant in the area of "good govern-
ment." People do not agree on what constitutes good government, much less
on how to achieve it or to deal with bad government. Therefore, national
policymakers have been sharply divided between hardline views, which I call
the post-Watergate approach,11 typified by the independent counsel mecha-
nism, and a less draconian treatment of errant public officials, illustrated by
civil sanctions for ethics law violations that might be criminally prosecuted.
212
Such fundamental disagreements are an obvious reason to take advantage of
the existence of fifty states to experiment with different approaches. In fact,
the states have responded creatively to the problem. For example, the large
proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that
end.").
207. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 583 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
208. United States v. Sabri, 183 F. Supp. 2d 1145, 1157 (D. Minn. 2002).
209. See ABRAMS & BEALE, supra note 25, at 268-71 (discussing policy considerations
concerning such a statute).
210. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 581 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
211. Brown, supra note 35, at 751-56.
212. Id. at 758--60.
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number of state ethics commissions utilize a variety of approaches.213 Nation-
alizing the pursuit and punishment of corrupt public officials frustrates
experimentation in an area in which it is obviously needed. When the federal
sheriff rides in with a one-size-fits-all approach to political corruption, devel-
opment of alternatives is stifled, if not destroyed.
Building on the work of earlier critics, all the arguments developed in
this section make a strong case for the existence of a fundamental inconsis-
tency between the premises of the new federalism and the ongoing prosecu-
tions of state and local officials. Yet, things are not so simple. Obviously, the
prosecutions continue. They constitute a paradox that reflects fundamental
tensions in the constitutional system. The same Court that is developing the
new federalism is well aware of this activity and, at times, has indicated tacit
approval. In the next Part, I deal first with the Court's recent anticorruption
precedents and their apparently ambiguous message. The analysis then turns
to a different body of precedent-the patronage decisions extending from
1976 to 1996-and finds surprising support for a federal anticorruption role.
V Corruption, Patronage, and the Rehnquist and Burger
Courts: Support for a National Role?
A. The State and Local Corruption Cases in the Supreme Court
Although the new federalism has flowered under the Rehnquist Court, the
seminal case is National League of Cities,214 decided in 1976 when Chief
Justice Warren Burger was pointing the Court in a more federalistic direction.
Since 1984, the Court has reviewed five of the corruption prosecutions that I
view as in tension with that thrust.215 The precedential value of these cases is
uncertain. One case was rendered moot by a statutory change. 216 A second
was overturned by Congress. 21' A third case was implicitly qualified by a
fourth.2"' Still, the decisions are important. One majority opinion and two
213. E.g., Jon Lender, Firm Settles Ethics Case: To Pay $5 Million in Historic Accord,
THE HARTFORD COURANT, July 4,2001, at Al, available at 2001 WL 4572676.
214. Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
215. Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52 (1997); Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255
(1992); McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257 (1991); McNally v. United States, 483 U.S.
350 (1987); Dixson v. United States, 465 U.S. 482 (1984).
216. The federal program bribery statute, discussed infra section VIIA.5, rendered
unnecessary the analysis in Dixson.
217. For a discussion of the overturning of McNally, see supra notes 37-41 and accompa-
nying text.
218. For a discussion of the effect of Evans on McCormick, see infra notes 276-96 and
accompanying text.
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dissents raised the federalism issues.21 9 The Court could hardly have been
unaware of them. I am inclined to read the cases as an endorsement, however
muffled, of the federal role.
The Court's only explicit reference to the federalism-based objections to
the prosecutions is a phrase in McNally v. United States.220 McNally involved
a mail fraud prosecution of a state politician for a scheme that allowed a
fictitious insurance agency to receive a portion of the commissions on msur-
ance purchased by the state.22' The convictions were based on the widely
accepted theory that "the mail fraud statute proscribes schemes to defraud
citizens of their intangible rights to honest and impartial government. '222 The
lower federal courts had developed the "honest services" doctrine in part
because the statute prohibited schemes or artifices "to defraud" or "for obtain-
ing money or property by means of false or fraudulent premises, etc."223
Honest services of public officials were viewed as a form of intangible right
protected by the general language "to defraud."
McNally put an abrupt end to the honest services doctrine." The major-
ity viewed the matter primarily as one of statutory construction, employing the
concept of lenity in noting that "[t]he Court has often stated that where there
are two rational readings of a criminal statute, one harsher than the other, we
are to choose the harsher only when Congress has spoken in clear and definite
language."025 Thus, the Court held, fraud only included "money or property"
and the intangible right to honest services did not constitute property.
226
Federalism concerns bolstered this result. Apart from the ambiguous "outer
boundaries" of the statute, the majority expressed its concern about a construc-
tion that "involves the Federal Government in setting standards of disclosure
and good government for local and state officials. '"2'  Nonetheless, the limits
were not presented as constitutional. Congress, the majority said, could speak
more clearly, presumably reinstating the doctrine.'
219. They were discussed briefly in the McNally opinion and the dissents in Dixson and
Evans.
220. McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987).
221. Id.352-53.
222. Id. at 355.
223. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2000). See ABRAMS &BEAIE,supra note 25, at 131-33 (discuss-
ing development of doctrine).
224. According to Professor Kurland, "the decision, which overturned nearly twenty years
of appellate court precedents, literally stunned federal prosecutors." Kurland, supra note 34,
at 400 (footnote omitted).
225. McNally, 483 U.S. at 359-60 (citations omitted).
226. Id. at 356-59.
227. Id. at 360.
228. Id. According to the majority, "[i]f Congress desires to go further, it must speak more
60 WASH. & LEE L. REV 417 (2003)
Justice Stevens, in dissent, relied in part on the well-worn argument that
Congress's goal was to defend the "integrity of the Postal Service."' He
noted the broad language of the statute and expressed his strong support for the
construction that had developed in the lower courts.230 Particularly important
for purposes of this Article was his explicit acceptance of the use of the postal
power to further a general right on the part of citizens "to an honest govern-
ment, or to unbiased public officials. '231 What is surprising about Stevens's
dissent is that Justice O'Connor joined it. McNally seems part of the effort by
those who dissented in Garcia, 1 2 including Justice O'Connor, to rehabilitate
the concept of state immunity from federal regulation that was lost when
Garcia overruled National League of Cities. McNally is a small step toward
one of the major decisions in the development of process federalism as one
vehicle to this rehabilitation: Justice O'Connor's opinion in Gregory v.
Ashcroft, 3 which used federalism-based statutory construction to broaden the
states' exemption from the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.234 Per-
haps this major architect of the new federalism did not see McNally as an
important federalism case.
In terms of the thrust of Rehnquist Court precedent, McNally can be read
as supporting the federalistic opposition to federal prosecution of state and
local corruption. However, this reasoning did not play a major role in the
decision. More importantly, Congress overturned it a year later. For purposes
of mail and wire fraud, "the term scheme or artifice to defraud includes a
scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of honest
services." 231 The legislative materials suggest that at least some members of
Congress saw McNally as not just incorrect statutory construction but also as
a misunderstanding of the broad scope of the federal role in prosecuting
corruption.
236
Dixson v. United States"37 and Salinas v. United States238 point in a
nationalist direction. Dixson involved kickbacks received by officials of the
clearly than it has." Id.
229. Id. at 366 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
230. Id. at 371-72 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
231. Id. at 366 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
232. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 557 (1985) (Powell, J.,
dissenting); id. at 579 (Rehnquist, C.I., dissenting); id. at 580 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
233. Gregory v. AshcrofL 501 U.S. 452,452 (1991).
234. Id. at 460-62.
235. 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2000).
236. See ABRAMS & BBAiE, supra note 25, at 134-35.
237. Dixson v. United States, 465 U.S. 482 (1984).
238. Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52 (1997).
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subgrantee under a city's Community Development Block Grant." 9 The
government prosecuted them under the federal bribery statute, which applies
to "public officials," defined in part as "an officer or employee or person acting
for or on behalf of the United States, or any department agency or branch of
Government thereof,... in any official function, under or by authority of any
such department, agency, or branch of Government." ° The defendants were
not federal officials and would probably not even have been considered local
officials.241 However, they played a key role in allocating federal funds
awarded to the city and were subject to federal guidelines.4 Therefore,
according to the Court, they had "assumed the quintessentially official role of
administering a social service program established by the United States Con-
gress."243 The majority found that they fit the statute's language of "acting for
or on behalf of."2" It formulated the following test to deal with persons in
such circumstances who are not federal officials: whether the person occupies
"a position of public trust with official federal responsibilities." 245 The major-
ity found that the defendants easily met the test.
246
Justices O'Connor, Brennan, Rehnquist, and Stevens dissented.247 The
opinion, written by Justice O'Connor, rested in part on issues of statutory
construction and the rule of lenity.248 Its most interesting aspect is a discussion
of federalism and federal grant relationships.249 She found a principle of
"grantee autonomy" present in all grant programs. ° Grants represent a special
form of intergovernment activity in which governmental grantees do not lose
239. See Dixson, 465 U.S. at 484 (detailing the scheme). For a description of the Commu-
nity Development Block Grant Program, see George D. Brown, Federal Funds and Federal
Courts-CommunilyDevelopmentLiigaton as a Testing Groundfor the New Law ofStanding,
21 B.C. L. REv. 525, 537-44 (1980).
240. 18 U.S.C. § 201(aXl) (2000).
241. See Dixson, 465 U.S. at 490 (noting that there is "no basis for claiming that petitioners
were officers or employees of the United States").
242. See id. at 484 (noting that petitioner was hired to provide "general supervision" of
administration of federal block grant funds).
243. Diron, 465 U.S. at 497.
244. Id. at 500.
245. Id. at 497.
246. See id. at 496-97 ("We have little difficulty concluding that these persons served as
public officials for the purposes of section 201(a)."). The majority stressed the defendants'
operational responsibility for the grant program and their obligations under federal guidelines.
247. Id. at 501 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
248. Id. at 501-02 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
249. See id. at 507-11 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (describing differing levels of federal
control over grants).
250. Id. at 508-10 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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their status as state and local governments. What she referred to as "grantee
autonomy" '251 should be especially strong in a decentralized block-grant
program.252 Thus Justice O'Connor was able to invoke "principles of federal-
ism inherent in our constitutional system" '253 and "proper respect for the
sovereignty of States."254
These federalism arguments would be somewhat weaker in the case of a
categorical grant. These grants employ extremely precise conditions to make
the recipient, governmental or not, act as something close to an agent of the
federal government.255 The spending power thus allows Congress to "deputize"
state and local governments in a way that it could not do directly, at least under
current law. 256 However, block grants reintroduce the elements of grantee
choice and discretion. The goal ofthese instruments is to take advantage ofthe
sovereign capacity of recipients to make their own expenditure choices. Thus,
Justice O'Connor's federalism points have considerable force apart from
statutory construction issues. However, they deal with the grant relationship,
and who is a federal official, rather than treating federal prosecution of state
and local officials as a distinct problem. As for the majority, it saw no
federalism-based objections to prosecution of the local subgrantees under
federal law.
Dixson's reasoning, if not its result, was superseded by passage of the
federal program bribery statute in 1984.257 This statute applies to "agents" of
all entities that receive more than $10,000 in federal funds in one year.25
Agents are subject to federal prosecution for a number of crimes, including
bribery, ifthe matter the bribe involves has a value of $5,000 or more.259 Thus,
if a city receives a $100,000 law enforcement grant, and the building inspector
takes a $3,000 bribe to expedite a $50,000 addition to a dwelling, he or she can
be prosecuted under the act. Such uses of the spending power to reach crimes
far removed from any apparent federal interest raise substantial constitutional
251. See id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (describing block grant).
252. Id. at 509 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
253. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
254. Id. at 510 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
255. See George D. Brown, Beyond the New Federalism-Revenue Sharing in Perspective,
15 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 19-20 (1977) (describing different forms of grants and extent of
federal control in categorical context).
256. Dixson v. United States, 465 U.S. 482, 510 (1984) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice
O'Connor argued that the Court should not normally interpret federal grant programs to
"deputize" states. Id.
257. 18 U.S.C. § 666 (2000).
258. Id. at § 666(b).
259. Id. at § 666(aXiXAXi).
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questions discussed below.2" Salinas v. United States261 upheld a conviction
under the statute in a case in which these questions were not present. Federal
funds were used to improve a county jail and to pay for incarceration of federal
prisoners.262 The sheriff and deputy took bribes from one of the federal
prisoners for special treatment.3 A unanimous Court upheld the deputy's
conviction.2" The Court found the federal interest clear, while leaving open
the question of the statute's application in cases of more attenuated federal
interest.265 It also noted that the statute addressed directly the issues debated
in Dixson and removed any doubts about such prosecutions. 2 Dixson and
Salinas involve wrongdoing closely related to federal funds. Each thus pres-
ents a specific federal interest rather than any general federal concern with
corruption.
Perhaps McNally points in a federalistic direction, while Dixson and
Salinas.are more nationalistic. A comparison of two Hobbs Act cases decided
during the same period provides further support for the latter position.
McCormick v. United States267 seemed an initial setback. The federal govern-
ment prosecuted a state legislator for extorting campaign contributions.2 s He
had played an important role in advancing the legislative interests of a group
of doctors. 9 During a campaign, he informed their lobbyist that "he had not
heard anything from [them]."270 Cash payments soon followed these state-
ments.27 The government prosecuted him under that portion of the Hobbs Act
that forbids extortion "under color of official right."2 The Supreme Court
reversed the legislator's conviction in part out of concern that the court of
appeals' construction of the Act would permit prosecution for legitimate
campaign contributions.2 3 The opinion develops a frequent theme of the
260. See infra notes 710-31 and accompanying text.
261. Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52 (1997).
262. Id. at 54.
263. Id. at 55.
264. Id. at 54.
265. See id. at 60-61 (noting issues left undecided).
266. See id. at 58 (explaining effect of statute).
267. McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257 (1991)
268. Id. at261.
269. See id. at 259-260 (describing the legislator's activities).
270. Id. at 260.
271. Id.
272. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(bX2) (2000).
273. See McCormick, 500 U.S. at 271-74 (stating that an alternative ground for reversal
was that the lower court "affirmed the conviction on legal and factual grounds that were never
submitted to the jury").
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current Court: the importance of private financing in political campaigns and
the role of "campaign promises" in generating that funding."" The majority
viewed "under color of official right" extortion as requiring an explicit quid
pro quo; the dissent would have permitted an implicit one, thus facilitating
prosecution.2v
Most of the ground lost by the prosecution in McCormick was made up
the following year. In Evans v. United States,276 the Court accepted a broad
reading of the Act's requirement of "inducementi' 27 and appeared also to
accept the notion of an implicit quidpro quo.27' These two aspects of the case
are significant as an apparent retreat from the strict approach ofMcCormick,279
although Hobbs Act prosecutions still present uncertainties.2"0 Two other
aspects of the decision are particularly relevant for this Article. First, the
plurality took note, with apparent approval, of the extensive use of the Hobbs
Act in political corruption prosecutions." It specifically referred to the
prosecution of a state governor as well as several county officials and political
leaders.
282
The second significant dimension of Evans is that Justice Thomas's
dissent2 " contains the only general discussion in any Supreme Court opinion
of the tension between principles of federalism and federal corruption prosecu-
tions of state and local officials." 4 His starting point was an argument for a
narrow construction of the "under color of official right" prong of extortion.2
He, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justice Scalia contended that it should only
apply when the official claimed a right to the extorted money, such as an
274. See, e.g., id. at 272 (noting that "[mloney is constantly being solicited on behalf of
candidates"); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 21 (1976) (noting "the important role of contribu-
tions in financing political campaigns").
275. See McCormick, 500 U.S. at 282 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that "there is no
statutory requirement that illegal agreements... be in writing").
276. Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255 (1992)
277. See id. at 258-59 (endorsing a broad definition). The majority opinion was written
by Justice Stevens, who had dissented in McCormick.
278. See id. at 278 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that "[t]he quid pro quo ... is the
essence of the offense").
279. See ABRAMS & BEALE, supra note 25, at 212-16 (discussing the change from
McCormick).
280. See id. (discussing uncertainties of Hobbs Act prosecutions).
281. See Evans, 504 U.S. at 269 (noting that many cases involved important officials).
282. See id. at 269 n.22 (noting prosecution of the governor of Oklahoma).
283. Id. at 278 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
284. As noted earlier, Justice O'Connor's dissent in Dixson was limited to the grant
context. Supra notes 247-56 and accompanying text.
285. Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255,280-85 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
NEW FEDERALISM'S UNANSWERED QUESTION
unlawful fee for services." Justice Thomas relied primarily on the history of
the crime of extortion.' He also criticized the majority for choosing "not only
the harshest interpretation of a criminal statute, but also the interpretation that
maxinizes federal criminal jurisdiction over state and local officials."'
Justice Thomas's federalism analysis began by noting the extraordinary
increase in use of the Hobbs Act as- "the engine for a stunning expansion of
federal criminal jurisdiction into a field traditionally policed by state and local
laws-acts of public corruption by state and local officials." 9 He traced the
development of these prosecutions in the lower courts and quoted the well-
known reference to the Hobbs Act, by a United States Attorney, as "a special
code of integrity for public officials."'  At this point in the opinion, under
today's federalism doctrine, one would have expected an analysis of the
serious constitutional problems such prosecutions present, particularly for
Justice Thomas.
However, he was writing under the shadow of Garcia and before the
new federalism had achieved its current doctrinal force. He even cited Garcia
in conceding that "Congress enjoys broad constitutional power to legislate in
areas traditionally regulated by the States-power that apparently extends
even to the direct regulation of the qualifications, tenure, and conduct of state
government officials." 1 Thus, instead of constitutional limits, he invoked
Gregory v. Ashcroft and its federalism limits. based on clear statement in
"traditionally sensitive areas.'!1m Justice Thomas clearly saw the federalism
"problem" that federal corruption prosecutions pose. In applying Gregory, he
referred not only to its general language on state sovereignty' but also to
Congress's "extraordinary power to regulate state officials."' These views
could lead to reservations about prosecutions under other statutes, whether of
constitutional or statutory magnitude."' His dissent is important. Still, it was
286. See id. at 285-86 (disagreeing with broader interpretation of the plurality).
287. Id. at 284-86 & nA.
288. Id. at 287.
289. Id. at 290.
290. Id. at 291 (citing United States v. O'Grady, 742 F.2d 682, 694 (2d Cir. 1984) (on
bane) (quoting letter from Raymond J. Dearie, United States Attorney for the Eastern District
of New York)).
291. Id.
292. Evans v. United States, 504 U.S 255, 292 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing
Gregory v. Aschcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991)).
293. See id. (noting that states retain substantial sovereign powers).
294. Id.
295. See infra subpart VILB (discussing possible impact of new federalism on corruption
prosecutions).
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a dissent. The majority and concurring Justices did not even discuss federal-
ism problems. 29s A fair reading of Evans is as an endorsement of the federal
role and as a stronger positive statement than the negative of McNally. Thus,
the cases that deal directly with federal prosecution of state and local officials
seem to support it more than to cast doubt upon it. They certainly do not
apply new federalism analysis. They do not even apply old federalism to
suggest a problem with the practice along the lines of the critique articulated
above. Moreover, there is another body of precedent-the "patronage" cases
decided between 1976 and 1996-that lends further support to the prosecu-
tions. The patronage cases are not normally viewed as relevant to federal
prosecution of state and local officials.2' However, they suggest the pres-
ence, alongside the recent emphasis on federalism, of nationalist values within
the legal system that argue in favor of a protective national role generally, and
deterrence of official corruption in particular. Because of their importance,
I discuss them extensively in the next subpart.
B. The Patronage Cases: Stretching Both Patronage and the First
Amendment to Reach Corruption
1. Overview
Most people regard patronage as bad.29 Still, it came as a surprise when
the Supreme Court declared patronage was unconstitutional. In the 1976 case
ofElrod v. Burns2" the Court held that most patronage dismissals-dismissals
of public employees based on their political activities or affiliations-violate
the employees' First Amendment rights.3" Subsequent cases reaffirmed
Elrod, 01 refined its analysis,"° and extended the First Amendment-based ban
to patronage-like practices well beyond the public employment context. In
Board of County of Commissioners v. Umbehr303 and O'Hare Truck Service,
296. The omission is remarkable, but is consistent with the Court's pattern in these cases.
297. But see Moohr, supra note 40, at 153-55 (linking corruption and patronage).
298. See generally Lydia Segal, Can We Fight the New Tammany Hall?: Difculties of
ProsecutingPoliticalPaironage andSuggestionsforReform, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 507 (1998).
Professor Segal discusses possible uses of anti-corruption statutes in prosecutions of patronage.
Id. at 534-45.
299. Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
300. See id. at 355-60 (developing First Amendment analysis of dismissals).
301. See Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 520 (1980) (holding that the tenure of an assistant
public defender may not be dependent on political affiliation).
302. Id. at 517-520.
303. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668 (1996).
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Inc. v. City of Northlake " the Court found First Amendment protection for
independent contractors from termination, or similar action, of their contracts
by local governments.
305
The patronage cases represent a significant intrusion by the federal
judiciary into the structure and operations of state and local governments
begun, ironically, in the same year the Court decided National League of
Cities.3° Yet, for twenty years, different majorities of the Court have clung
to Elrod and its First Amendment foundations. ° 7 They have done so in the
face of substantial criticism from within and without °9 the Court, overt
resistance from lower federal courts, 310 and the impossibility of extending
First Amendment analysis to many patronage practices.311 The Court's First
Amendment analysis seems incomplete and unconvincing. For example, why
should public employees who received their jobs through patronage in the first
place be heard to complain about the constitutionality of patronage? If
protection from patronage problems really is one of the First Amendment
rights of public employees, why did the Court ignore for twenty years its
precedents on dismissals of public employees for their speech3 2 and then treat
those precedents as part of the governing law when it extended Elrod to
persons who were not public employees?
This lack of fit suggests that more is involved than a First Amendment
problem. One way to look at the patronage cases-some of which do not
304. O'Hare Truck Serv., Inc. v. City of Northlake, 18 U.S. 712 (1996).
305. Id. at 720-26.
306. The Court decided both cases in 1976.
307. In the two most recent cases, Umbehr and O'Hare, the margin was seven-to-two. In
terms of numbers, the closest case was the five-to-four decision Rutan v. Republican Party of
Illinois, 497 U.S. 62 (1990).
308. See, e.g., Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668,686-711 (Scalia& Thomas, JJ., dissenting) (arguing
the value of patronage and its importance as a governmental interest).
309. See, e.g., Bryan R. Berry, Note, Donkeys, Elephants, and Barney Fife: Are Deputy
Sheriffs Policymakers Subject to Patronage Termination?, 66 Mo. L. REV. 667,681-82 (2001)
(criticizing confused state of Court's doctrine).
310. See, e.g., Susan Lorde Martin, A Decade of Branti Decisions: A Government Offi-
cial's Guide to Patronage Dismissals, 39 AM. U. L. REv. 11, 29-31 (1989) (noting Second
Circuit's hostility to expanding categories of protected employees). The author states that the
court is concerned with "federal intrusion into the essence of local governance." Id at 29.
311. The Elrod analysis requires an individual right holder to bring a suit Creation of a
special job for a favored politician might not produce plaintiffs with sufficient harm to survive
a standing challenge.
312. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968), first surfaced in a concurrence and
dissent in Rutan v. Republican Party of ll., 497 U.S. 62 (1990). Rutan, 497 U.S. at 86
(Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 99 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
60 WASH. &LEE L. REV 417 (2003)
involve patronage as traditionally defined3" 3-is that the Court sought to call
into question a range of corrupt practices."" The First Amendment provided
a vehicle for condemning patronage in specific instances. That condemnation
gave the Court the opportunity to signal its views on both patronage and
political corruption in general. What emerges from the cases is a vision of
what a legitimate government ought to be: neutral and nonpartisan in its
operation, free from corrupt practices, and selected by a political process that
avoids such evils as "entrenchment." In short, the cases are about "good
government."
2. Elrod: Shocked to Find Patronage in Cook County!
Elrod v. Burns seems a weak rock upon which to build a major doctrine.
Justice Brennan wrote for a plurality of three.3" Two other Justices joined in
the result, but not in his "wide-ranging opinion."3"6 Three Justices dissented,
sounding themes that would be repeated for twenty years. 317 However, Justice
Brennan's analysis has remained the touchstone for cases that go far beyond
the straightforward fact pattern of Elrod. That case arose out of a change in
administrations in Cook County, Illinois.3 1' The newly elected Democratic
sheriff replaced non-civil-service Republicans with Democrats. 19 Some
discharged Republicans sued, claiming violation of their First Amendment
rights. 2 Justice Brennan seized on the case as presenting "but one form of the
general practice of political patronage. "3"1 He broadly defined patronage to
include not only jobs but also "lucrative" contracts, special treatment in public
services, and other plums.3' He also made clear that he did not like it, linking
it to Nazi Germany and to corruption here at home.32
313. The independent contractor cases do not involve "the practice where politicians
reward their supporters with government jobs and promotions in return for political backing."
Segal, supra note 298, at 507. But see id. at 507 n. II (discussing the possibility of broader
definitions that would include contracting).
314. See infra sections V.B.6-9 (discussing patronage cases).
315. Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347,349 (1976).
316. Id. at 374 (Stewart, J., concurring).






323. Id. at 353-54.
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Patronage might be evil, but was it unconstitutional? Justice Brennan
answered with a ringing "yes." 24 He viewed the problem as one of coerced
belief and association, a classic First Amendment violation.3 2 He also sug-
gested problems of a broader scope. Patronage can harm 't he free functioning
of the electoral process,"3 and "tip it in favor of the incumbent party."'"
However, his emphasis was on the individual rights of association and
belief.328 Justice Brennan saw a system in which retaining one's job depends
on one's party affiliation as analogous to coerced orthodoxy, such as prohibit-
ing public employment of members of certain groups,329 or requiring an "oath
denying past affiliation with Communists."330 Thus, he viewed patronage as
a form of condition: a non-civil-service employee's beliefs had to be accept-
able to the ruling political party. This amounted to the government seeking to
produce indirectly a result it could not command directly. 31 Such an attempt
triggered the unconstitutional condition doctrine. 32 Justice Brennan brushed
aside any notion that the plaintiffs waived their rights by getting their jobs
through patronage in the first place.3
Because core First Amendment rights were at stake, the practice needed
to survive strict scrutiny and such associated doctrines as narrowly tailored
means to advance a government interest of vital importance. 34 Justice
Brennan first dismissed the possible force of any significant interest in em-
ployee effectiveness or accountability.33 He declined to equate efficiency
with party affiliation and cited merit systems as a less intrusive means of
ensuring accountability.3 36 A second purported governmental interest was
harder to deal with: the need for "political loyalty of employees" to ensure that
disconcerted employees did not undercut the elected officials' policies. 37
Justice Brennan conceded the point, but he limited its application to validating
324. Id. at 373.
325. See id at 355-57 (outlining costs of patronage dismissals).
326. Id. at 356.
327. Id.
328. See id. (stating that "political belief and association" constitute the core of the
activities protected by the First Amendment).
329. See id. (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,642 (1943)).
330. See id. at 358 (citing Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952)).
331. Id. at359.
332. See id. at 360-61 (citing Perry v. Sinderman, 405 U.S. 593, 597 (1972)).
333. Id. at359-60 n.13.
334. Id. at 362-64.
335. Id. at 364-66.
336. See id. at 364-67 (doubting political affiliation as motive for poor performance). This
portion of the opinion shows his deep suspicion of "partisan" public administration.
337. Id. at 367.
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patronage dismissals in "policymaking positions.""33 Thus, despite its evils,
the opinion would permit some patronage.339
The most significant governmental interest advanced-and the one that
most sharply reveals the Justices' differing views of patronage-was the key
role of patronage in maintaining political parties and thus in "preservation of
the democratic process."'  Justice Brennan met the argument head-on by
recognizing the goal of preserving the democratic process as a significant
interest, but arguing that patronage dismissals may well impede that goal. 4
Parties, he insisted, can function well without patronage.342 More importantly,
patronage (and patronage dismissals) creates the danger of entrenchment and
impairs individual rights of freedom and association."4
As a whole, Justice Brennan's opinion extends well beyond the issue in
the case: whether patronage dismissals violate First Amendment rights. His
analysis is an indictment of patronage in general.344 It not only threatens good
administration, but it strikes at democracy.3 45 He views the case as presenting
the "evil of influence,"'34 which the Court in Buckley v. Valeo347 had invoked
to justify both limits on campaign contributions and broad disclosure rules.348
However, Brennan's views were those of only three Justices. The two
concurring Justices rejected '"te Court's wide-ranging opinion," although they
were apparently willing to invalidate patronage dismissals of "nonpolicy
making, nonconfidential government employee[s]."' 9 The principal dissent,
written by Justice Powell, saw patronage in a wholly different light.35 He
described it as "a practice as old as the Republic" with numerous benefits.35'
He defended it not only as strengthening parties352 but also as a means of
broadening the base of political participation, thus "increasing the volume of
338. Id.
339. Id.
340. Id. at 368.
341. Id. at 369.
342. Id. at 368-69.
343. Id. at 369-70.
344. Id. at 372.
345. Id. at 369-70.
346. Id. at 370 n.25.
347. Buckley v. Valco, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
348. See Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 370 n.25 (1976) (noting that "[p]atronage dismiss-
als involve the evil of influence, whose very need for elimination justified the contribution and
disclosure provisions in Buckley").
349. Id. at 378 (Stewart, J., concurring).
350. Id. at 376 (Powell, J., dissenting).
351. Id. (Powell, J., dissenting).
352. Id. at 382-86 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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political discourse." ' Justice Powell also noted the role of patronage in
advancing the social status of minority groups.5 He apparently accepted the
plurality's conditional employment analysis,35 but distinguished patronage
from governmental attempts to prescribe or eliminate political beliefs. 56 Thus,
although largely accepting the plurality's First Amendment mode of
scrutiny,3" he found a sufficiently important state interest. 58 For Justice
Powell, the whole point of patronage is to promote "vigorous ideological
competition in the political marketplace."
59
One comes away from Elrod with considerable uncertainty. The case
might be an attempt to reach out beyond dismissals to call into question a
broad range of patronage practices. Indeed, it might be a step toward establish-
ing good government as an enforceable right. On the other hand, only two
Justices joined Justice Brennan. Certainly, Justice Powell's strong defense of
patronage makes the existence of an important state interest look like one of
those questions that could go either way. The constitutional compulsion to
condemn it seems weak, particularly at the behest of individuals who have
benefitted from the practice. These are not the only analytical problems with
Elrod. Thus, the first post-Elrod question was whether and how the decision
would survive.
3. Branti: Refining (and Reaffirming) Elrod
One can view the Court's 1980 decision in Branti v. FinkeP6" in two
ways. On the one hand, the six-member majority treated Elrod as unquestion-
ably good law,36' even appearing to broaden its scope by restricting the test for
353. Id. at 379 (Powell, J., dissenting).
354. See id. at 385 n.6 (Powell, J., dissenting) (stating that "each first appointment given
a member of any underdog element is a boost in that element's struggle for social acceptance").
355. See id. at 381-82 (Powell, J., dissenting) (stating that "[tihe question is whether it is
consistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments for a State to offer some employment
conditioned, explicitly or implicitly, on partisan political affiliation and on the political fortunes
of the incumbent officeholder").
356. See id. at 387-88 (Powell, J., dissenting) (explaining how patronage differs from other
contexts).
357. See id. at 381 (Powell, J., dissenting) (noting use of Buckley standard in First
Amendment analysis).
358. See id. at 387 (Powell, J., dissenting) (concluding that "patronage hiring practices
sufficiently serve important state interests, including some interests sought to be advanced by
the First Amendment, to justiy a tolerable intrusion on the First Amendment interests of
employees or potential employees").
359. Id. at 388 (Powell, J., dissenting).
360. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980).
361. See id. at 513-18 (referring to Elrod as authority for the Court's ruling).
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permissible patronage dismissals. 2 On the other hand, Justice Stevens's
opinion for the Court is void of any discussion of the evils for the denocratic
process that Justice Brennan found lurking in patronage.363 The facts in Branti
were somewhat similar to Elrod.' A newly elected Democratic county public
defender began terminating the assistants of his Republican predecessor. 6
The assistants invoked Elrod and won in the lower courts.366 Apart from a
feeble attempt to distinguish that case, the defendant's principal argument in
the Supreme Court was that Elrod supported him. The public defender argued
that the plaintiffs were "policymaking, confidential employees 3 67 whom he
could, under Elrod, dismiss on partisan grounds.s Justice Stevens, for the
Court, repeated the prior First Amendment unconstitutional condition analysis
and seemed to narrow the exceptions to it.'" Whether a public employee can
be dismissed on partisan grounds does not depend on policyimaking or confi-
dential status.37 1 "[Rlather, the question is whether the hiring authority can
demonstrate that party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effec-
tive performance of the public office involved.1371 The Brand opinion noted
the potentially broad scope of patronage practices, but stated that they were not
then before the Court, nor had they been in Elrod. 72 The Court thus left the
larger, good government issues of 1976 for another day or, perhaps, quietly put
them to rest for good.
In dissent once again, Justice Powell criticized the majority for extending
Elrod by narrowing the category of permitted dismissalsY 3  In Justice
Powell's view, the decision was another "evisceration of patronage
362. See id. at 518 (stating that "the question is whether the hiring authority can demon-
strate that party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the
public office involved").
363. See id. at 508-20 (containing the opinion of the Court).
364. Compare id. at 509-10 (dealing with newly appointed public defender replacing
Republican assistants) with Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 349-52 (1976) (addressing a newly
elected Democratic sheriff's dismissal of Republican, non-civil servants).
365. See Branti, 445 U.S. at 509-10 (outlining facts of case)
366. See id. at 510-11 (reviewing lower court's disposition of case).
367. Id. at518.
368. Id.
369. See id. at 513-18 (quoting Justice Brennan's analysis from Elrod, which analyzes the
impact of a political patronage system and states that political patronage imposed an unconstitu-
tional condition upon the receipt of a public benefit).
370. See id. at 518 (noting that "the ultimate inquiry is not whether the label 'policymaker'
or 'confidential' fits a particular person").
371. Id.
372. See id. at 513 n.7 (stating that, in this case and in Elrod, the only practice at issue was
the dismissal of public employees for partisan reasons).
373. Id. at 523-27 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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practices. 374 He contended that the Court compounded the Elrod mistake by
formulating a test which excluded dismissal of confidential employees"' and
limited the dismissal of policymakers.3" Powell also put forth an argument
that would become one of the main themes of post-Elrod criticism of the
patronage cases: the Court's standard was so "vague and sweeping" that it
would create substantial uncertainty for whomever had to apply it.3"7 Much of
Justice Powell's dissent restates his earlier views about the importance of
patronage to political parties and their essential role in the political process.78
He saw Branti as "decreas[ing] the accountability and denigrat[ing] the role of
our national political parties."379 Formulating an argument that would also
become central to Justice Scalia's later attacks on the patronage cases, Justice
Powell contended that weakening parties would strengthen special interest
groups, an undemocratic and destabilizing result. 80
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of Justice Powell's dissent in Branti
is his development of federalism and related concerns, which Chief Justice
Burger had alluded to in a brief dissent in Elrod.5 Fearing the "downgrading"
of states, Chief Justice Burger invoked National League of Cities"82 and the
Tenth Amendment to argue that patronage is an example of a state's choice
about how to manage its government.383 He had also presented the issue as a
matter of judicial intrusion into legislative and executive matters.34 Echoing
the latter argument, Justice Powell criticized Branti as the formulation of "a
constitutionalized civil service standard."385 He also saw the decision as one
that "fwell may impair the right of local voters to structure their government."
38 6
374. Id. at 521 (Powell, J., dissenting).
375. Id. at 523 (Powell, J., dissenting).
376. Id. (Powell, J., dissenting).
377. See id. at 524 (Powell, J., dissenting) (criticizing the standard articulated by the
majority).
378. See id. at 526-33 (Powell, J., dissenting) (identifying and weighing the governmental
interest that patronage serves).
379. Id. at 531 (Powell, J., dissenting).
380. Id. at 532 (Powell, J., dissenting).
381. See Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 375-76 (1976) (Burger, C., dissenting) (discuss-
ing the impact of the Court's decision on the power of the states).
382. Id. (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
383. See id. (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (stating that the Court should not disturb the choice
of state legislatures to use patronage).
384. See id. at 375 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (describing the decision as "a significant
intrusion into the area of legislative and policy concerns, the sort of intrusion Mr. Justice
Brennan has recently protested in other contexts").
385. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 521 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting).
386. Id. at 532 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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Thus, Branti may simply be a refinement of Elrod. True, the Branti test
seems to make patronage dismissals of public employees more difficult, but
the Court limited its decision to that narrow context. However, the key
significance of Branti is the possible emergence of a solid majority in support
of Elrod and its constitutional analysis. Why stop with dismissals? The
acceptance of Justice Brennan's views suggests the possibility of a broader
attack on patronage and, indeed, on corruption itself.
4. Rutan: Continuing and Broadening the Debate
The 1990 decision in Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois8 7 dropped the
other shoe by extending the Elrod-Brantl analysis to patronage hirings. 388 At
the same time, the five-to-four split exposed the uncertain status of the
antipatronage position, even as the majority Justices hinted at broader applica-
tions. Rutan arose out of an apparent attempt by the Republican governor of
Illinois to convert that state's civil service system into a patronage system." 9
A hiring agency first screened all vacancies in state employment.39 The
agency then submitted its choice for approval to the Governor's Office of
Personnel.39 These approvals extended to promotions, transfers, recalls and
new hires.39 Plaintiffs, appealing from a variety of negative actions, asserted
that a Republican party connection was necessary for the Office of Personnel
to issue an affirmative decision. 93
Justice Brennan, for the majority, had little difficulty applying Elrod-
Branti to promotions, transfers, and recalls. He found potentially significant
personal costs, like those of a dismissal, at stake in such actions.394 Illinois's
failure to hire because of belief and association also burdened the plaintiffs'
First Amendment rights.395 Justice Brennan found the unconstitutional
condition cases directly relevant to the denial of a valuable benefit such as
387. Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62 (1990).
388. See id. at 65 (holding that promotion, transfer, hiring, and recall decisions involving
low-level public employees may not be based on party affiliation).
389. See id. at 66 (stating the facts of the case).




393. Id. at 66-68.
394. See id. at 75 (stating that the First Amendment extends beyond dismissal because
"there are deprivations less harsh than dismissal that nevertheless press state employees and
applicants to conform their beliefs and associations to some state-selected orthodoxy").
395. Id. at 77.
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employment. 96 Thus, what had seemed the big, unanswered question, turned
out not to be very difficult after all.
Justice Brennan hints in Rutan that more might be at stake than the claims
of individual jobholders. He invoked the risk of "entrenchment" as a means of
curtailing First Amendment freedoms3" and impairing the electoral process.'"
However, it is the clash between Justice Scalia's dissent and Justice Stevens's
concurrence in response to that dissent that reveals both the depth of the divide
on patronage and the presence of broader issues?"9 Part of Justice Scalia's
dissent is a restatement of Justice Powell's earlier arguments. In Rutan, Justice
Scalia stated the importance of patronage for maintaining the political par-
ties-"the forges upon which many of the essential compromises of American
political life are hammered out"4 -- and the danger that the Court's decision
would hasten the decline of political parties to the benefit of special interest
groups.4°" Justice Scalia admitted the seamy side of patronage such as "finan-
cial corruption" and "salary kickbacks," but viewed the advantages of patron-
age as sufficiently strong to survive a properly framed balancing test and to
make the whole question one of policy to be decided by the legislature rather
than the judiciary.4" Justice Stevens, in his concurrence, seized on these
admitted weaknesses to place patronage squarely at the center of corruption in
American life.4 3 Justice Stevens also decried the impact of patronage on the
electoral process and found it "at war with the deeper traditions of democracy
embodied in the First Amendment."
4
04
Justice Scalia's dissent inRutan offered two other critiques of post-Elrod
developments that are important to appreciating the vulnerability of that line
of authority. He raised the previously unaddressed question of why strict
scrutiny was even the right standard. At least since Pickering v. Board of
396. See id. at 78 (stating that conditioning hiring on political beliefs is "plainly" an
unconstitutional condition).
397. See id. at 70 (quoting Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 368 (1976), and stating that
patronage can result in the entrenchment of one or a few parties to the exclusion of others).
398. See id. (stating that the democratic process functions as well or better without
patronage).
399. Compare id. at 92-115 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that judges who are not
politically elected should not be making decisions about patronage for government jobs) with
id. at 79-92 (Stevens, J., concurring) (defending the Court's recent decisions).
400. Id. at 106 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
401. See id. at 107-108 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that a system relying heavily on
the parties has a stabilizing effect and deters end runs by splinter groups and special interests).
402. Id. at 104-09, 113-14 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
403. Id. at 89 n.4 (Stevens, J., concurring).
404. Id. at 92 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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Education, 5 decided in 1968, the Court had subjected the government's
ability to take action against its employees because of their speech to a less
vigorous standard.4" Why not, Justice Scalia argued, apply the same looser
analysis to adverse personnel action based on political affiliation?'4 7 The
absence of any sustained discussion of Pickering in previous majority opinions
does seem a serious omission. A second problem, raised earlier by Justice
Powell, is the imprecision in the Branti test for determining when affiliation-
based dismissals are appropriate and the test's apparent restriction of Elrod in
this respect.' Justice Scalia had great fun demonstrating the "shambles"40 9 of
post-Branti law by citing apparently conflicting lower court decisions.41 °
Indeed, these cases are the tip of an iceberg that includes not only uncertainty
but also thinly veiled oppositionto the Court's approach.4" Still, Justice Scalia
did not prevail. As of 1990, the law seemed settled, even if by a five-to-four
decision, that a state or local government could not base personnel decisions
on political affiliation unless it could demonstrate that "party affiliation is an
appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the public office
involved."
412
5. Umbehr and O'Hare: Extending Patronage
Analysis Beyond Patronage
In 1996 the Court returned to the Elrod problem in two cases that did not
involve public employees. At issue in Board of County Commissioners v.
UmbehrA13 and 0 'Hare Trucking Services, Inc. v. City of Northlake414 were
politically motivated decisions concerning independent contractors. Although
the facts were somewhat similar, the two majority opinions used substantially
405. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
406. See Rutan v. Republican Party of DI., 497 U.S. 62, 98-101 (1980) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (stating that restrictions on speech for nonemployces are judged differently than
restrictions on employees).
407. Id. at 94-98 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
408. See id. at 110-12 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (saying of the Court's current test: "What
that means is anybody's guess.").
409. Id. at 111 (Scalia J., dissenting).
410. See id. at 111-13 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that the Brand" test has produced
inconsistent and unpredictable results).
411. The conflicting approaches described by Berry, supra note 309, clearly reflect not
only differing readings of Elrod-Brandi, but also differing degrees of acceptance.
412. Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62,64 (1980).
413. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668 (1996).
414. O'Hare Truck Serv., Inc. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712 (1996).
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different approaches.41 The Elrod analysis emerged extended, but seriously
confused.
a. Umbehr: Pickering Now?
In Umbehr, the county terminated plaintiff's waste disposal contract
because of his constant criticism of the Board of Commissioners over a range
of topics from landfill user rates to mismanagement of funds.4"6 The plaintiff
also ran for the board.4" 7 The lower courts saw the problem not as an Elrod
issue, but as a question of whether to extend Pickering's protection of public
employee speech to independent contractors.418 Writing for the majority,
Justice O'Connor appeared to agree. She focused on the Pickering balancing
test as an attempt to accommodate the competing interests when governments
punish employee speech and found that independent contractors have similar
enough interests that it should apply in that context.419 The Pickering inquiry
is sufficiently flexible to take account of any differences in status. 42 °
If that were all the opinion contained, it would not tell the reader much
about the Court's current view of Elrod beyond two references to Branti421
and a linking of Pickering to the unconstitutional condition doctrine. 4
However, the opinion makes an abrupt turn from a discussion of government
versus independent contractor rights to an indictment of patronage. 423 The
Court claimed that the Board had engaged in "patronage contracting," an
example of more widespread evils.424 Justice O'Connor cited "courtroom
patronage," "bribery, "extortion," "kickbacks," "abuses of power," "illegal
government action," and "political bias" to bolster her analysis.4'
415. Umbehr gave the Pickering analysis substantial weight, while O'Hare drew heavily
on Elrod. The end result is a blurring of the two.
416. Umbehr, 518 U.S. at 671-72.
417. Id.
418. E.g.,id. at 672.
419. See id. at. 676-681 (balancing the First Amendment rights of employees against the
states' interest in efficiency).
420. See id. at 678-79 (stating that the Pickering approach is superior to a bright-line rule).
421. See id. at 675,676 (citing Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980)).
422. See id. at 679 (discussing Pickering and stating that the prohibition of unconstitu-
tional conditions on speech applied regardless of the employee's contractual or other claim to
ajob).
423. See id. at 681-85 (disputing the dissent's use of patronage as a positive factor in First
Amendment analysis).
424. See id. at 681. (discussing patronage in connection with other violations of free
speech, including the Sedition Act of 1798 and common-law libel).
425. See id. at 681-83 (rebutting the dissent's defense of patronage and its argument that
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A case involving the application of Pickering to independent contractors
seemed suddenly to have become one about patronage. Uncertainties abound.
This portion of Justice O'Connor's opinion does not cite, let alone discuss, the
Elrod line of cases, which do analyze patronage.426 Pickering, which was
about employees, played virtually no role in the cases involving patronage-
related treatment of employees. The Court was now applying it in cases
brought by nonemployees.427 A possible explanation is that the Court wanted
governments to benefit from the more lenient Pickering standard in cases
involving contractors. The question remains why it applied to some negative
actions and not others. The Court's apparent answer was that Elrod and its
line of cases involved affiliation while Pickering involved speech.4" In the
political context, this distinction is hard to draw. Indeed, the similarity of a
wide range of political activities, and their protection under the First Amend-
ment, is the cornerstone of many of the Court's important cases in the area,
such as Buckley v. Valeo.429 However, these observations are more a criticism
of the Elrod line of cases than of Umbehr. One could understand Justice
O'Connor's keeping the two lines of cases separate in order to allow more
lenient treatment of independent contractors. Then came O'Hare.
b. O'Hare: Melding Elrod and Pickering?
In 0 'Hare, the Mayor of Northlake, Illinois, removed an independent
towing operator from the city's eligible list after the towing operator refused
to make a contribution to him, supported his opponent, and displayed that
opponent's campaign posters.43 Though the facts seemed somewhat similar
to Umbehr, Justice Kennedy began his majority opinion by citing Elrod and
Branti and stating the issue as whether to extend the two cases to independent
contractors.43 He specifically drew a distinction between the Elrod and
patronage is more suitable for independent contractors).
426. Id. It is true, of course, that many of her criticisms of patronage are the same as those
made in this line of cases.
427. See id. at 673 (using the Pickering balancing test for independent contractor suits).
428. See id. at 672 (noting that Pickering addressed employees' speech rights).
429. Buckley v. Valco, 424 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1976).
430. O'Hare Truck Serv., Inc. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712, 715 (1996).
431. See id. at 714 ("We must decide whether the protections of Elrod and Branti extend
to an independent contractor, who, in retaliation for refusing to comply with demands for
political support, has a government contract terminated or is removed from an official list of
contractors authorized to perform public services.").
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Pickering analyses.432 Adverse action based on belief or association triggers
the former,433 while adverse action based on speech triggers the latter."'
There is, of course, the Buckley problem that speech, belief, and affilia-
tion can best be analyzed as tightly bound together given their First Amend-
ment origins, especially in the political context. In O Hare, the government
could be viewed as punishing the contractor for his speech or his beliefs.
Indeed, Justice Kennedy treated the case as presenting both problems.435 The
whole issue would largely disappear if the two labels led to the same judicial
inquiry into the contested action, but he insisted they do not. Branti (affilia-
tion) requires the government to "demonstrate that party affiliation is an
appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the public office
involved." 436 Umbehr (speech) calls for balancing "legitimate countervailing
government interests" against the employee's rights.437
Pickering seems more deferential.43 This might make a big difference
if we were at the initial (Elrod) phase of deciding the close question of the
validity of patronage. However, Justice Kennedy treated patronage as a closed
issue439 and indicated that both types of cases (affiliation and speech) require
case-by-case analysis." The whole inquiry may even merge into a question
of reasonableness."' Justice Kennedy suggested this," 2 but then in a remark-
able remand directed the court of appeals to "decide whether the case is gov-
erned by the Elrod-Branti rule or by the Pickering rule.e
443
Apart from the fact that patronage as a value seems beyond analysis under
either "test," the above seems clear as mud. Nonetheless, O Hare can fairly be
read as another reaffirmation and possible extension of Elrod. If anything,
432. Id. at 718-20.
433. Id. at 718.
434. Id. at 719.
435. See id. at 718 (citing cases involving both political beliefs and political speech for
support of analysis).
436. Id. (quoting Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 518 (1980)) (emphasis added).
437. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 675 (1996).
438. This was an important point of Justice Scalia's dissent in Rutan. One of his reasons
for upholding the patronage practices that the Court had been invalidating since Elrod was that
the strict scrutiny standard was applied rather than Pickering balancing. Rutan v. Republican
Party of Me., 497 U.S. 62, 97-103 (1980) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Although admitting that the
question of which test should be used was not clear, he stated that "the normal 'strict scrutiny'
that we accord to government regulation of speech is not applicable in this field." Id. at 100.
439. O'Hare Truck Serv., Inc. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712, 718 (1996).
440. See id. at 719-20 (stating that case-by-case analyses will result in more just results).
441. Id. at 719.
442. Id.
443. Id. at 726.
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reaffirmation is the more significant interpretation. Elrod governs when
"government retaliates... for the exercise of rights of political association or
the expression of political allegiance. """ The evils of patronage go beyond
infringement of individual rights. The 0 'Hare facts might well constitute
bribery." On a broader level, Justice Kennedy raised the specter of entrench-
ment,446 portrayed patronage as a form of "governmental overreaching," 447 and
questioned whether it is a "necessary part of a legitimate political system. ""
Whether or not they are extended to independent contractors like O'Hare, the
antipatronage precedents remain central to any analysis of government person-
nel and related practices.
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, dissented in both cases. 449 He
not only reiterated his earlier defense of patronage as a long-standing govern-
mental practice with good and bad aspects,4 " but also objected strenuously to
extending the antipatronage analysis beyond the employment context 't o the
massive field of all government contracting." 45 1 Not surprisingly, he castigated
the majority in the two cases for the analytical confusion discussed above;
452
in particular, their apparent blurring of the Elrod and Pickering analyses.4 3 He
read Umbehr as adopting the latter, more deferential approach45 4 and reminded
his colleagues that the Rutan dissenters would have applied it there.455 Con-
ceivably, the patronage-based action at issue in that case might have stood if
444. Id. at 714-15. The Courtwentonto state:
We hold that the protections of Elrod and Branh extend to an instance like the one
before us, where government retaliates against a contractor, or a regular provider
of services, for the exercise of rights of political association or the expression of
political allegiance.
Id.
445. See id. at 721 (citing Illinois law on bribery).
446. See id. at 718 (citing Elrod and Justice Stevens's concurring opinion in Rutan).
447. Id. at 724.
448. Id. at 726.
449. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668,686 (1996) (Scalia & Thomas, JJ.,
dissenting). The joint dissent is printed alter Umbehr, but applies to both decisions.
450.. Id. at 688-90 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
451. Id. at 687 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
452. See id. at 702 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting) (contrasting use of strict scrutiny in
Rutan with balancing test in Pickering).
453. See id. at 705-06 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting) (criticizing inconsistent treatment
by majority).
454. See id. at 702-03 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting) (applauding Court's use of fact-
sensitive deferential weighing approach).
455. Id. at 702 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
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it did not have to face a "strict scrutiny standard."4 At least Umbehr drew the
line.
'"What the Court sets down in Umbehr, however, it rips up in O 'Hare.
'457
Justice Scalia noted the replacement of balancing with '"he rigid rule of Elrod
and Branti. ''45 This gave him the opportunity to focus not only on the different
treatment of speech and political affiliation but also on the problem of how to
tell the difference in the first place. The O 'Hare plaintiff certainly presented
his case as involving speech.459 Justice Scalia hypothesized the many cases in
which courts could not discern which right is involved, accused the Court of
suggesting it might balance in Elrod cases, and generally dismissed both
contractor decisions as "traged[ies] of inconsistenicy. "4 0
One can hardly fault the dissenters for poking fun at an opinion whose
first paragraph states that it is governed by one standard,4" remands for deter-
mination of which of two different standards applies,4 2 and suggests in the
body that the two standards are, in fact, the same."'3 Perhaps, however, this is
the important point to take away from the two decisions: The different "tests"
are not that different and would lead to the same result in all patronage-based
treatment of employees.' Each has its roots in the First Amendment, each
draws heavily on unconstitutional condition precedents such as Perry v.
Sindermann,65 and each involves balancing. Regardless of how one constructs
the balancing, it is highly doubtful that the various majorities that have con-
denned patronage would allow it to prevail over any dismissal based on
exercise of First Amendment rights.
Perhaps the real significance of Justice Scalia's dissent is neither its
methodological critique nor its reiterated support of patronage. Rather, it is his
456. See id. at 702-03 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting) (rejecting strict scrutiny standard
and advocating a more flexible approach).
457. Id. at 703 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
458. Id. at 704 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
459. See O'Hare Truck Serv., Inc. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712, 715-16 (1996)
(alleging in the complaint that "the removal was in retaliation for Scratzianna's stance in the
campaign").
460. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Umbchr, 518 U.S. 668,706 (1996) (Scalia & Thomas, JJ.,
dissenting).
461. See O'Hare, 518 U.S. at 714-15 (asserting case is governed by Elrod and Brants).
462. Id. at 726.
463. Id. at 719. Justice Kennedy stated that the Court would apply Pickering balancing
in cases in which affiliation is joined with speech. Id. He also stated that affiliation cases call
for a reasonableness analysis. Id.
464. The Court's remand suggests that independent contractors might lose, however,
depending on the test applied.
465. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
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rejection of an aspirational view of American government that sees politics as
playing a rightful role only at election time and only as long as the field is level
and incumbents do not benefit from unfair advantages."' In this view, politics
then disappear in favor of a government that treats citizens neutrally, or at least
does not differentiate on the basis of their political stance.' s Seen this way,
patronage-based personnel decisions are doubly wrong. They can alter the
political playing field by giving incumbents advantages that lead to entrench-
ment and they represent nonneutral awards of the benefit of government
employment. For Justice Scalia, on the other hand, politics is something of a
no-holds-barred contest, and the governmental process of bargains and pres-
sures is a continuation that reflects electoral results.'" "[It is utterly impossi-
ble to erect, and enforce through litigation, a system in which no citizen is
intentionally disadvantaged by the government because of his political
beliefs."" 9 The O'Hare majority paid lip service to the fate of constituencies
that must take their chance "in the larger political process,"47 but that assess-
ment is far from agreement with Justice Scalia's view that "[flavoritism...
happens all the time in American political life, and no one has ever thought that
it violated-of all things-the First Amendment. '471 As the patronage cases
show, the Court has struggled for consistency when presented with contrasting
views of the political-governmental process. Viewing these cases as part of
this broader debate opens the door to analyzing them as more than First
Amendment disputes. It also suggests that an anticorruption perspective might
bolster the decisions, thereby making up for some serious weaknesses in the
analyses.
6. The Patronage Cases and the First Amendment: A Further
Look at the Problems
From Elrod to 0 'Hare, the Court's patronage opinions rely solely on the
First Amendment. No other substantive constitutional provision plays a role
in the analysis. Yet, prior to Elrod, critics of patronage did not tend to see it
as a First Amendment problem. Justice Scalia may have exaggerated slightly
when he said that "[n]o court [had] ever held, and indeed no one ever thought,
466. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 711 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
467. The majority opinions in the patronage cases reflect this aspirational view. Infra
section V.B.7.
468. See, e.g., Umbehr, 518 U.S. at 710 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing political process
of rewarding supporters).
469. Id. at 695 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
470. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting O'Hare Truck Sere., Inc. v. City of Northlake, 518
U.S. 712, 720 (1996)).
471. Id. at 711 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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prior to our decisions in Elrod and Branti, that patronage contracting could
violate the First Amendment., 42 However, he is not far from the mark. The
most widespread criticisms of patronage had been that it led to inefficient
government and was tied to corruption in general.4" From a legal perspective,
the most obvious basis for an attack was the Baker v. Carr-74 line of cases that
opened up the franchise. Indeed, these cases appear to have been the principal
foundation for the Shakman litigation aimed at patronage in Cook County and
Chicago.47 Although equal protection analysis would certainly have bolstered
the result, none of the Supreme Court patronage cases cites Baker and its
progeny or Shakman.
476
Perhaps another sign of weakness with the cases is the ongoing division
and uncertainly within the Court. In Elrod there was no majority.477 Justice
Stewart, whose concurring opinion provided the necessary votes for a majority
in Elrod, dissented in Branti when the Court changed the standard for deter-
mining when patronage dismissals of public employees are valid.47 More-
over, every one of the decisions has provoked a strong dissent, first by Justice
Powell, 479 then by Justice Scalia .4 " The methodological problems that the
latter has decried, while perhaps not as fatal as he insists, do suggest that the
Court thinks something is wrong with the governmental actions before it, but
cannot make up its mind on how to analyze them.
Evidence from the lower courts suggests that Justice Scalia was right in
warning of considerable uncertainty in applying the Court's guidance. The
Court presented Branti as a narrowing of permissible patronage-based action,
472. Id. at 689-90.
473. See, e.g., C. Richard Johnson, SuccessfulReform Litigation: The ShakmanPatronage
Case, 64 C-.-KNT L. REV. 479, 482 (1988) (criticizing system that benefitted parties over the
public); Segal, supra note 298, at 508 (noting civil service reformers' blaming patronage "for
rampant government waste and inefficiency"). Professor Segal discusses contemporary
problems of "oppressive" patronage in the context of decentralized schools in New York. Id.
at 524-26.
474. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
475. See Johnson, supra note 473, at 483-84 (citing Baker and equal protection). How-
ever, First Amendment claims were present in the case. See id. at 484 (noting violations of
political speech).
476. The Shakman litigation was commenced in 1969 and led to a consent decree in 1972.
477. Justice Brennan's plurality opinion was joined by two Justices. Elrod v. Burns, 427
U.S. 347, 349 (1976) (plurality opinion). Two other Justices concurred. Id. at 374 (Stewart,
J., concurring).
478. Branti v. Finke, 445 U.S. 507, 520 (1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
479. E.g.,Elrod, 427 U.S. at 376 (Powell, J., dissenting).
480. E.g., Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62,92 (1980) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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but some lower courts have been inclined to read the exception broadly."" One
commentator found "a cacophonous mix of lower court voices on the issue of
patronage"1482 and stated that the situation "cries out for resolution by the
Supreme Court."4 3 What is involved is more than the inevitable confusion that
ensues when the Court introduces a new doctrine. The problem is weakness
in the grounding of that doctrine solely in the First Amendment.
Certain fundamental aspects ofthe First Amendment analysis do not seem
quite right. In Elrod, Justice Brennan relegated to a conclusory footnote any
waiver argument that might be raised against the discharged employees.484 The
issue deserves more consideration, as Justice Powell's two invocations of it
suggest.4" The plaintiffs in Elrod and Branti appear to have gotten their jobs
through patronage.4 6 Thus, the Court let those who were beneficiaries of the
system turn into attackers. A strong sense of equity adheres in the notion that
"beneficiaries of a patronage system may not be heard to challenge it when it
comes their turn to be replaced."4 7 Justice Brennan seemed to think these
plaintiffs were fighting an unconstitutional condition the government had
thrust upon them.' More likely, they wanted the condition because it gave
them a preference they would otherwise not have had. To say that these
plaintiffs cannot sue is not to validate patronage as Justice Brennan Suggests.
489
A current employee who had not received his or her job because of partisan
affiliation could still challenge a patronage dismissal. Thus, Brennan's conten-
tion confuses standing with the merits.
He also brushes aside any contention that patronage practices balance out
in the long run.4 * True, what the Court considers a violation occurs after a
481. See Martin, supra note 310, at 28 (describing confusion over Brand application).
482. Berry, supra note 309, at 668.
483. Id. at 682.
484. See Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 359 n.13 (1976) (plurality opinion) ("The difficulty
with [the waiver argument] is that it completely swallows the rule. Since the qualification may
not be constitutionally imposed absent an appropriate justification, to accept the waiver
argument is to say that the government may do what it may not do.").
485. See id. at 38041 (Powell, J., dissenting) (stressing that employees had gotten their
jobs through patronage, had knowledge about political loyalty expected in the system, and
reaped benefits from such a system); see also Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 526 n.6 (1980)
(Powell, J., dissenting) (repeating the position he took in Elrod).
486. Brand, 445 U.S. at 526 n.6 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting); Elrod, 427 U.S. at 380-81
(Powell, J., dissenting).
487. Elrod, 427 U.S. at 380 (Powell, J., dissenting).
488. See id. at 360-61 (citing the unconstitutional condition precedents for the following
proposition: "The denial of a public benefit may not be used by the government for the purpose
of creating an incentive enabling it to achieve what it may not command directly.").
489. See id. at 360 n.13 (stating that the waiver argument "completely swallows the rule").
490. See id. at 360 (arguing that "regardless of how evenhandedly these restraints may
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given election. But the next election can redress the balance, at least in a two-
party context.49 Over time, advantages and disadvantages may cancel each
other out. This is a far cry from the type of hypothetical edict on which Justice
Brennan placed heavy reliance: an imposed orthodoxy that bars individuals of
certain races or beliefs from public office.4 The losing Republicans in Elrod
may be shut out, or they may fight like tigers to unseat the (temporarily?)
victorious Democrats. Perhaps this calls for the fact-specific analysis a trial
court could make in a particular case.493 That is different from an appellate
court's generalized conclusion that "patronage is a very effective impediment
to the associational and speech freedoms which are essential to a meaningful
system of democratic goVernment." 494 As Justice Scalia said, the Court in the
patronage cases "left the realm of law and entered the domain of political
science.."4 Indeed, much ofthe debate among the Justices has focused on how
to interpret political science materials.4" A famous law review article written
in 1991 concluded that Justice Scalia's predictions about the cases' impact on
political parties were wrong," but he has continued to attack them.49
7. The Patronage Cases as an Anticorruption
Statement: A Supplemental Explanation
The Powell and Scalia dissents, and other criticisms suggested here, are
strong arguments that the cases are close ones. However, it does not follow
that the results, at least all of them,4 9 are wrong as a matter of federal constitu-
operate in the long run, after political office has changed hands several times, protected interests
are still infringed and thus the violation remains").
491. In a one-party context, the advantages of entrenchment might negate any balancing
out. However, Justice Brennan stated that the rule of Elrod applies categorically. Id.
492. See id. at 357-59 (stressing that the use of race, religion, or belief to disqualify
persons from public employment is impermissible).
493. Cf. O'Hare Truck Serv., Inc. v. City ofNorthlake, 518 U.S. 712,719 (1996) (explain-
ing that certain instances involving party affiliation and the exercise of free speech may call for
a case-by-case adjudication).
494. Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347,369-70 (1976) (plurality opinion).
495. Rutan v. Republican Party of i., 497 U.S. 62,113 (1980) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
496. E.g., id. at 88 n.4. Citing numerous political science and law review articles, Justice
Stevens stated: "I note only that many commentators agree more with Justice Scalia's admis-
sions of the systemic coats of patronage practices ... than with his belief that patronage is
necessary to political stability and integration of powerless groups."
497. Cynthia Grant Bowman, "We Don't Want Anybody Anybody Sent": The Death of
Patronage Hiring in Chicago, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 57,95 (1991).
498. E.g., Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 686 (1996) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
499. Perhaps the strongest case is Rutan, in which the governor appeared to have effec-
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tional law. My main point is that the cases do not fit comfortably within First
Amendment analysis. Something more is at issue. What that might be is
obscured by the Court's focus on the rights of the plaintiffs-an Article HI
necessity under a strict reading of the adjudicatory role of the federal courts.
This focus may cause insufficient attention to the broader effects of the defen-
dant's conduct beyond those rights. Clearly, the Court saw the various defen-
dants' actions as examples of corruption and it was at least as anxious to
condemn that corruption as it was to grant redress to the plaintiffs. An
aspirational, anticorruption reading of the patronage cases not only helps
understand (and perhaps strengthen) the results, but it also explains why the
Court reached out for First Amendment analysis to achieve those results. The
First Amendment served as the most readily available building block on which
to base this broader vision.
From the outset, the antipatronage Justices have gone to some length to
link patronage with corruption. In Elrod itself, Justice Brennan cited "strong"
nineteenth century "discontent with the corruption and inefficiency of the
patronage system"5" and even mentioned that patronage "played a significant
role in the Nazi rise to power.""01 In Rutan, Justice Stevens, concurring, cited
"the financial corruption, such as salary kickbacks and partisan political
activity on government-paid time, [and] the reduced efficiency of govern-
ment." Majority Justices have noted the possible presence of bribery,"°3
possible "abuses of power in the name of patronage"5 °" and, of course, one can
find a reference to the disregard of the "public interest. 50 5
The concept of abuse of power represents a general critique. On a more
specific level, one can trace four major themes linking patronage to what might
be seen as a form of corruption. The most frequent theme is the detrimental
effect ofpatronage on the electoral process. Given the cases' First Amendment
framework, this is usually stated as a constraint on the freedom of individual
voters."° However, another dimension to the problem exists: the danger that
tively abolished the civil service system to the point that a very wide range of personnel actions
depended on political affiliation. Rutan, 497 U.S. at 65-66.
500. Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347,354 (1976) (plurality opinion).
501. Id. at353.
502. Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 88 n.4 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring).
503. E.g., O'Hare Truck Serv., Inc. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712, 721 (1996);
Umbehr, 518 U.S. at 682.
504. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668,682 (1996).
505. See Rutan, 497 U.S. at 88 (Stevens, J., concurring) (contending that Justice Scalia's
"defense of patronage obfuscates the critical distinction between partisan interest and the public
interest').
506. See id. at 82 n.3 (Stevens, J., concurring) (stating that the interest in protecting parties
from "unrestrained factionalism... has not disturbed our protection of the rights of individual
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patronage destroys any possibility ef a level playing field. "Patronage.. . tips
the electoral process in favor of the incumbent party, and where the practice's
scope is substantial relative to the size of the electorate, the impact on the
process can be significant."5  There are direct echoes here of Buckley v.
Valeo's upholding of limits on "large individual financial contributions.""
Admittedly, the analogy is not perfect. Buckley was concerned with possible
quid pro quos from outside forces."° Here, the suspect force is not out-
side-parties are part of the system and are expected to try to win. Moreover,
the patronage cases may come closer to accepting an equalization rationale
than Buckley and its progeny. ° Still, the broader value of "confidence in the
system of representative government,' found in both Buckley and the patron-
age cases,512 is threatened if the electorate views the process as rigged in
advance."1 3 It is in this sense, I believe, that Justice Brennan in Elrod discussed
Buckley in his. reference to "the evil of influence" and "the grave evil of im-
proper influence in the political process. '
The dissenters would dismiss this line of argument as naive .' and point
to the long tradition of bare-knuckles politics in America. People and parties
with advantages will use them.1 6 At this point, a second major theme of the
corruption analogy comes into play: "entrenchment." The cases are replete
with discussions of this evil."' Entrenchment can, of course, simply be
voters").
507. Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347,356 (1976) (plurality opinion).
508. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 27 (1976).
509. Id. at 26-27.
510. See, e.g., id. at 48-49 (rejecting equalization rationale as "wholly foreign to the First
Amendment").
511. Id. at 27 (citing U.S. Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S.
548, 565 (1973)).
512. Id., see Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 84 (1980) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (noting the value of politically neutral public service).
513. See Rutan, 497 U.S. at 88 n.4 (Stevens, J., concurring) (describing "hopelessness" of
challenging a political machine).
514. Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 379 n.25 (1976) (plurality opinion).
515. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668,696 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(expressing concern that the Court would "end up holding the First Amendment requires the city
of Chicago to have as few potholes in Republican wards (if any) as in Democratic ones"). In
his Rutan dissent, Justice Scalia accused the majority of"a naive vision of politics." Rutan, 497
U.S. at 103 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
516. See Umbehr, 518 U.S. at 710-11 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that favoritism is
common and often nothing that "one would get excited about").
517. See Rutan v. Republican Party of Ml., 497 U.S. 62, 70 (1980) (quoting Elrod for the
same proposition); Elrod, 427 U.S. at 369 ("Patronage can result in the entrenchment of one or
a few parties to the exclusion of others.").
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another way of referring to an unfair playing field in which one party uses its
captive troops to constantly outflank the others. 518 Citizens have the right to
vote, but they cannot use it to effect change, a defect in the democratic system
analogous to malapportionment. This is primarily the way the Court uses the
term. However, entrenchment also serves to keep the emoluments of office
flowing to the incumbents. Profiting from office for personal gain is certainly
a major form of corruption.5 9 The Court's references to bribes and
kickbacks 20 can be seen as adding this dimension to its condemnation of
patronage.
A third theme of the antipatronage critique that links it to corruption is
the danger it poses to neutral operation of government.5"' The goal of equal
access to government services is an important theme of conflict-of-interest
analysis. 22 Harking back to Ex Parte .Curtis," the cornerstone of Supreme
Court anticorruption jurisprudence, the Court has proclaimed the "impartial
execution of the laws" as the "great end" of democratic government."2 The
landmark decisions upholding the constitutionality of the Hatch Act's restric-
tions on political activity by federal workers relied heavily on the dangers of
partisan administration." s In the patronage context, the corruption lies in the
fact that every citizen has an equal vote, but that equality does not extend to
the administration of programs adopted by elected representatives. 26 If only
a favored few get benefits intended for all, the system is not working demo-
cratically. Again, the dissenters would level accusations of naivete.121 Some
518. See Rutan, 497 U.S. at 88 n.4 (Stevens, J., concurring) (describing how public
employees can be used as campaign workers).
519. Segal, supra note 298, at 534. In describing patronage as a possible form of bribery,
Professor Segal states that "it involves an abuse of public office by officials for private gain."
Id.
520. E.g., O'Hare Truck Serv., Inc. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712,721 (1996).
521. See, e.g., Rutan, 497 U.S. at 84 (Stevens, J., concurring) (emphasizing the "desirabil-
ity of political neutrality in the public service and the avoidance of the use of the power and
prestige of government to favor one party or the other").
.522. Beth Nolan, Public Interest, Private Income: Conflicts and Control Limits on the
Outside Income of Government Officials, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 57, 79 (1992) (stating that "[t]he
equal access principle seeks to keep government in the public interest rather than permitting it
to be captured by private, monied interests").
523. ExParte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371 (1882).
524. U.S. Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548,565 (1973).
525. See id. at 555-66 (noting danger of allowing federal employees to become part of
campaign structure).
526. See Rutan v. Republican Party of ll., 497 U.S. 62, 84 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(noting government's interest in "not compromising the availability of public service").
527. See id. at 103 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that the Court's categorical rejection of
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favoritism is inevitable, as Justice Kennedy admitted. However, there are
limits. The fact that basic governmental services cannot be differentially
provided on the basis of race is well-established.529 Large deviations on other
grounds may not rise to the constitutional level, but they too erode confidence
in the fairness of the system.
The overarching importance of preserving this confidence is a bedrock
principle of anticorruption law and suggests a fourth theme: the pervasive
effects of patronage call into question the legitimacy of government. Justice
O'Connor questioned the legitimacy of patronage contracting. 3  Justice
Stevens described the sense of hopelessness felt by opponents of the
machine.53 Perhaps his ultimate criticism of patronage is that "its paternalis-
tic impact is actually at war with the deeper traditions of democracy."5 32 A
vigorous democracy is built on citizen participation. Distrust can lead to
abandonment. In sum, the systemic evils of patronage touch many facets of
the democratic system and threaten to destroy it. For the antipatronage
Justices, viewing the practice as part of a broader corruption enhanced their
desire to outlaw it.
8. When Good Government and the First Amendment
Clash: The Campaign Finance Reform Conundrum
The patronage cases do not represent the only area in which the Court
has intimated a vision of good government. The issue is sharply posed in the
series of challenges to campaign finance reform legislation beginning with
Buckley. Here, the political branches have sought to advance the cause of
good government through regulating the campaign process. In these cases, the
First Amendment functions essentially as a shield, wielded by those who
assert their individual rights against these reform efforts. The Court has been
somewhat receptive to their claims, leaving some doubt as to how far a vision
patronage "reflects a naive vision of politics").
528. See O'Hare Truck Serv., Inc. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712, 720-21 (1996)
(noting that the plaintiff "was not part of a constituency that must take its chance of being
favored or ignored in the larger political process--for example, by residing or doing business
in a region the government rewards or spurns in the construction of public works").
529. See Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286,1292 (Sth Cir. 1971) (determining that
municipal services cannot be distributed unequally according to race), rev'd in part, 461 F.2d
1171 (5th Cir. 1972) (per curiam).
530. See Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 681 (1996) ("[W]e do not
believe that tradition legitimizes patronage contracting.").
531. See Rutan, 497 U.S. at 88 n.4 (Stevens, J., concurring) (describing sense of hopeless-
ness felt by political machine's opponents).
532. Id. at91-92.
479
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of electoral reform (an example of good government) can withstand a First
Amendment challenge when the reform involves limiting the role of money
in political campaigns.
The principal battleground has been how to define corruption. The
Court is in general agreement that preventing quid pro quo corruption, or its
appearance, can be a strong enough governmental interest to justify restric-
tions on what Buckley identified as First Amendment rights of association and
speech in the campaign context. Corruption may well extend beyond bribery
"to the broader threat from politicians too compliant with the wishes of large
contributors," although some division on this point exists.533 The extent to
which equalization of electoral opportunity might justify curbs on the use of
differing resources remains a particularly controversial issue.534 The cases do
not always point in the same direction. Buckley rejected an equalization
rationale,535 but Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce536 points
toward viewing unequal influence as close to corruption.537 Notions of a level
playing field seem implicit in limiting the influence of large contributors.
How much of a step would it be from this view of corruption to an explicit
recognition of equalization as a legitimate state interest? Professor Richard
Briffault views the Court as engaged in a "nuanced revision of the meaning
of 'corruption.'
5 38
The campaign finance cases are relevant to the inquiry here in at least
three ways. The first is that the Court has articulated a vision of corruption
that permits government action to overcome it in the face of constitutional
challenge. Eliminating corruption is thus reinforced as a valid governmental
interest. The cases focus primarily on the electoral process, as opposed to
government operations in general, but many of the themes are the same as in
the patronage cases. In particular, if large donors did receive preferential
treatment, one would normally see it at some point during the operation of
government. 39 Thus, the search for fairness in elections carries over to fair-
533. See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 389 (2000) (reading Buckley as
recognizing such a threat); id. at 423-25 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority opinion
for extending concept of corruption).
534. See Richard M. Briffault, Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC: The Begin-
ning of the End of the Buckley Era?, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1729, 1741-45 (2001) (examining
equalization with respect to monetary sources).
535. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 55-57 (1976).
536. Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
537. See Briffault, supra note 534, at 1742 (noting that the Court "has repeatedly blurred
the corruption/inequality distinction, treating inequality as a form of corruption").
538. Id. at 1757.
539. See Buckley v. Valco, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976) (referring to corruption concerns as
NEW FEDERALISM'S UNANSWERED QUESTION
ness in the ensuing government. A second similarity, already noted, is the
repeated emphasis on citizen confidence in government as an important factor
that buttresses reform efforts, even when they pose First Amendment prob-
lems. 4' Perhaps most importantly, those who challenge the campaign finance
reform laws are pre-enforcement defendants whose legal position is somewhat
analogous to the defendants in the corruption prosecutions.5 4' While the
campaign defendants are challenging actions of their own government, as
opposed to those of another level, that does not detract from the similarity.
What is key is that they assert a constitutional right in order to oppose, some-
times successfully, a governmental attempt to attack corruption. These
defendants are asserting individual rights derived from the Constitution. The
corruption defendants, if they invoke federalism, are at least asserting a
constitutional value, perhaps a right on the state's part that could, under the
new federalism, be viewed as equivalent to an individual's right.
Thus, the campaign finance reform cases may cut both ways in terms of
the general problem this Article raises. On the one hand, they reinforce the
notion of combating corruption as an important government activity. Thus,
we can find an area of jurisprudence outside of the patronage cases in which
a vision of good government is adumbrated. Even though, it may reflect a
more narrow vision of corruption, focusing primarily on quid pro quo from
outside sources. 42 On the other hand, the campaign finance reform cases
show that the Constitution places limits on the activity of fighting corruption
regardless of how it is defined. Whether these limits extend beyond the First
Amendment rights involved in those cases to the state sovereignty values
enshrined in the new federalism is for now an open question.
reflecting concern over "the real or imagined coercive influence of large financial contributions
on candidates' positions and on their actions if elected to office") (emphasis added).
540. See, e.g., id. at 27 (noting that averting the appearance of corruption is critical).
541. Any ultimate prosecution under the criminal provisions of these laws would probably
not be for the corruption itself, but for acts that could lead to it.
542. The Court's decision in Federal Election Commission v. National Conservative
PoliticalAction Committee, 470 U.S. 480 (1985), defines corruption as follows:
Corruption is a subversion of the political process. Elected officials are influenced
to act contrary to their obligations of office by the prospect of financial gain to
themselves or infusion of money into their campaigns. The hallmark of corruption
is the financial quidpro quo, dollars for political favors.
Id. at 497. But see Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 389 (2000) (noting that the
Court has "recognized a concern not confined to bribery of public officials, but extending to the
broader threat from politicians too compliant with the wishes of large contributors").
A particularly helpful discussion of the problem of defining corruption is found in Daniel
H. Lowenstein, Political Bribery and the Intermediate Theory of Politics, 32 UCLA L. REV.
784, 798, 805 (1985).
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9. The Patronage Plaintiffs as Private United States Attorneys
Combating Corruption
As for the patronage cases, they do not address the federal role in com-
bating state and local corruption. On the surface, the cases represent typical
constitutional litigation. The plaintiff asserts a federal constitutional right, the
Court agrees, and orders appropriate relief. However, they can be seen as
more--as an endorsement by implication of a broad federal role. As an initial
matter, one can view some of the plaintiffs as private attorneys general (or,
better yet, United States Attorneys) who have brought a broad-scale prob-
lem-not only their individual claims-before the Court. In Rutan, for
example, the Court should be viewed as having struck down the Governor's
entire "political patronage system." 3  In Elrod, the Court not only struck
down the patronage dismissals at issue, but also upheld the granting of broad
preliminary injunctive relief. 5 Beyond the results in any particular case, the
Court repeatedly made clear its disapproval of other practices and its view of
patronage as a form of corruption that threatens the legitimacy of the demo-
cratic process itself.
The clearest indication of the Court's endorsement of a broad federal
role in the area is that federalism-based objections were made forcefully in the
patronage cases from the outset. Chief Justice Burger's dissent in Elrod relied
heavily on federalism concerns in stating the issue as "whether the choice of
[the patronage system's] use in the very government of each state was not, in
the words of the Tenth Amendment, reserved to the States ...or to the
people."" For him, the answer was clear.5" He even cited National League
of Cities v. User s47 in decrying "constant inroads on the power of the States
to manage their own affairs." 4 Federalism surfaced again in Justice Powell's
dissent in Brantd.49 He warned that the decision might well "impair the right
543. Rutan v. Republican Party of ll., 497 U.S. 62,66 (1980).
544. See Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 373-74 (1976) (plurality opinion) (finding the
practice of patronage dismissals unconstitutional and upholding the grant of injunctive relief,
as First Amendment interests were threatened at time relief was sought and plaintiff's demon-
strated a probability of success on the merits).
545. Id. at 376 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
546. See id. (Burger, CJ., dissenting) (citing Congress's choice, not open to judicial
scrutiny, to allow the executive branch to have a small number of political appointments, and
stating that the state legislature's choice should be given equal deference).
547. Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
548. Elrod, 427 U.S. at 375-76 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
549. See Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 521 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting) (describing his
concern with the imposition of a "constitutionalized civil service standard that will affect the
employment practices of federal, state, and local governments").
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of local voters to structure their government."'55 In Rutan, the majority
rejected the concern expressed by the court below about opening state em-
ployment decisions to "excessive interference by the Federal Judiciary.
'"5 1
The theme of states' ability to structure their internal operations is a
recurring one in federalism debates. Chief Justice Burger's invocation of
National League of Cities is particularly significant given its role as a major
source of the precepts of today's federalism cases. 5 2 Obviously, federal
attacks on patronage run counter to these views. Thus, one can see the patron-
age cases and their broader implications as an opposing theme to strong
precepts of federalism, one that favors a national role. Moreover, the cases
do not stand alone. Other, similar themes in the legal and constitutional
tradition point in the same direction.
. The National Government's Protective Role Within
the New Federalism
A. The Patronage Cases and the Prosecutions: Common Values
Despite what one might think from reading the editorial page of the New
York Times,5 3 the Supreme Court is not single-minded in its attempt to
strengthen federalism at the expense of all other constitutional values. Profes-
550. Id. at 532.
551. See Rutan v. Republican Party of Il., 497 U.S. 62, 76-77 n.8 (1980) ("Our decision
does not impose the Federal Judiciary's supervision on any state government activity that is
otherwise immune. The federal courts have long been available for protesting unlawful state
employment decisions.").
552. Supra notes 82-90 and accompanying text
553. See, e.g.,A MisguidedExpansion ofStates'Rights, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 12,2000, atA22
(stating that the Supreme Court's decision that Congress had no authority to require states to
observe federal law barring age discrimination was a result of its efforts to diminish Congress's
power under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause); Supreme Mischief, N.Y.
TIMES, June 24, 1999, atA6 (finding recent decisions of the Supreme Court "disturbing," in that
the Court "significantly strengthened the powers of the states in the Federal System while
weakening those of the Federal Government"); The High Court Loses Restraint, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 29, 1995, at 22 (arguing that the Supreme Court's decision in Lopez undermined the
traditional deference that the Court had given Congress with respect to the Commerce Clause).
Professor Massey offers the following observation:
A reader only of the Times would think that the Rehnquist Court's federalism lacks
any connection to constitutional history or doctrine, is devoid of reason, and is
prompted only by partisan politics. As should be evident, I think this is a risible
caricature. There may well be grounds for disagreement with the Court (and I shall
register my disagreement later on) but the Times's basis of disagreement is too
shallow to merit further mention.
Massey, supra note 146, at 436 n.25
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sor Farber sees the Court as currently focused on three goals: upholding the
states as republics, maintaining the established balance of federal and state
power, and defending constitutional rights from either level of government. 54
If one accepts an analysis along these lines, the natural assumption is that the
Court will need to juggle conflicting normative commitments to state sover-
eignty, federal supremacy, and individual rights. Given the fact of strong
pulls in different directions, the result is likely to be closer to a maintenance
of. the status quo than to a constitutional counter-revolution. 5 5 However,
federalism issues are more hotly debated than in the past and federalism as a
constitutional value occupies a higher status than.it once did. As a result,
some cases do come out differently.
As for the corruption prosecutions of state and local officials, they are
an example of what might be called the protective role of the national govern-
ment in terms of both the functioning of the federal system and the protection
of individual rights. The key question then becomes the extent to which a
national protective role can coexist with the centrifugal force of the new
federalism. After all, one possible interpretation of the logic of the new
federalism is that the states can protect their citizens and police themselves.
This Article treats the patronage cases at length because they reach results and
further values that are consistent with those of the prosecutions and the vision
of a national protective role. Both sets of cases advance common nationalist
values, many of which have deep roots in the American constitutional and
legal traditions. This Part reviews those values briefly and considers how
their interaction with the new federalism might play out.
B. Confidence, the Franchise, and the Goal of Neutral Government
The question of citizen confidence in government at all levels is a recur-
ring theme in Supreme Court jurisprudence. The cornerstone case, United
States v. Mississippi Valley Generating Co.,"56 represented a broad reading of
a conflict-of-interest statute in a case which Chief Justice Warren stated "has
a far-reaching significance in the area of public employment and involves
fundamental questions relating to the standards of conduct which should
govern those who represent the Government in its business dealings. ""' The
554. Farber, supra note 133, at 1134.
555. See id. at 1139 ("[T]he New Federalist Justices as a group seem to conceive of
themselves as defending the status quo, preserving only the limits on that 'vast' federal power
that have been respected through most of the post-New Deal era, and protecting those limits
against the recent threat of an omnipotent nationalism.").
556. United States v. Miss. Valley Generating Co., 364 U.S. 520 (1961).
557. Id. at 523.
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Court stressed the prophylactic nature ofthe conflict-of-interest statute, stating
that it
embodies a recognition of the fact that an impairment of impartial judg-
ment can occur in even the most well-meaning men when their personal
economic interests are affected by the business they transact on behalf of
the Government .... It attempts to prevent honest government agents
from succumbing to temptation by making it illegal for them to enter into
relationships which are fraught with temptation."s
The broad thrust of the opinion is captured in Chief Justice Warren's statement
that
the statute is directed at an evil which endangers the very fabric of a
democratic society, for a democracy is effective only if the people have
faith in those who govern, and that faith is bound to be shattered when
high officials and their appointees engage in activities which arouse
suspicions of malfeasance and comiption." 9
This emphasis on confidence recurs throughout the Court's opinions on
campaign finance. As the Court recently stated in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri
Government PAC:s e "Leave the perception of impropriety unanswered, and
the cynical assumption that large donors call the tune could jeopardize the
willingness of voters to take part in democratic governance." 61  Corrupt
government at one level may erode public confidence in the system as a whole.
This argument would justify prosecution of corruption at all levels.
Federal intervention in the processes of state and local government is not
an isolated phenomenon. Perhaps the classic example is the availability of the
federal courts to vindicate denials of the right to vote.562 Baker v. Carr 63 was
a fundamental step beyond denials into the thicket of reapportionment and vote
dilution-a core political question of state and local governance.5" Corruption
558. Id. at 549-50.
559. Id. at 562.
560. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000).
561. Id. at 390.
562. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,554 (1964) ("Undeniably the Constitution of the
United States protects the right of all qualified citizens to vote, in state as well as in federal
elections. A consistent line of decisions by this Court in cases involving attempts to deny or
restrict the right of suffrage has made this indelibly clear."); id. at 555 (citing examples of
federal judicial intervention); id. ("The right to vote freely for the candidate of one's choice is
of the essence of a democratic society, and any restrictions on that right strike at the heart of
representative government").
563. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
564. See id. at 237 (finding that an equal protection challenge to Tennessee's statute
regarding appointment of seats to the general assembly is a justiciable cause of action).
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cases may also be tied directly to efforts to distort the fairness of a particular
vote. A classic example is federal prosecution of a state or local official for
extortion of campaign contributions, which give him or her an unfair advan-
tage in the electoral process. 5 The repeated reference in the patronage cases
to the problem of "entrenchment ' "6 shows a close relationship to the overall
concern with exercise of an unobstructed franchise.
Somewhat more controversial is the question of how far beyond the vote
itself the federal role to protect the right to cast that vote extends. As Professor
Karlan has stated, "[tjhe right to vote embodies a nested constellation of
concepts [including]... the ability to have one's policy preferences enacted
into law within the process of representative decision-making." 61 This raises
the question of how far one can extrapolate this principle from the actual vote
to the manner in which the government implements policy. At the least,
serious corruption within government after the election could be viewed as a
classic attempt by one interest group to utilize superior resources to thwart the
goals of democracy. A basic definition of corruption is the undernining of
majority preferences through improper influence of "wealth and market
forces. ' s" The notion of thwarting the outcome suggests that some peo-
ple-the winners-ought to be treated better than others. Either way, there are
winners and losers.
At the same time, there exists in our constitutional tradition a frequently
articulated notion of a right to be treated equally by public entities. The Equal
Protection Clause embodies this ideal. A good example of its operation in
practice is the series of cases associated with Hawkins v. Town of Shaw"9 that
prohibit race-based denials of equal treatment in the provision of municipal
services."' The broader thrust of the clause extends beyond its historical
context to a general notion of equality before the laws. Concurring in the
rehearing of Hawkins, Judge Wisdom viewed the decision as recognizing "thde
565. See Segal, supra note 298, at 533-45 (discussing the role of extortion and bribery
statutes in the campaign context).
566. See, e.g., Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 369 (1976) ("Patronage can result in the
entrenchment of one or a few parties to the exclusion of others.").
567. Pamela S. Kadan, The Newest Equal Protection: Regressive Doctrine on a Change-
able Court, in THE VOTE: BUSH, GORE, AND THE SUPREME COURT 77,79 (Ca R. Sunstein &
Richard A. Epstein eds., 2001).
568. See SusAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, COIRUFrION: A STUDY IN POLrITcAL ECONOMY 2
(1978) (discussing possible ways in which wealth and market forces affect political and
legislative decisions).
569. Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971), rev'd in part, 461 F.2d
1171 (5th Cir. 1972).
570. Id. at 1288.
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right of every citizen regardless of race to equal municipal services." '  The
same aspirations are captured in42 U.S.C. § 1981, originally enacted in 1870,
stating that "all persons" shall enjoy 'the same right ... to make and enforce
contracts.. .and to the full and equal benefit of all laws .. as is enjoyed by
white cftizens."s72 Again, if one abstracts the racial context from these cases,
the same aspiration toward equal administration is present. This Article has
noted the importance of the Hatch Act cases5'3 and their foundation in the
landmark 1882 decision in E parte Curtis,574 which declared equal treatment
before the laws as a fundamental value of a democratic society. 5 There is, of
course, a tension between the notion that the winners in a democratic election
ought to be better off in some respects and the aspirational goal of equal
administration. It surfaces sharply in the patronage cases. However, in the
context of corruption prosecutions, both values may point in the same direc-
tion. The payment of bribes, extortion by officeholders, and other abuses by
those in office skew the provision of services, thus violating one or even both
of these precepts.
C. Towards a Right to Good Government
When it acts to preserve citizen confidence in institutions of government,
the national government can, of course, be seen as protecting itself. A loss of
confidence in one level of the democratic system could have repercussions for
all levels.576 Might it also be seen as acting to protect an individual right of
state citizens to good government, instead of simply protecting itself? This
view would put the national government in the more typical posture of protect-
ing individual federal rights.
The right to vote is a good example. As discussed,"' the question arises
if one can extrapolate from this right, beyond such concepts as neutral adminis-
tration, a basic right to good government. Professor Karlan offers an interest-
571. Hawkins, 461 F.2d at 1175 (Wisdom, J., concurring).
572. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000).
573. See, e.g., U.S. Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548,
565 (1973) ("A major thesis of the Hatch Act is that to serve this great end of government...
it is essential that federal employees... not undertake to play substantial roles in partisan
political campaigns .... Forbidding activities like these will reduce the hazards to fair and
effective government.").
574. Exparte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371 (1882).
575. Id. at 373.
576. See Kurland, supra note 34, at 376-77 (stating that "(t]he faith that the citizenry
places in all levels of government is the foundation of the republic," and explaining that the
government's interest in preventing erosion of this foundation should secure federal protection
of it at all levels of government).
577. Supra notes 562-67 and accompanying text.
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ing interpretation of Bush v. Gore... and the reapportionment cases dealing
with racial gerrymandering." 9 She calls the right found in these cases "struc-
tural" equal protection.8 ° As Professor Karlan states:
In this newest model of equal protection, the Court deploys the Equal
Protection Clause not to protect the rights of an individual or a discreet
group of individuals, particularly a group unable to protect itself through
operation of the normal political processes, but rather to regulate the
institutional arrangements within which politics is conducted.58'
Even if the cases she cites could be read to establish such a federal role, it is not
clear the Equal Protection Clause could be extended to a broader individual
entitlement to good government protected by the federal government standing
ready to prosecute those who violate it. As the echoes of Professor John Hart
Ely suggest, a classic derivative of the right to vote is an umpiring role for the
judiciary."8 2 Ely states, for example, that the focus should not be on "whether
this or that substantive value is unusually important or fundamental, but rather
on whether the opportunity to participate either in the political processes by
which values are appropriately identified and accommodated, or in the accom-
modation those processes have reached, has been unduly constricted." ' 3 He
considers it an appropriate function of the Court to keep the "machinery of
democratic government running as it should, to make sure the channels of
political participation and communication are kept open. "58 4 Even so, this
classic view of the national government's protective role, not just that of the
judicial branch, may go beyond electoral participation, but it stops short of a
general federal supervisory jurisdiction over the quality of government and
public servants. There is an important conceptual step from fair and open
government to corruption-free government.
However, other important strands in the legal tradition point in this
direction. One, discussed earlier in this Article, is the lower federal courts'
persistent development of the doctrine that citizens have an intangible right to
honest public service. 5 A key question is whether the right belongs to individ-
uals or is essentially of a shared, general nature. Thus, while this right might
not be enforceable in a private civil suit, in part because of standing problems,
578. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
579. See generally Karlan, supra note 567.
580. Id. at 78.
581. Id.
582. See ELY, supra note 8, at 76 (evaluating the meaning of footnote four in United States
v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938)).
583. Id. at 77.
584. Id. at 76.
585. Supra text accompanying notes 26-31.
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the national government's continued protection of it through the criminal law
is substantial evidence of the right's existence." 6 The right may not be of
constitutional status. However, the federal courts can be viewed as developing,
in the criminal context, a federal common law of good government."8 7 The
honest services doctrine has deep roots in the common law-in part, it is an
application of concepts of fiduciary duty to public servants."' These common-
law roots perhaps reinforce the notion of the doctrine as an individual right as
well as a matter of "federal public policy."" 9 Moreover, it is important to
emphasize that when the Supreme Court brought this development to a halt in
McNally, Congress stepped in almost immediately, and both ratified and
endorsed the judicial creation of such a right.5" The overturning of McNally
is an example of a second strand: repeated congressional action to deal with
corruption. While the traditional view is that the statutes under which the
federal government prosecutes state and local corruption are not aimed at this
phenomenon, a strong textual argument can be made that the statutes do
confirm a national policy against corrupt government.5 91 The defendants in
these cases are not simply criminals who happen to be public officials. This is
one more piece of evidence for the existence of some form of a right to
corruption-free government that the prosecutions vindicate.
D. Preventing Corruption as Protecting Civil Rights
The classic example of the national government's protective role is in the
area of civil rights. Professor Ely paraphrases the third paragraph of the
586. A private civil suit to enforce the intangible right to honest services would appear to
present a generalized grievance and thus encounter the sort of standing obstacle which the
Supreme Court has emphasized since the 1970s. See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Reservists to Stop the
War, 418 U.S. 208, 220-28 (1974) (finding that standing cannot be predicated on an abstract
injury that all members of the public share, and holding that petitioners had no standing as
taxpayers because they failed to satisfy the "nexus" test). Standing aside, Civil RICO, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1964(c) (2000), provides a possible enforcement vehicle. See H.J., Inc. v. Northwestern Bell
Telephone Co., 492 U.S. 229, 232-33 (1989) (consumer class action suit based on bribes to
state agency and brought under civil RICO).
587. I put to one side issues of the validity of a federal common law of crimes. The honest
services doctrine can always fit under the category of statutory construction. This is particularly
true since the enactment of 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2000). As for federal common law, it is far from
clear that the duties of public officials fall within any of the recognized "enclaves." See FALLON
ET AL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSThM (5th ed. 2003)
(discussing enclave theory of federal common law).
588. See United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108, 123-26 (2d Cir. 1982) (discussing the
fiduciary duties of public officials).
589. Id. at 124.
590. Supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
591. See supra notes 32-59 and accompanying text (discussing this issue at length).
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famous United States v. Carolene Products footnote,5 2 stating that it suggests
"that the Court should also concern itself with what majorities do to minori-
ties," particularly mentioning laws directed at "religious, national, and racial
minorities and those infected by prejudice against them. "59 This has also been
a major role for Congress, both as envisaged in Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment and as practiced in the extensive panoply of civil rights legisla-
tion. Civil rights also represent an area in which critics ofthe new federalism
have been particularly concerned that it would lead constitutional law in a
different direction. Nonetheless, observers such as Professor Farber insist that
the new federalism does not mean a retreat from the national protection of civil
rights.
594
Assuming this to be the case, one can view corrupt government at the
state and local level as a form of injury to minority groups. A good example
is that of corrupt police departments. Apart from possible prejudice, they are
likely to do a less effective job in protecting the residents of minority neighbor-
hoods from street crimes, thus diminishing the protection of their basic rights
to life, liberty, and property.595 Let us assume as a general proposition that
corrupt government will be less efficient overall and more responsive to those
who can place extra resources in the hands of officials. Under these assump-
tions, minority citizens are likely to be the ones who suffer. The ultimate step
in developing this logic would be a broad interpretation of the criminal civil
rights jurisdiction of the national government. The possibility of such a
development has been discussed,5 and the Supreme Court's broad decision
in United States v. Lanier" definitely increases the possibility of what Profes-
592. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
593. Id.
594. See Farber, supra note 133, at 1140 ("Even a casual newspaper reader knows that the
Court has taken action against the states in fields ranging from Free Speech to land use regula-
tion to political redistricting and affirmative action. The Court's interest in states' rights ends
at the point where its commitment to individual rights begins.").
595. See Tom Stacy & Kim Dayton, The Underfederalization of Crime, 6 CoRNELL J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 247, 288 (1997) ("[T]he principal problem facing African-Americans in the
context of criminal justice today is not over-enforcement but under-enforcement of the law."
(quoting Randall Kennedy, The State, Criminal Law, and Racial Discrimination: A Comment,
107 HARVARD L. REV. 1255, 1259 (1994))). Stacy and Dayton go further in making the civil
rights connection: "The national government's accepted role in promoting racial equality
obviously can justify a national response to racially motivated crimes. Perhaps less obviously,
it also furnishes significant support for supplemental national efforts to combat the violent street
crime that disproportionately afflicts African-American communities." Id.
596. George D. Brown, Should Federalism Shield Corrupion?--Mail Fraud, State Law
and Post-Lopez Analysis, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 225, 235-38 (1997) (discussing civil rights
statutes as a means of combating political corruption).
597. United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259 (1997).
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sors Abrams and Beale foresaw as an increasing use of the civil rights statutes
against "official corruption. '" They certainly may be called into play when
police departments act in an abusive manner that is aimed at minority groups,
although how much further the jurisdiction would extend is unclear. A limiting
factor is that the statute in Lanier recognizes harm to "a person" asserting
federal rights. 5' " This raises again the question of whether the right to good
government can be viewed as belonging to an individual or is of a more shared,
general nature.
In a sense, many of these arguments-the franchise, neutral administra-
tion, good government, and civil rights-are so closely associated that they can
be seen as merging. A good example is the Supreme Court's decision in
Katzenbach v. Morgan." In that decision, the majority justified its broad
interpretation of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment as not only enhancing
the voting opportunities of Puerto Rican citizens of New York, but "as a
measure to secure for [them] non-discriminatory treatment by government both
in the imposition of voting qualifications and the provision or administration
of governmental services, such as public schools, public housing, and law
enforcement. " "°s Katzenbach represents the protective role at both the judicial
and legislative levels. However, the decision has been qualified by new
federalism decisions on the Fourteenth Amendment such as City ofBoerne v.
Flores.' Thus, the tension between traditional protective views and the
jurisprudence of the new federalism is evident. Nonetheless, the notion of the
national government stepping in to protect those not receiving adequate protec-
tion at the lower levels is a long-standing and enduring theme of constitutional
and legislative decisions. Let us consider two justifications for this interven-
tion in the corruption context, one widely accepted and one generally rejected.
E. The Issue of State Inability to Act as a Justification
for a National Protective Role
A recurring theme in American constitutional discourse is whether state
inability to deal with a particular problem justifies federal intervention. This
inability is also relevant to the issue of federal power to deal with it. Article
I, Section 10 of the United States Constitution declares certain subjects
598. ABRAMS & BEALE, supra note 25, at 529.
599. 18 U.S.C. § 242 (2000).
600. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
601. Id. at 652.
602. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (concluding that the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 exceeded congressional authority under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment and that the Act contradicted vital principles that maintain the balance
between state and federal powers and that respect the separation of powers).
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off limits to the states, in part out of concern that state activity in, for example,
war-related matters, would produce piecemeal acts that could frustrate the
goals ofthe country as a whole. 3 Most of what Section 10 forbids to the states
is granted to the national government.6" In a similar vein, the post-Civil War
Amendments lay the foundation for a national role in protecting persons of
color that some states could not, or would not, protect. 5
The issue of state ability to act in particular areas played an important
role in twentieth century debates over the reach of the commerce and spending
powers.' A frequent argument was that the states' competitive position vis-
ti-vis each other created a serious collective action problem. One state might
hesitate to regulate a subject, or might regulate it leniently, out of fear that less
regulation, or no regulation, by a competitor would prove attractive to the
regulated entity. In theory, this could lead to actions, such as business reloca-
tions, detrimental to the first state. This view is reflected in the so-called
"race to the bottom" thesis.'
In debates over federal criminal law, the states' capacity to deal with a
problem does not stem from competition among states to attract criminal
activities. Nonetheless, it occupies a central role regarding questions of the
need for federal action.' Professor Rory K. Little's concept of "demon-
strated state failure" presents a particularly helpful contribution to this
603. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
604. For example, powers relating to war and foreign affairs arc specifically granted to the
national government. Also, some of the matters forbidden to the states in Section 10 are
permitted with the consent of Congress.
605. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII (outlawing slavery); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV §§ 1, 5
(securing due process and equal protection of the laws for all persons born or naturalized in the
United States and giving Congress the authority to enforce such provisions); U.S. CONST.
amend. XV (securing voting rights for citizens of all races and giving Congress the power to
enforce this provision).
606. See, e.g., Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548,588 (1937) (stating that, with
respect to the development of unemployment insurance schemes, "many [states] held back
through alarm lest, in laying such a toll upon their industries, they would place themselves in
a position of economic disadvantage as compared with neighbors or competitors").
607. See, e.g., GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTTIUTIONAL LAW 219-20 (4th ed. 2001)
(discussing the "race to the bottom" thesis in the context of states deciding whether or not to
adopt some kind of unemployment system).
608. See generally ABRAMS & BEALE, supra note 25, at 64-71 (outlining "the great debate"
over the desirability of a broad federal criminal law). Several participants in the debate cite the
need for federal involvement in an area in which "[t]he national government has a distinct
advantage as compared to state criminal justice systems in detecting, prosecuting, or punishing
a particular behavior." Id. at 67 (quoting Franklin E. Zimring & Gordon Hawkins, Toward a
Principled Basisfor Federal Criminal Legislation, 543 ANNALs AML ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sci.
15,23 (1996)).
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subject.' He begins with a "rebuttable presumption against federaliza-
tion. ' '610 He then posits a "principle [which] would endorse the federalization
of criminal conduct only when there is a demonstrated failure of state and
local authorities to deal with the targeted conduct. ' 611 Whether stated as a
matter of power or policy,6 2 the concept of state incapacity has become
widely accepted as a starting point for analysis.61 3 Trying to identify actions
a state might not take has led to the formulation of subject lists for federal
criminal action at varying levels of generality. Frequent examples include
"complex financial investigations,161 4 "activity calling for complicated surveil-
lance capability,1615 resources such as the witness protection program and
preventive detention, 616 a need for "federal resources,"
617 and inadequacy of
state criminal jurisdiction.618
Political corruption represents one area that is common to many lists.
619
Many agree that "in instances of state and local governmental corruption...
the criminal conduct at issue may place it beyond the effective reach (or
interest) of state authorities."62 One can view the patronage cases as variants
609. Rory K. Little, Myths and Principles of Federalization, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1029,
1077-1081 (1995) (outlining principle of demonstrated state failure), see also Geraldine Szott
Moohr, The Federal Interest in Criminal Law, 47 SYRACUsE L. REv. 1127, 1142-43 (1997)
(discussing state failure model). In a differnet context one might view the reapportionment
cases as an example of federal intervention when the relevant state organs are unable to act.
610. Little, supra note 609, at 1071.
611. Id. at 1078.
612. Professor Kurland states that "an unfortunate, and perhaps unnecessary, dichotomy
has developed between perceived federal interests and the federal authority for official corrup-
tion prosecutions of state and local officials." Kurland, supra note 34, at 376.
613. See, e.g.,TAsK FORCE ON TIE FEDERAIZATION OF CRRIINAL LAW, THE FEDERAUZA-
TnON OF CRzaNAL LAW, CRIMINAL JusTIcE SECTION, AM. BAR Ass'N 48 (1998) [hereinafter
ABA REPORT] (discussing potential benefits of federalization of criminal law).
614. Id.
615. Id.
616. See ABRAMS & BEALE, supra note 25, at 67 (citing Harry Litman & Mark D.
Greenberg, DualProsecutions: A Modelfor ConcurrentFederalJurisdiction, 543 ANNALSAM.
ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCL 72, 81-82 (1995)).
617. Id. at68.
618. Id. at67.
619. See ABA REPORT, supra note 613, at 48 (discussing appropriate state areas for federal
criminalization). One might argue that corruption is similar to competition because businesses
will welcome the opportunity to purchase favorable treatment. However, many businesses may
prefer to operate in a "clean" environment
620. Little, supra note 609, at 1079 (footnote omitted). Professor Little adds an important
qualification: "However, a demonstrated state failure should be required even in this context;
local prosecutors have not always been ineffective in addressing local government corruption,
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on the state default principle. To the extent that patronage has led to entrench-
ment and an uneven political process, state and local governments cannot
provide the necessary corrective.621 Just as with the forms of corruption
referred to in the criminal law debate, these cases necessitate federal interven-
tion, in this instance, through somewhat forced constitutional analysis. The
fact that the current Court, by a substantial majority, has reaffirmed and
extended the earlier patronage cases indicates that it sees a state default
problem in this area.
The Supreme Court has also accepted state inadequacy as a justification
for broad federal criminal statutes and as a rebuttal to federalism-based
arguments against these statutes. This analysis did not occur in a corruption
case, but the two statutes involved appear frequently in that context. Perrin
v. United States622 involved the definition of bribery under the Travel Act.6 3
The defendant invoked federalism in arguing for a narrow definition.624 The
Court's terse response identified "a clear and deliberate intent on the part of
Congress to alter the federal-state balance in order to reinforce state law
enforcement."621 The Court elaborated on the theme of state default in United
States v. Turkette,626 its first treatment of RICO.627 The defendant argued for
an interpretation of the statute's concept of "enterprise"'6 that would limit it
to "legitimate enterprises. "629 The Court again faced the contention that a
broad construction of a federal statute would upset the federal-state law
enforcement balance, and again the Court saw this as one of the goals of
and federal prosecution of local corruption for publicity purposes alone, without inquiry into
state failure, would not meet the federalization principle proposed here." Id. at 1079 n.242. I
am indebted to Professor Marci Hamilton for the alternative view that local prosecutors might
welcome federal intervention because it takes a difficult problem off their hands.
621. See, e.g., Rutan v. Republican Party of Il., 497 U.S. 62, 88-89 & n.4 (1980) (Stevens,
J., concurring) (stating that "[t]he 'massive Democratic patronage employment system' main-
tained a 'noncompetitive political system' in Cook County in the 1960s" (quoting Johnson,
supra note 473, at 481)); Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 369 (1976) (stating that "patronage
dismissals clearly.., retard [the political] process. Patronage can result in the entrenchment
of one or a few parties to the exclusion of others.").
622. Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37 (1979).
623. 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (2000).
624. Perrin, 444 U.S. at 49-50.
625. Id. at 50.
626. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981).
627. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (2000).
628. Id. § 1961(4).
629. Turke.te, 452 U.S. at 579-80.
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RICO: "The view was that existing law, state and federal, was not adequate
to address the problem, which was of national dimensions. ' '
The concept of demonstrated state failure looks like a well-accepted
justification for a national protective role in various contexts. Still, its consis-
tency with the new federalism as currently articulated should not be taken for
granted. As Professor Beale has noted, the existence of state "failure" is not
always clear.63 State inaction on a given matter may reflect a deliberate
policy. Failure is in the eye of the beholder. There are two, more fundamen-
tal reasons for hesitation. The new federalism's vision of states as sovereigns
presents the first problem. Sovereigns, like people, will make mistakes. They
may fail to act, act when they should not, or adopt policies that some will view
as "bad." The citizens of Providence, fur example, might accept Mayor
Cianci's conduct and place greater emphasis on his efforts to redevelop the
city. The states would hardly enjoy true sovereignty if they possessed it only
when the national government agreed with their policies. If taken as a general
principle of the allocation of constitutional authority, the state default ratio-
nale presents a second problem-it would equal a step toward a form of
variable national power to deal with any domestic problem that reaches
sufficiently serious proportions.63 Even if not an actual source of national
authority, the state default rationale would play a role in construing the federal
government's use of its powers much like the approach rejected by the feder-
alist Justices in Lopez and Morrison. It could constitute a form of logic
without a stopping point, which would inhibit, if not prevent, the delineation
"between what is truly national and what is truly local.1
633
F The Guarantee Clause: The Road Not Taken
Clearly, corruption prosecutions raise difficult federalism issues. If the
Constitution directly addressed the national government's power to supervise
the operations of state and local governments, these issues would go away.
In an important article, Professor Adam Kurland argued that the Guarantee
Clause does just that.634 Its text-'he United States shall guarantee to every
630. Id. at 586.
631. See Sara Sun Beale, Reporter's Draft for the Working Group on Principles to Use
When Considering the Federalization of Criminal Law, 46 HASTINoS L.J. 1277, 1297-98
(1995) (discussing role of federal government in criminal law).
632. Brown, supra note 596, at 241.
633. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567-68 (1995).
634. See Kurland, supra note 34, at 490 (stating that "Congress should directly address the
federal government's true constitutional role in the prosecution of state and local officials and
unambiguously base those prosecutions on the constitutional foundation where they be-
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State in this Union a Republican form of Government" 635-provides support.
Like the Fourteenth Amendment, the Guarantee Clause represents a specific
provision of the Constitution that addresses the federal-state balance, pushing
it in a nationalist direction. Under this approach, Congress could, for exam-
ple, pass a general anticorruption statute applicable to states and localities.636
However, the clause has not developed in this direction. As an initial
matter, one can read the text just as easily to cover only extreme situations,
such as installation of a monarchy, in which a state's governmental structure
or form has undergone fundamental change. For present purposes, more
significance may attach to the current Court's apparent view that the clause
preserves state independence.637 In New York v. United States, 68 Justice
O'Connor, in dictum, suggested that the Guarantee Clause did not cast doubt
on portions of the statute the Court had previously upheld because, under the
relevant provisions, "[t]he states thereby retain the ability to set their legisla-
tive agendas; state government officials remain accountable to the local
electorate. '639 She expressed concern over the possibility of "altering the form
or the method of functioning of New York's government, ' 0 but the risk came
from the federal government, and the protection would come from the Court.
More recently, in Printz v. United States," Justice Scalia listed the Guarantee
Clause among provisions that reflect the Constitution's commitment to state
sovereignty. 2 Moreover, the Court's federalistic reading of the clause has
academic support."u In sum, it is not available as a deus ex machina.
long-the Guarantee Clause").
635. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
636. See generally Kurland, supra note 34, at 415-70. It should be noted, however, that
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides specifically for federal enforcement. There
is no analogous language in the Guarantee Clause. For a generally favorable analysis of the
Kurland thesis, see John C. Coffee, Jr., Modern Mail Fraud: The Restoration of the Pub-
lic/Private Distinction, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 427,456-59 (1998).
637. These cases do not address the issue of congressional power. The modem political
question cases discuss the clause frequently. They do so in the context of attempted private
litigation under it. In this context, they have rendered the clause a "dead letter." STONE ET. AL.,
supra note 607, at 128.
638. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
639. Id. at 185.
640. Id. at 186.
641. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
642. Id. at919.
643. Professor Deborah Jones Merritt has compiled the most notable body of work,
including The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88
COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1988), which the Court cited in New York, 505 U.S. at 157, 185.
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VII. A Tentative Reconciliation and Some Possible Scenarios
A. A Tentative Reconciliation
The Guarantee Clause represents a nationalistic route not taken, but the
protective role of the federal government nonetheless has strong roots in the
legal system. The corruption prosecutions fit squarely within that tradition,
just as the new federalism represents, in part, a reaction against it. This
Article has analyzed the patronage cases at length because they offer strong
support for the protective role in general and, by inference, for the prosecu-
tions. The fact that these cases began at the same time as National League of
Cities and that the Court then reaffirmed and extended them one year after
Lopez suggests the possibility of a coexistence with the new federalism.
However, the Court's commitment to the new federalism will most likely
cause it to take a second look at the prosecutions, whatever it may have said
in other contexts. The prosecutions represent a problem it has thus far
skimmed over, but they go to the heart of the relationship between the national
government and the states. The defendants are not simply criminals who
happen to be public officials. Their "crimes" embody instances of bad gov-
emnment made criminal by federal legislation. The Court cannot ignore its
words regarding state sovereignty, accountability, autonomy, and related
concepts. If one really believes all this, federal intrusions that amount to
state-level ABSCAMS go far beyond anything the patronage cases might seem
to support. Yet, the federal role in prosecuting state and local corruption has
achieved a status somewhat analogous to the federal role in regulating the
national economy, albeit more recent. Just as a rollback of the New Deal
seems far-fetched, so does a broad-based ouster of the federal prosecutor from
the local scene and wholesale declarations of the invalidity of the relevant
federal statutes. Some continuation of the status quo, presents the sort of
resolution to be anticipated in a situation of strong, conflicting currents within
the legal system. Nonetheless, a significant tilt may develop in the direction
of the states and localities. That tilt will come, if it does, primarily through
statutory construction, with constitutional undertones, leaving basic constitu-
tional questions unresolved, while suggesting that Congress still has the last
word.
B. Possible Scenarios
1. Federal Criminal Law in General: Tightening Jurisdictional Elements
The general debate over federal criminal law could significantly affect
the questions about the criminal statutes used in the corruption prosecutions
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discussed here. This debate, ongoing and intense since the substantial growth
of that law in the post-war period, 4 has recently taken on potential constitu-
tional dimensions. 5 The interpretation of jurisdictional elements presents
one area in which a more stringent approach could affect corruption prosecu-
tions.' A jurisdictional element statute carves out of a larger class of activi-
ties, for example, all loansharking, a smaller class with a direct tie to a source
of federal power, for example, loansharking using the facilities of interstate
commerce. As Justice Breyer has noted, the availability of the jurisdictional
element technique lets Congress choose between dealing with a matter "in-
stance by instance" or "problem by problem.""7  The focus on cases with a
direct tie between the defendant's conduct and federal power may also reflect
congressional doubt as to its constitutional authority to deal with the problem
more broadly. In both Lopez and Morrison, the Court seemed to express a
receptive attitude toward statutes that contain jurisdictional elements.' 4
However, the Court has not adopted a per se rule regarding these types of
statutes. Whether a court's approach to jurisdictional elements is broad or
narrow can make a substantial difference in deciding whether the require-
ments of a particular statute have been met.
2. Mail (and Wire) Fraud: Revisiting Schmuck
The mail fraud statute presents a good example of the problem.649 It
authorizes prosecution of any person who, as part of various schemes, "for the
purpose of executing such scheme or artifice or attempting so to do, places in
any post office or authorized depository for mail matter, any matter or thing
whatever to be sent or delivered by the Postal Service.16s0 The courts have
developed the construction that the mailing need only be "incident to an
essential part of the scheme., 611 Several earlier cases, although inconsistent,
suggested that the mailing had to have a fairly close relation to the underlying
644. See, e.g., ABRAMS & BEALE, supra note 25, at 64-72 (discussing "the federal role in
enforcement against crime").
645. See generally George D. Brown, Constitutionalizing the Federal Criminal Law
Debate: Morrison, Jones, and the ABA, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 983.
646. See id. at 1013-1023 (discussing debate over jurisdictional elements).
647. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 630-31 (1995) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
648. See id. at 561 (noting absence ofjurisdictiona element).
649. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2000).
650. Id.
651. Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 711 (1989); Pereira v. United States, 347
U.S. 1, 8 (1954).
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scheme.652 However, in Schmuck v. United States,653 the Court took an ex-
tremely liberal approach." 4 - The defendant sold used cars to retail dealers,
after rolling back their odometers. 6" The dealers needed to submit a title
application form to the State Department of Transportation in order to sell the
cars to the ultimate purchaser.' 5 The Court upheld the finding of jurisdiction
on the ground that "[tihe mailing of the title-registration forms was an essen-
tial step in the successful passage of title to the retail purchasers. '657 Four
Justices joined in Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion.658 He relied primarily
on the earlier cases that cast doubt on the presence ofjunsdiction, contending
that "it is mail fraud, not mail and fraud, that incurs liability. 659 Although he
does not elaborate on the argument, a federalism note also occurs in Justice
Scalia's dissent: "The law does not establish a general federal remedy against
fraudulent conduct, with use of the mails as the jurisdictional hook, but
reaches only those limited instances in which the use of the mails is a part of
the execution of the fraud, leaving all other cases to be dealt with by appropri-
ate state law."
060
The broad construction criticized by Justice Scalia can, of course, play
a large role in the availability of the mail and wire fraud statutes for corrup-
tion prosecutions. In United States v. Woodward,"' the defendant challenged
federal jurisdiction in an honest services prosecution under the wire fraud
statute. 2 A Massachusetts lobbyist wined and dined a Boston-based state
legislator in Florida, thus presenting a possible honest services violation." 3
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit accepted the prosecution's
argument that the legislator knew the necessity of some form of interstate
communication for the lobbyist to make the reservations in Florida.
6 4
652. See, e.g., United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 399 (1974) (addressing question of
whether "these mailings were sufficiently closely related to respondent's scheme to bring his
conduct within the statute").
653. Schmuck, 489 U.S. at 705.
654. Id. at 707
655. Id.
656. Id.
657. Id. at 714.
658. Id. at 722 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
659. Id. at 723 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
660. See id. at 722-23 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Kann v. United States, 323 U.S. 88,
95 (1944)).
661. United States v. Woodward, 149 F.3d 46 (1 st Cir. 1998).
662. Id. at 51.
663. Id. at 51-54.
664. See id. at 63-65 (examining the sufficiency of evidence of intent in mail and wire
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For purposes of this Article, let us consider the scenario of a signifi-
cantly more narrow approach to jurisdictional elements than those accepted
in Schmuck and Woodward. The result would lead to a substantial decrease
in prosecutions under the relevant statutes, including those covering corrup-
tion. Given the importance of the mail and wire fraud statutes in this area, this
narrow approach would represent a significant development and a reduction
in federal authority. The jurisdictional attack is not the only serious possibil-
ity. Until now, the honest services doctrine has withstood vagueness chal-
lenges, but the issue has resurfaced.' 5
3. Tightening Jurisdictional Elements and the Special Problem
of the Hobbs Act
A more narrow approach to jurisdictional elements generally is a distinct
possibility. Most federal statutes with jurisdictional elements are based on the
commerce power. In the corruption area, the principal examples are the Hobbs
Act,66 the Travel Act,667 and RICO.668 In its recent decision in Jones v. United
States, 9 a unanimous Court reversed a conviction under an arson statute that
reads in part:
Whoever maliciously damages or destroys, or attempts to damage or
destroy, by means of fire or an explosive, any building, vehicle, or other
real or personal property used in interstate or foreign commerce or in an
activityaffecting interstate or foreign commerce shall be [punished] .... 670
Jones applied a narrow construction to the statute's application to the arson of
a residence. It is not the last word on construing jurisdictional elements,
however, because the statute uses the word "used."6"1 The Court suggested that
a different interpretation would have resulted if Congress utilized only the
broader term "affecting commerce."672 Nonetheless, Jones is a step towards a
narrow approach. From a doctrinal point of view, the opinion is particularly
important because of its invocation of Lopez as the source of constitutional
fraud conviction).
665. See United States v. Handakas, 286 F.3d 92, 96 (2d Cir. 2002) (reversing conviction
for "honest services" violation because of vagueness).
666. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2000).
667. Id. § 1952.
668. Id. § 1961.
669. Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848 (2000).
670. 18 U.S.C. § 844 (i) (2000); Jones, 529 U.S. at 850.
671. 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (2000).
672. See Jones, 529 U.S. at 853-57 (distinguishing between activities "on commerce" and
those activities substantially "affecting commerce").
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concerns about a broader construction.67 I have discussed above the potential
impact of a narrowing of jurisdictional element constructions on prosecutions
under the mail and wire fraud statutes. There, at least, the problem is relatively
straightforward: How close must the relation be between the defendants'
conduct and use of the mails or wire communication? Prosecutions under the
Hobbs Act may pose far more difficult problems.
The Hobbs Act plays such an important role in corruption prosecutions
that Professors Abrams and Beale were prompted to state that it "now appears
to be the statute of choice in prosecutions for bribery involving state and local
officials."674 Its jurisdictional element applies to "[w]hoever in any way or
degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the movement of any article
or commodity in commerce.""67 Let us assume initially that the trial court looks
only at the particular act or acts that are the basis of the prosecution. Would a
local building inspector's extortion of a payment in return for a building permit
have an effect on interstate commerce? Would the effect have to be substan-
tial, or would de minimis suffice? '676 Would the court look only at the payment,
or would it factor in the effect of the building? Note that most of the problems
arise under the "affects" language, as opposed to the "obstructs" or "delays"
language 7  The possibility exists for a narrowing of the jurisdiction of the
Hobbs Act, with serious implications for corruption prosecutions.
One way the prosecution could evade the question of the effect of a single
payment would be to consider how all similar payments taken in the aggregate
affect interstate commerce. The possibility of aggregation under the Hobbs
Act is a hotly debated topic.67 A prior question is whether aggregation is even
permitted under jurisdictional element statutes. The analysis here proceeds on
the assumption that it is, although that is by no means clear.679 After all, the
whole point of a jurisdictional element is that Congress is not regulating a class
of activities. One question is whether the defendants' activity must be viewed
as economic before one adds it to similar activities. Lopez and Morrison
673. Id. at 858; see Brown, supra note 645, at 1010-11 (stating that "one must note the
presence and effect of key Lopez themes in Jones").
674. ABRAMS & BEALE, supra note 25, at 195.
675. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (2000).
676. E.g., United States v. Pascucci, 943 F.2d 1032, 1035 (9th Cir. 1991).
677. See Brown, supra note 645, at 1017-18 (discussing application of obstruct or delay
component of statute as application of "protective principle" advocated by Professors Nelson
and Pushaw).
678. See, e.g., ABRAMS & BEALE, supra note 25, at 229-232 (discussing cases considering
proper breadth of Hobbs Act).
679. See Brown, supra note 645, at 1020 (noting the appeal of aggregation but explaining
its problems).
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suggest a requirement of economic activity when aggregation is in question.6"°
In the corruption context, an extorted payment might be viewed as an exchange
for governmental services. Political extortion ("under color of official
right")6" is different from robbery; it is closer to the "extortionate credit
transaction" in Perez v. United States.6 2 Recently, a group of judges on the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit have engaged in a sophisticated
analysis of jurisdiction over robbery under the Hobbs Act.6 3 They contend
that aggregation requires a form of interconnected activity, usually
economic,6' 4 and that robbery is not economic and, thus, cannot be aggre-
gated.6 ' The issue remains sharply debated in the Fifth Circuit.6 '6 Although
extortion defendants have raised similar arguments, the same court has dealt
with them in relatively summary fashion. ' There are conceptually interesting
issues that seem to remain unaddressed: Is there a national market in illegal
government services, whose regulation is at issue? Does one look beyond the
particular illegal service and aggregate it?' These questions do not seem to
play a restraining role in Hobbs Act extortion cases. If the scenario plays out
along these lines, the new federalism would not affect corruption prosecutions
under the Act unless the Court were to develop a special set of rules to limit
jurisdiction in such cases. This is possible, but the Court would have to be
mindful of the importance ofjurisdictional element analysis in all applications
of the statute.
4. The Substance of the Hobbs Act and Mall Fraud Violations
in the Corruption Context
An alternative way to give teeth to the new federalism in the context of
corruption is to focus on those portions of two key statutes that are interpreted
to cnminalize it. For the Hobbs Act, the key concept is extortion "under color
680. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598,610-12 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549,559-60 (1995).
681. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(bX2) (2000).
682. Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
683. United States v. McFarland, 311 F.3d 376, 377 (5th Cir. 2002) (Garwood, J.,
dissenting); id. at 410 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting); United States v. Hickman, 179 F.3d 230,
231-43 (5th Cir. 1999) (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
684. Hickanan, 179 F.3d at 233-36 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
685. Id. at 237 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
686. See McFarland, 311 F.3d at 416 (Jones, J., dissenting) (criticizing colleagues who did
not explain their views).
687. See, e.g., United States v. Villafranca, 260 F.3d 374, 377-78 (5th Cir. 2001) (reject-
ing Commerce Clause attack on jurisdiction in Hobbs Act extortion case).
688. See id. (relying on interstate market in drugs in extortion prosecution for fixing drug
cases).
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of official right. ' 9 Here, a possible scenario is limiting the language to the
conduct described by Justice Thomas inhis dissent inEvans v. United States.690
He argued that the Court had taken the language much too far by only requiring
'that a public official has obtained a payment to which he was not entitled,
knowing that the payment was made in return for official acts."'691 Justice
Thomas, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, argued that the
statute utilized the well-established common-law requirement 'that the money
or property be obtained under color of office, that is, under the pretense that
the officer was entitled thereto by virtue of his office."'  This construction
would, as a matter of substantive coverage, severely reduce the availability of
the Hobbs Act for most of the corruption cases in which prosecutors now use
it. The federal prosecutors' problem would be that it is currently their principal
vehicle for combating bribery given the somewhat restrictive requirements of
the Travel Act. The federal program bribery statute is an alternative, but is the
subject of some uncertainty.693 However, Evans itself stands as a serious
obstacle to any such limitation. Even though Justice O'Connor did not reach
the question in her concurrence,69 4 five Justices rejected Justice Thomas's
narrow construction. He made the federalist arguments, but they did not
prevail. Indeed, the majority ignored them. 69 The result in Evans, plus the
force of stare decisis, makes this substantive reduction in the scope of the
Hobbs Act unlikely.
The status of the honest services doctrine in mail and wire fraud prosecu-
tions is somewhat more uncertain. The Supreme Court has never addressed its
content. Courts of appeals constantly grapple with such questions as the
relationship between the federal honest services doctrine and state law,6' the
689. 18U.S.c. § 1951(bX2)(2000).
690. Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255,278 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
691. Id. at 285-86.
692. Id. at 279 (quoting 3 RONALD A. ANDERSON, WHARTON'S CRIMaNAL LAW AND
PROCEDURE § 1393 (1957)).
693. See infra section VII.B.5 (discussing federal program bribery statute).
694. Justice O'Connor contended that the proper interpretation of "under color of official
right" was not before the Court and had not been briefed or argued by either party. Therefore
she expressed no view as to the correct position. Evans, 504 U.S. at 272 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
695. In ignoring the arguments, the majority acted consistently with other corruption cases
in the Supreme Court in which federalism objections have not been deemed worthy of rebuttal.
However, the Evans plurality did discuss and rebut Justice Thomas's statutory construction
argument. The issue may not be dead. See Scheidler v. National Org. of Women, Inc., 123
S.Ct. 1057, 1064 (2003) ("At common law, extortion was a property offense committed by a
public official who took 'any money or thing of value' that was not due to him on the pretense
that he was entitled to such property by virtue of his office.").
696. United States v. Brumley, 116 F.3d 728, 731-34 (5th Cir. 1997) (requiring state law
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extent to which a violation of that doctrine must resemble bribery as opposed
to more general ethical violations,6" and whether a scheme to defraud the
public of an official's honest services can extend to efforts by that official to
secure votes of colleagues.6' In this general context, the Court might possibly
take an honest services case and render a distinctly narrow construction of the
doctrine. The new federalism certainly points in this direction, but the last time
the Court attempted to rein in the law by abolishing the doctrine, Congress
restored it almost immediately. Thus far, the scenarios developed in this
section point towards the status quo, with perhaps the strongest possibility for
a federalistic tilt in the area of jurisdictional elements, particularly those for
mail and wire fraud. The next section examines a relatively new area on which
the Court has spoken, but perhaps not so definitively as to rule out a new
federalism decision that sharply curtails corruption prosecutions of state and
local officials.
5. The Federal Program Bribery Provision: Has the Court Foreclosed
a Limitation of Its Use?
A statute which has caused considerable differences of opinion within
the lower courts 6"-many of them based on new federalism consider-
ations-and which is likely to be before the Supreme Court once again is the
federal program bribery statute." This surprisingly little-known statute is on
the way to becoming a favorite tool of federal prosecutors dealing with state
and local corruption. It applies to governmental and other entities that receive
regulation). Professor Coffee has criticized Brumley: "The acceptance of Brumley by other
circuits would significantly cut back the ability of the federal government to reach state and
local corruption." Coffee, supra note 636, at 453-54. But see United States v. Murphy, 323
F. 3d 102, 116 (3d Cir. 2003) (endorsing "the decisions of other Courts of Appeals that have
interpreted § 1346 more stringently and required a state law limiting principle for honest
services fraud"). See generally Brown, supra note 596 (discussing issue of federal enforcement
in general and advocating use of state law standards in mail fraud honest services cases). It
should be noted that Professor Coffee advocates a broad construction of the statute in cases
involving public fiduciaries. Coffee, supra note 636, at 459-63.
697. United States v. Sawyer, 239 F.3d 31,36-42 (lst Cir. 2001).
698. United States v. Lopez-Lukis, 102 F.3d 1164, 1168-70 (1 th Cir. 1997).
699. Compare United States v. Suarez, 263 F.3d 468, 484-85 (6th Cir. 2001) (requiring
no nexus between receipt of federal funds and bribe) with United States v. Zwick, 199 F.3d 672,
687 (3d Cir. 1999) (requiring nexus). See generally United States v. Sabri, 183 F. Supp. 2d
1145, 1149-54 (D. Minn. 2002) (discussing disagreements over construction of the statute
within the lower federal courts).
700. 18 U.S.C. § 666 (2000). The statute first came before the Supreme Court in Salinas
v. United States, 522 U.S. 52 (1997). See infra notes 714-18 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing Salinas); see also United States v. Fischer, 529 U.S. 667, 669 (2000) (applying § 666 to
payments to Medicare providers).
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"in any one year period, benefits in excess of $10,000 under a Federal pro-
grain involving a grant, contract, subsidy, loan, guarantee, insurance, or other
form of Federal assistance." '' Once an entity is covered, the statute delin-
eates two separate types of crimes for which "agents" of the entity can be
prosecuted. The first encompasses embezzlement, theft, obtaining by fraud,
conversion, or intentional misapplication, property of the covered entity worth
more than $5,000."° The second type of crime is a form of bribery. It is
defined as corruptly soliciting, accepting, offering, or giving "anything of
value [from or] to any person... in connection with any business, transaction,
or series of transactions of [the covered entity] involving anything of value of
$5,000 or more."7 3 None of the specified crimes contain any reference to
federal funds or programs.
The serious federalism problem that § 666 poses is the possibility of
prosecutions under it that seem totally unrelated to receipt of federal funds.
I will use the following hypothetical to illustrate the problem: 04 A large
county receives a federal coastal planning grant for its seacoast region. In the
interior section of the county, an agricultural inspector receives a bribe
concerning a transaction worth $5,000. There is no connection between the
coastal funding and the inspector's job or the matter in question. Could the
federal government prosecute the inspector and the giver of the bribe under
§ 666?
Under the broad language of the statute, the answer is yes, assuming the
coastal grant is for more than $10,000. The entity is covered, and the crime
is covered. There are certainly arguments as to why such a prosecution is
constitutional. One might begin by noting that Congress intentionally used
broad language in order to deal with an area in which it possesses special
expertise: the disbursement and protection of funds expended from the
national treasury. 5 Congress specifically chose language of this breadth
because it was convinced that some cases were falling through the cracks of
the earlier statutory scheme.706 On a more general level, since the 1930s the
Court has shown great deference to Congress's exercises of the spending
power. 7 Section 666 would seem to be clearly based on this power. In
701. 18 U.S.C. § 666(b) (2000).
702. Id. § 666(cX1XA).
703. Id. § 666(aX1)(B); Id. § 666(aX2).
704. See Brown, supra note 45, at 289-90 (setting out similar hypothetical and referring
to the hypothetical as presenting "the § 666 constitutional problem").
705. See id. at 277 (discussing concern of Congress to ensure protection of federal funds
because of possible gaps in existing statutory coverage).
706. Id.
707. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206-08 (1987) (noting breadth of Con-
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reviewing prosecutions under the statute, courts have accepted the argument
that Congress's interest goes far beyond the particular funds to concern with
the fiscal integrity of the recipient.7°0 The statute thus can be seen as reflect-
ing a policy of deterring fiscal-related crimes in recipient entities. In this
respect, it is like a "cross-cutting" condition in a standard grant program.
Typical examples are those requiring that recipients of federal funds refrain
from specified civil rights violations.!"
Nonetheless, there are serious constitutional questions about the broad
reading, especially given the new federalism's emphasis on the somewhat
autonomous status of states. Section 666 is not a grant statute. Thus, it may
present sui generis problems rather than benefitting from the lenient approach
that the Court has shown in analyzing grant conditions. If the bribery provi-
sion is analogized to a grant condition, however, one might apply the four-part
test articulated in South Dakota v. Dole.710 There certainly would be a related-
ness problem, triggering the third Dole element.7 ' The crime with no con-
ceivable effects on federal funds does not appear to have any conceivable
relation to their receipt. In the county hypothetical, would the United States
have any basis for terminating the coastal grant because of the agricultural
bribe? As for the cross-cutting conditions, such as civil rights provisions, they
deal with areas in which the federal government has a long-standing concern,
often with constitutional bases.712 That, of course, is the whole issue under
consideration in evaluating a broad use of § 666. Is there any parallel national
interest in good government or entities that happen to receive federal funds for
some of their operations? One might view this particular draftsmanship as
another example of a jurisdictional element. However, it differs from the
classic jurisdictional element which links the defendant's conduct directly to
the subject over which Congress has power.1 3 Indeed, the question is whether
§ 666 contains any such link.
gress's power and citing cases).
708. See United States v. Westmoreland, 841 F.2d 572, 578 (5th Cir. 1988) (stating that
Congress sought "to preserve the integrity of federal funds by assuring the integrity of the
organizations or agencies that receive them").
709. E.g., Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000)).
710. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
711. See id. at 207-08 (listing four restrictions on spending power).
712. The Court in Dole suggested that Congress can use grant conditions "to further broad
policy objectives." Id. at 206 (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 474 (1980)). See
generally Brown, supra note 45, at 297 (discussing relationship between cross-cutting condi-
tions and the presence of a separate federal regulatory power).
713. See United States v. Sabri, 182 F. Supp. 2d 1145, 1155 (D. Minn. 2002) (rejecting
government's argument that "666(b) is an 'express jurisdictional element' that limits the
statute's reach and constitutes a proper conferral of federal jurisdiction").
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The Supreme Court may have resolved all of these issues in Salinas v.
United States. 714 Salinas dealt with a prosecution of a county deputy sheriff
under § 666.7' s The county had received federal funds to assist in moderniz-
ing its jail and also housed federal prisoners for which it was paid on a regular
basis. 6 One prisoner gave bribes to key personnel in order to enjoy "contact
visits" with his wife or girlfriend. . The federal interest in the integrity of its
funding is clear-the national government would, presumably, not want
prisoners for whose housing it paid to enjoy such visits. Moreover, the
conduct fits easily within the broad statutory language. A unanimous Court,
in an opinion by Justice Kennedy, emphasized that language in affirming the
conviction. Justice Kennedy stressed the use of the word "any" as undercut-
ing attempts to impose a "narrowing construction" and precluding a view of
the statute as ambiguous.1 Professor Coffee reads the case for all it is worth.
In the course of contending that the current Court has been reluctant to apply
a new federalist critique to the corruption prosecutions under discussion here,
he states that
[p]erhaps the clearest indication of this judicial hesitation at fully adopt-
ing the dual sovereignties position is exhibited in the Court's recent
decision in Salinas v. United States, in which the Court held that a prose-
cution of a state official for bribery under [§ 666] does not require the
prosecution to prove any effect upon federal funds, even though the
statute's reach was dependent upon the state agency's receipt of a requi-
site level of federal funds.719
Professor Coffee also notes that "the case declined to construe narrowly a
federal statute that seemed on its face intended only to protect the use of
federal funds" and that a unanimous Court "expressly disdained the opportu-
nity to apply either Gregory v. Ashcroft's clear statement requirement or the
principles of McNally to this context."720 Some federal courts have agreed
with this interpretation of Salinas: it validates a broad reading of the statute,
and establishes that it is constitutional. 21
714. Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52 (1997).
715. Id. at 54.
716. Id.
717. Id. at 55.
718. Id. at57.
719. Coffee, supra note 636, at 459 (citation omitted).
720. Id.
721. See United States v. Suarez, 263 F.3d 468,484 (6th Cir. 2001) (noting Court's broad
view of statute); Unites States v. Grossi, 143 F.3d 348, 350 (7th Cir. 1998) (declaring that court
will not "trim § 666 by giving its text a crabbed reading" and citing Salinas).
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However, the Kennedy opinion contains ambiguities which suggest that
the constitutional problems posed by § 666 have not been laid to rest. Some
courts have read the statute to require a connection between the crime and the
federal funds,722 some have found the statute unconstitutional,7 and an excel-
lent commentary, while advocating a broad reading, admits that the Salinas
opinion "specifically left open" the issue of coverage."2 On the surface,
Justice Kennedy did encourage the broadest possible reading. One has to look
a bit to discover the possible limitations. The first is that the defendants were
arguing that the prosecution had to "prove the bribe in some way affected
federal funds, for instance by diverting or misappropriating them."725 This is
an apparent reference to a reading that would limit the statute to actual effects
on the funds, such as a bribe to put the giver in the position to participate in a
federal grant. It may well be with reference to this narrow sense of affecting
the actual monies, the receipt of which triggers the statute in the first place, that
the opinion states that the broad language "does not support the interpretation
that federal funds must be affected to violate section 666(a)(1)(B)."726 Justice
Kennedy emphasized the fact that the statutory language reaches the case
before the Court-one in which the federal interest in the use of the funds was
obvious-and rejected the specific contention made by the defendants." 2
Their conduct may not have affected the funds, but it certainly affected the
program. The following quote from the opinion is representative: "mhe text
[of § 666] is unambiguous on the point under consideration here, and it does
not require the Government to prove federal funds were involved in the bribery
transaction." 28 What about less direct relationships, or none at all, in cases in
which defendants do not argue for a specific effect, but rather that the statute
requires some form of connection between their conduct and the funds? Justice
Kennedy apparently left open the question whether the statute requires some
form of "connection. '" His statement of the holding is that it "does not
require the Government to prove the bribe in question had any particular
722. E.g., United States v. Zwick, 199 F.3d 672, 687 (3d Cir. 1999); United States v.
Santopietro, 166 F.3d 88,93 (2d Cir. 1999).
723. See United States v. Sabri, 183 F. Supp. 2d 1145,1158 (D. Minn. 2002) (finding that
§ 666 "does not contain a proper conferral of federal jurisdiction"); United States v.
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influence on federal funds and that under this construction the statute is consti-
tutional as applied in this case.""° As one commentator notes, the opinion
manages to imply a literal reading of unambiguous language while leaving
open the possibility of qualifying it."1 In other words, while stating that the
statute is both unambiguous and constitutional, Justice Kennedy succeeded in
authoring an opinion that is a masterpiece in creating doubt on both points.
If the matter does come before the Supreme Court again, as seems likely,
the Court will have to face the important question of how to integrate its
approach to the spending power with the new federalism. " 2 (All analysts agree
that § 666 represents an exercise of the spending power. At the beginning the
funds are the property of the United States, and might be protected on this
ground, but at some point, they cease to be federal property. Still the govern-
ment's spending power justifies a continued interest in them.) In an influential
article, Professor Baker argued that the Court should apply Lopez-like re-
straints to exercises of the spending power to ensure consistency in attaining
its goals. 33 Professor Massey has suggested that the Court's doctrines are
simply inconsistent; it is possible that they will remain so. Others suggest, or
at least hope, that the Court will continue to give a broad reading to the spend-
ing power in order to preserve a strong national role in areas that restrictive
new federalism decisions threaten.734 Why the Court would leave Congress
with this particular trump card if it is serious about rethinking federal-state
relations across the board is unclear. The spending power permits the federal
government, in effect, to regulate in areas in which it otherwise would be
unable to do so. Moreover, issues of accountability and autonomy are substan-
tially complicated by use of the grant device. Funds come from the federal
government, sometimes matched, often with detailed guidelines concerning
their use. Administrative responsibilities are shared between the two levels.
Ironically, Justice O'Connor's opinion in New Yorktakes a receptive approach
to use of the spending power when grants create the very accountability prob-
lems that the opinion otherwise decries. 35
730. Id. at 61.
731. Salvatoriello, supra note 32, at 2404.
732. See Lynn Baker, Conditional Federal Spending After Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. REV.
1911, 1916 (1995) (proposing that the Court presume invalid "offers of federal funds to the
states which, if accepted, would regulate the states in ways that Congress could not directly
mandate under its other Article I powers"); Massey, supra note 146, at 436 (labeling as
"curious" the lack of doctrinal innovations regarding the spending power during the develop-
ment of the new federalism).
733. Baker, supra note 732, at 1962-63.
734. E.g., Zietlow, supra note 151, at 192-93.
735. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166-69 (1992) (noting Congress's
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The issue will not go away. Attention may be shifting to the Necessary
and Proper Clause as justification for a broad reading.736 Taken to its limits,
the combination of the spending power with the Necessary and Proper Clause
could exceed the scope of the Guarantee Clause discussed earlier. Congress
could be viewed as having an interest in all facets of recipient governments in
order to ensure that federal funds are being spent in accord with a wide range
of perceived values, not limited to integrity. Several scenarios might play out
if a case like the county hypothetical--criminal conduct in a recipient jurisdic-
tion that is totally unrelated to federal funds-reaches the Court. One result
could be that the statute is constitutional in all applications. A second possibil-
ity is that it is unconstitutional as applied, given the absence of any "connec-
tion." A third possibility is that the Court would change direction completely
and hold that the large number of unconstitutional applications render the
statute invalid as a general matter. A fourth possibility is a limiting construc-
tion that would prevent application to the hypothetical as an example of the
sorts of cases Justice Kennedy seemed to have in mind. The first scenario
seems too much at variance with basic principles of the new federalism. The
second-unconstitutional as applied-might seem to introduce the unwieldy
concept of "as applied" into an area where it would produce undesirable
complexity. The scenario of outright unconstitutionality seems impossible
after the unanimous decision in Salinas. Salinas also stands in the way of the
limiting construction approach, but one can focus on language in the opinion
suggesting that the statute was unambiguous on the facts presented while
seeming to leave open different results in different cases. If the Court went
down this route, it might develop some form of nexus test such as requiring the
prosecution in a § 666 case to show that the defendant's conduct affected
federal funds directly, indirectly, or potentially."7 This approach would save
the statute, respect the new federalism, and seems consistent with an overall
status quo approach.
6. Executive Action
Up to this point, this Article has focused on the interaction between
Congress and the Supreme Court, assuming that the Executive Branch will
continue to bring prosecutions as it consistently has. However, the possibility
always exists that the Executive Branch might change its mind, perhaps
736. See United States v. Lipscomb, 299 F.3d 303, 323-37 (5th Cir. 2002) (discussing
Necessary and Proper Clause analysis). In a forthcoming article, Professor Richard Oarnett
surveys the caselaw, and relevant arguments, including the Necessary and Proper Clause, and
concludes that § 666 is unconstitutional. Richard W. Garnett, Unfinished Business, Conditional
Spending, Criminal Law, and the New Federalism, CORNFLL L. RE V. (forthcoming).
737. See Brown, supra note 45, at 304-05 (advocating a form of the nexus test).
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through Department of Justice action738 or through a generalized Executive
Order on federalism.739 The executive action approach is frequently recom-
mended and may exist to some extent already. Nonetheless, I do not propose
to explore it here. Administrations come and go, as do changes in policy.
There is also the possibility that whatever Washington says, individual United
States Attorneys will find a way around it. Thus, the ultimate decision on
where to go with the corruption prosecutions remains with the Court. I think
this is where it ought to be, as long as we operate under the assumption that the
new federalism is broad in scope and rests on serious constitutional underpin-
nings.
VIII Conclusion
Mayor Cianci was convicted, but the issues raised by his prosecution
remain. A serious tension exists between the Supreme Court's desire to elevate
state and local governments to sovereign status and the federal government's
continued practice of prosecuting their officials for corruption. So far the
Court has not addressed, much less resolved, this tension. When it does, my
expectation is that the prosecutions will not be eliminated, but they will be
reduced, perhaps substantially. In particular, a serious re-examination of the
jurisdictional dimensions of the Hobbs Act, mail fraud, and § 666 could
produce a sea change in the allocation of prosecutorial responsibilities. Stat-
utes that currently play a major role may be considerably narrowed, leading to
far fewer federal prosecutions. The result will not only be a federal system in
which decisionmaking and policy formulation at the local level have real
meaning and visibility for citizens of states and localities; they will also control
the selection and conduct of their officials through the franchise and whatever
local means are available for disciplining corrupt conduct. The national
protective role will not be completely eliminated, however. Perhaps we will
see a modern variant of Madison's vision as set forth in The Federalist No. 51:
"A double security arises to the rights of the people. The different govern-
ments will control each other, at the same time that each will be controlled by
itself."' The national government will still be able to step in, but on a consid-
erably more limited basis, to restore the democratic functioning of institutions
that have temporarily lost this capability. This result is not a clean victory for
either side. Rather, it is a typically American compromise-an effort to
achieve the best of both worlds. In a sense, it mirrors the federal system itself.
738. See ABRAMS & BEALE, supra note 25, at 103-23 (discussing prosecutorial discretion).
739. See Bush Administration Delaying Issuance of Controversial Federalism Executive
Order, 70 U.S.L.W. 2267, 2267 (Nov. 6, 2001) (noting possibility of such an order to ensure
federal agencies do not preempt state laws).
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